



**A NECESSARY GOOD:  
U.S. LEADERSHIP  
ON PREVENTING  
MASS ATROCITIES**

**FINAL REPORT OF THE  
EXPERTS COMMITTEE ON  
PREVENTING MASS VIOLENCE**



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# **A NECESSARY GOOD: U.S. LEADERSHIP ON PREVENTING MASS ATROCITIES**

## **FINAL REPORT OF THE EXPERTS COMMITTEE ON PREVENTING MASS VIOLENCE**

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*November 2016*



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# WHY THIS REPORT

## LETTER ON BEHALF OF THE CONVENING BODY

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Two generations—that is how much time it takes for countries to restore the rule of law after extreme violence such as civil war, mass atrocities or genocide, according to the World Bank.

In the spring of 2016, the Prevention and Protection Working Group (PPWG), which is coordinated by the Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL) Education Fund, convened the Experts Committee on Preventing Mass Violence to ensure that our next president has a detailed and compelling roadmap to make the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy.

This effort comes at a critical time. The outbreak of violent conflict around the world has resulted in the highest number of displaced people in human history. The dire humanitarian consequences and the broader security challenges stemming from recent global violence are unprecedented.

Over the past decade, there has been an emerging bipartisan consensus that preventing atrocities should be “a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States,” as both a recent executive order and congressional legislation have stated. There is also a growing recognition that early prevention is the most effective course of action not only to save lives, but also to save money, limit military interventions, and promote U.S. national interests.

We asked the experts who prepared this report to articulate a clear, bipartisan agenda for policymakers in 2017 and beyond. We believe the report outlines a set of tangible recommendations that demonstrate that preventing mass atrocities is an achievable goal.

We are grateful to all of the experts for making time to share their insights and develop the recommendations found in this report, which were drawn from their experience both inside and outside of the U.S. government. Special thanks and appreciation to Charles Brown who skillfully managed the Experts Committee process—without Charlie’s thoughtfulness and deep commitment to these issues, this report would not have come together.

In addition to all those highlighted in the acknowledgements section of this report, we would like to say a big thank you to Humanity United for their financial support for the PPWG and related projects, including the convening of the Experts Committee. I would also like to thank the members of the Prevention and Protection Working Group who identified the need for this report and who will be important advocates for its recommendations. Finally, I want to thank FCNL staff, particularly Allyson Neville who coordinates the PPWG, Theo Sittler who directs the Peacebuilding Policy program, and Julia Watson who is FCNL's Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow, without whom this report would not have been possible.

A final word of deepest appreciation and thanks to all those doing the hard work of building peace and preventing violent conflict around the world, including those who serve in the U.S. government, international nongovernmental organizations and their staff, local civil society leaders who make a difference in their communities every day, and all the advocates around the U.S. who support these efforts.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Diane Randall". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Diane Randall  
Executive Secretary  
Friends Committee on National Legislation Education Fund  
on behalf of the Prevention and Protection Working Group

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Mass atrocities and genocide continue to challenge the world's conscience. Over the past decade—in Darfur, Syria, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Yemen, and elsewhere—hundreds of thousands of civilians have been murdered, raped, beaten, bombarded, and gassed. Tens of millions more have been forced to flee their homes. And as the crisis in Syria so clearly demonstrates, mass atrocities have unanticipated over-the-horizon effects that have a profoundly negative impact on American power and interests. These can include severe economic and resource disruptions, massive refugee flows, weakened national and international institutions, fractured international norms, and the rise of violent extremism.

It has been nearly eight years since the 2008 report of the Genocide Prevention Task Force (GPTF). Five years ago, President Obama issued Presidential Study Directive 10 (PSD-10), declaring that “preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States” and establishing the Atrocities Prevention Board to coordinate U.S. government (USG) policy. The past decade has seen innovative structural reforms, creative approaches to emerging crises, and the emergence of a small and dedicated cadre of mid-level officials committed to atrocity prevention. Despite these developments, atrocity prevention remains outside the mainstream of U.S. policymaking.

