The U.S. must adopt a policy which withdraws the military but doesn’t abandon Afghans. As of October 7th, the U.S. has been in Afghanistan for exactly ten years, a decade fraught with endless issues and ill-conceived policies.
Since President Obama took over the helm in 2009, the number of foreign troops has more than tripled. As a result, security conditions have worsened, the mood of Afghans over all has soured, regional stability has been compromised significantly and Afghanistan is governed, at best, by a fragilely functioning non-representative oligarchy.
Security remains a grave concern to many Afghans. Recent attacks on the U.S. embassy compound and the assassination of Berhanuddin Rabbani, head of the presidentially appointed High Peace Council, underscore the decline in security. On my recent trip to Afghanistan, countless people talked about the steady decline in security since 2004, most notably in the last two years. The policy prescribed by the U.S. military for the last several years, even before the Obama administration, has not delivered the political settlement or solution—a political solution even generals acknowledge is the only solution for the conflict.
Why?
The Pentagon led U.S. policy has been fixated on security and “beating” the Taliban to the negotiating table. Under this guise, the military recommended—and President Obama implemented—polices of targeted assassination, drone strikes on suspected (not convicted) militants and the expansion of the “kill and capture” program in Afghanistan. Not only have these policy created a growing insurgency (lower case “t” Taliban, if you will, each fighting for different reasons), they’ve also destabilized the region—most notably the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan. The policy of beating up the T/(t)aliban has increasingly pushed the conflict over the Afghan-Pakistani boarder and consistently made a comprehensive regional settlement less attainable.
There are layers of complexity here. Pakistan is not an honest broker in this situation; but from there perspective, what incentive—absent a political settlement with India—do they have to play fair? Pakistan, like Iran, India, China and many others will never forego their own interests, whether perceived or legitimate, in order to pursue U.S. interests. It’s no secret that Pakistan and India are playing out a proxy war in Afghanistan with the complicity and in some cases assistance of the U.S. Peace in Afghanistan may never come unless these regional issues are addressed.
Regional issues also complicate the national issues ones. For example, the creation of an Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) which, at an annual cost of $6-8 billion dollars for the foreseeable future, Afghans cannot sustain to guard against unwarranted regional influence is not a solution to the security dilemma. The annual revenue of the Afghan government is on the order of $1.5 billion dollars, whereas the annual salaries and benefits of the ANSF is around $6 billion. Unless the U.S. is willing to indefinitely fund the ANSF at a minimum of $8 billion dollars a year—several billion more than all the aid paid to the highest U.S. recipient, Israel—there will be a lot of U.S. trained and armed Afghan soldiers without paychecks in the coming years, which will inevitably add to Afghan and regional violence as a power vacuum is filled.
The U.S. fixation on “security” and the military side has not only failed to deliver a comprehensive political settlement, but has also left many gaps in other areas—such as governance. The Afghan government has not yet developed the capacity needed to govern the country in the absence of the U.S. presence. Why? The effect of ten years of parallel structures created by international actors has usurped power and responsibility from the Afghan government. Unless operational capacity and capability is developed outside of Kabul, it is hard to envision a government which can adequately govern Afghanistan in 2014.
To be sure, the Afghan government isn’t without issues of legitimacy and corruption. However, with only two years and some change until the U.S. will transition full security to the Afghan government, according to the President, it’s too late to just start all over. It would be foolish for the U.S. or others in the international community to try. The Afghan government is imperfect, yes. But so is ours.
The silver lining in this may be that, according to the Afghan Constitution which says the President can only serve two five year terms, President Karzai cannot run for another term in office. He has said he will not try to change the constitution to stay. If this is correct, it would mean that in 2014, Afghans will decide what their next government looks like. The best role of U.S. and other international actors, here, is to vigorously work for free, fair and inclusive elections in a way consistent with Afghan culture and society, and then step back to let them happen. In the end, it will be for Afghans to decide.
Ten years later, that is at the heart of this all. The U.S. and other international actors cannot import foreign solutions for what, in the end, are Afghan problems with only Afghan solutions. The military strategy of the last decade, and particularly the last two years, has made Afghanistan less safe and the region less stable. The U.S. military should be withdrawn, but the U.S. should not abandon Afghans. There is room for a non-military partnership, even if it is just the U.S. creating a space for Afghans to solve problems and then stepping back. There is a need for a responsible withdrawal that recognizes an obligation to support Afghan processes going forward.
It is time to end this war.
