In July, the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia signed a nuclear cooperation agreement, known as a 123 agreement, to help establish a civilian nuclear energy program. Now, Congress has a 90-day window to review the deal before it goes into effect. Congress should take action and oppose this dangerous deal.
While this agreement focuses on nuclear energy, rather than nuclear weapons, it lowers the standard of U.S nuclear nonproliferation agreements. FCNL is generally supportive of measures to strengthen cooperation between countries, but the current deal forgoes important guardrails. The agreement increases the risk that Saudi Arabia will eventually develop a nuclear weapon, further destabilizing an already enflamed region and undermining critical efforts to revitalize global nuclear arms control.
Why FCNL opposes this agreement
The problems with this agreement stem from the “dual-use” of nuclear technology, or the ability to divert nuclear materials used initially for peaceful purposes towards building nuclear weapons. The enrichment of uranium for nuclear reactor fuel is the same process necessary to build nuclear weapons, the difference comes from the level of enrichment. This means, without clear safeguards, uranium enrichment for peaceful use can be later used for weapons level enrichment. This condition is especially concerning given that, according to U.S intelligence, Saudi Arabia has not ruled out the possibility of developing nuclear weapons.
Without clear safeguards, uranium enrichment for peaceful use can be later used for weapons level enrichment.
Saudi Arabia could work to relieve this anxiety, by allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to implement the Additional Protocol, a key mechanism to verify the peaceful use of nuclear materials and facilities. However, the deal proposes substituting a bilateral safeguards agreement for the Additional Protocol. This substitution would limit traditional international scrutiny and reduce the number of facilities that are subject to inspection.
Other U.S. 123 agreements require non-nuclear states to forgo pursuing enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, since the spread of enrichment technology as a serious proliferation threat. A good example is the U.S. agreement with the United Arab Emirates in 2009. The U.S.-Saudi deal does not meet this standard and increases the risk of technology transfer, by developing enrichment facilities in foreign countries, with an unspecified “black box” approach to prevent Saudi Arabia from directly accessing the technology.
It is also worth comparing this proposed deal with the Iran nuclear deal. The Iran deal, which was abandoned in 2018, limited enrichment to 3.67% for 15 years. The proposed Saudi deal allows enrichment up to 5% but with the potential to increase up to 20%, after the completion of a two-year study. Allowing enrichment up to 20% gets Saudi Arabia much closer to weapons grade level enrichment compared to previous U.S nonproliferation agreements.
More than anything, the U.S.-Saudi deal sets a dangerous precedent for future agreements, as other countries might try to negotiate similarly lax deals, threatening further proliferation.
Returning to the world we seek
FCNL believes that “in order for arms control to succeed, it is imperative to stem the proliferation of weapons-usable nuclear material.” This agreement directly violates that directive. Fears of a new nuclear state emerging led to the unauthorized war in Iran, and now this agreement, without the appropriate international guardrails, risks another country getting closer to a nuclear weapon.
Supporting other countries in their development of clean energy is a noble goal, but doing so cannot come at the expense of strict standards intended to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation. Congress must act and block this deal to prevent proliferation risks, while catalyzing needed diplomacy to halt an emerging, new nuclear arms race.