As Americans prepare to elect their next president, the Prevention and Protection Working Group—a coalition of nongovernmental organizations dedicated to improving U.S. government policy on and capacities to prevent mass violence and protect civilians—convened the Experts Committee on Preventing Mass Violence to recommend what should be done over the next four years to strengthen existing atrocity prevention initiatives, develop new measures, and ensure that the issue is institutionalized within the national security bureaucracy.

This report—which is the product of the Experts Committee's deliberations—reaffirms that preventing mass atrocities and genocide is not merely a necessary good, but an achievable one. Prevention is consistent with American values, and early action is far more effective and less costly than late response. Although the United States cannot respond to every current or potential crisis, preventing genocide and mass atrocities must remain a core national security interest and presidential priority.



Building on these principles, the report outlines concrete steps that the next president, Congress, civil society, and relevant federal agencies should take to strengthen U.S. efforts to prevent mass atrocities. Its ten topline recommendations are framed by three overarching themes: *recommit*, *prevent*, and *implement*.

## RECOMMIT

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**1. Demonstrate leadership.** If the next president does not demonstrate clearly and often that preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a national security priority, then public promises, policy innovations, and improved tools will mean little. In addition, the next president will need to be willing to respond when the United States has the tools, capacity, and means to help prevent an emerging atrocity crisis from spinning out of control. These are not tasks that can be undertaken half-heartedly; they require a fundamental commitment to prevention and response. Congress also should be prepared to support and, if necessary, push to implement the recommendations outlined in this report. Similarly, civil society has an essential role to play in building public support and encouraging buy-in for these initiatives.

## PREVENT

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**2. Prioritize and institutionalize early prevention.** A long-term USG focus on early prevention—which this report defines as *initiatives (including post-conflict stabilization, transitional justice, and reconstruction) that aim to reduce social marginalization and conflict; strengthen legitimacy, accountability and resilience; and promote respect for human rights*—can play a critical role in helping fragile societies develop the capacity and resilience to reduce the risk of mass violence. Policies that emphasize early prevention can help limit the opportunity for atrocities, and in the process save lives, strengthen social norms against violence, and enhance national, regional, and international stability. The next administration also should make funding for strengthening local civil society a major pillar of the early prevention agenda.

**3. Ensure dedicated funding.** Major initiatives require significant funds, not only to ensure their success but also to force the national security bureaucracy to take them seriously. A commitment to prioritizing early prevention will mean little without a corresponding pledge to allocate sufficient funding and personnel to implement it. It is critical that the next president make a compelling argument that funding early prevention can help forestall open-ended crises that are far more damaging to American interests and power and far costlier to the American taxpayer.

**4. Promote international cooperation.** U.S. interests are best advanced when the international community is able to work together in a timely fashion to prevent or respond to a crisis. Closer and earlier cooperation and collaboration with the United Nations, regional and sub-regional organizations, international and local civil society, and like-minded partners can help build early international support for effective action, particularly in the realm of early prevention.

**5. Develop a consistent approach to countering non-state actor (NSA) violence.** In recent years, NSAs have increasingly regarded mass atrocities as a means to advance their broader strategic vision. Despite this, many U.S. officials regard NSAs—especially those who target the United States—as falling outside the atrocity prevention framework. The current USG response—known as countering violent extremism (CVE)—has focused almost exclusively on Islamist radicals. The next administration should affirm that CVE and atrocity prevention are mutually reinforcing initiatives, sharing many of the same strategies, tactics, goals, and outcomes. It also should expand the prevention toolkit to include measures that are more effective in countering atrocities committed by the full spectrum of NSAs.

## IMPLEMENT

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**6. Strengthen and expand policy coordination.** At its best, the Atrocities Prevention Board (APB) has served as an incubator for innovative structural reform and creative thinking about emerging crises. When the Board instead served primarily as a mechanism for information-sharing and follow-on discussion, its utility declined precipitously. The next administration should retain the APB but adopt a range of measures—including giving the APB greater authority, using new funds to ease the regional-functional divide, and developing an effective lessons-learned process—that will strengthen the Board's position and, more broadly, help mainstream atrocity prevention into policymaking.

**7. Involve and empower U.S. embassies.** The Department of State's post-Benghazi tendency to draw down U.S. embassies at the moment when countries are at greatest risk of mass atrocities has meant that even those posts with the capacity to track a crisis often find themselves operating with a skeleton crew at the very moment that the APB is pushing for greater attention and engagement. In many cases, atrocity crises occur in places where the United States has only limited diplomatic representation. The next administration should prioritize providing additional funding to support embassies in countries at risk of mass atrocities so that they can mobilize or manage a more effective on-the-ground response.

**8. Strengthen intelligence collection.** The Intelligence Community's (IC's) monthly updates provided the APB the timely, actionable intelligence it needed to draw interagency attention to below-the-radar crises. The next administration should strengthen, institutionalize, and expand the IC's capacity to provide targeted support to the APB by creating a new National Intelligence Manager position with responsibility for tracking atrocities and ensuring that relevant IC bodies—including the Open Source Enterprise and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency—assign full-time personnel to the issue.

**9. Revisit targeted sanctions.** Although targeted sanctions have been used effectively in certain atrocity situations, the next administration should revisit the idea of a stand-alone sanctions mechanism that can target individuals known to have committed or enabled the commission of mass atrocities without requiring a blanket country designation. For that to happen, agencies—particularly the Department of Treasury—will need sufficient collection and analytic resources to research and sanction those known to be responsible for atrocities.

**10. Build an internal constituency.** Despite the growth of a small and dedicated cadre of mid-level officials committed to the APB and related initiatives, there are no long-term measures in place to encourage others to regard atrocity prevention as something that can boost their careers. This is particularly true for Foreign Service Officers, many of whom view work on atrocity prevention as unlikely to enhance their long-term professional trajectory. These challenges won't be overcome overnight. Real progress will require a significant change in the way departments and agencies mandate training for and incentivize engagement by mid-level officials.



# INTRODUCTION

Genocide and mass atrocities continue to put civilian lives at risk and challenge the world's conscience. Over the past decade in Syria, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere, hundreds of thousands of civilians have been murdered, raped, beaten, bombarded, gassed, and forced to flee their homes. These atrocities are not the product of “ancient” ethnic or religious hatreds but rather are conscious, strategic decisions by ruling elites or non-state actors to achieve specific ends.

If the sheer human toll were not enough, mass atrocities also have unanticipated over-the-horizon effects that undermine international stability and have a negative impact on U.S. power and interests: severe economic and resource disruptions, massive refugee flows, badly weakened institutions, fractured international norms, and the rise of violent extremism. Even when atrocities have occurred in places where the nexus to U.S. national security is less apparent, standing U.S. commitments to fund humanitarian and peacekeeping operations have meant that failing to prevent even the most obscure crisis can cost American taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars.

It has been nearly eight years since the 2008 report of the Genocide Prevention Task Force (GPTF) called on the 44th President of the United States to make preventing genocide and mass atrocities a national priority. It has been more than five years since President Obama did so by issuing Presidential Study Directive 10 (PSD-10), which declared that, “preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States” and established the Atrocities Prevention Board (APB) to coordinate U.S. government (USG) policy.<sup>1</sup>

As Americans prepare to elect their next president, the Prevention and Protection Working Group (PPWG) convened an Experts Committee on Preventing Mass Violence to assess progress to date and develop a blueprint for improving U.S. policy and capacity to prevent and respond to mass atrocities. This report, which is the product of the Committee's deliberations, offers a series of specific recommendations on what the next administration should do to sustain and strengthen existing U.S. efforts to prevent and respond to mass atrocities.

## DEFINING “MASS ATROCITIES”

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There continues to be a debate over what constitutes mass atrocities. Events in Syria, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and elsewhere have raised questions both about when the term should be used and how many people have to die before it can be invoked. Mass terror attacks, such as those in Paris, Brussels, Orlando, Ouagadougou, Istanbul, and Dhaka, have led to discussions about the dividing line between mass atrocities and other forms of violence, such as terrorism.

That said, we recognize that any report recommending future action on preventing and responding to mass atrocities requires a clear description of the central concept. To that end, this report will utilize the definition first used in the 2008 Report of the Genocide Prevention Task Force and subsequently adopted in Executive Order 13729: “*large scale and deliberate attacks on civilians.*”<sup>2</sup> These acts include (but are not limited to) genocide, crimes against humanity, and many war crimes, all of which are defined under international law.<sup>3</sup>

## FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

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This report is based on the assumption that the next president will in fact continue to regard atrocity prevention as a core national security interest and important objective of U.S. foreign policy. That may not turn out to be the case: prominent voices on both the left and the right have questioned the relevance of a positive, outward-focused foreign policy that sees the United States as engaging with—and serving as an example for—the rest of the world.

We believe that turning away from America’s traditional role as an (admittedly flawed) human rights champion and exemplar would represent an abdication of our core values and a threat to our national security. When the United States fails to adhere to the principles that it has championed for so long—whether by ignoring abuses or responding to them with abuses of its own—it encourages governments and non-state actors alike to abuse civilians, acting with impunity even as they decry American actions.

In addition to U.S. leadership on human rights, other key principles have guided and animated our deliberations.

- We reaffirm that preventing mass atrocities and genocide is not merely a necessary goal, but also an achievable one. We strongly support and reiterate Executive Order 13729’s determination that, “preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States.”<sup>4</sup>
- We reiterate that preventing mass atrocities and genocide is consistent with American values. The United States has a fundamental moral obligation to try to prevent mass atrocities—and to work with our partners and allies to stop them. Acting otherwise would risk abandoning our core principles and a key component of our national identity.
- We state unequivocally that early action—what we call early prevention—is far better than late response. Focusing on early prevention by dedicating sufficient resources to building resilient, accountable, and just societies is more sensible (and significantly more cost effective) than acting only after high-risk situations have metastasized into full-blown crises.
- We acknowledge that the United States cannot respond to every current or potential crisis. The international community has an essential role to play in preventing and responding to mass atrocities.
- We reject the argument that the current fiscal environment requires that the implementation of USG policies and programs be “revenue neutral.” Major initiatives require significant funds, not only to help ensure their success but also to give the national security bureaucracy the necessary capacity and personnel to implement them effectively.

**Mass atrocities are “large scale and deliberate attacks on civilians.” These acts include (but are not limited to) genocide, crimes against humanity, and many war crimes, all of which are defined under international law.**





# RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADVANCING PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

## A ROADMAP FOR THE NEXT FOUR YEARS

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As important as it to emphasize first principles, they are of little value without specific suggestions as to how the next administration can build on what the GPTF proposed and the Obama Administration implemented. To that end, we have identified ten topline recommendations, which we have organized into three overarching themes: *recommit*, *prevent*, and *implement*.

### **Recommit**

The next president will need to recommit to the principle that preventing mass atrocities is a core national security interest and core moral responsibility of the United States. This is not something that can be done half-heartedly; it will require a strong focus on early prevention and, when necessary, on working with the international community to slow or stop atrocities once they are underway. Congress and civil society also have an equally important role to play in these efforts.



## Prevent

Initiatives that focus on early prevention can play a critical role in helping fragile societies develop the capabilities and resilience to reduce the threat of mass violence. The next president should announce that early prevention will be a major foreign policy priority and that he or she will be seeking strong bipartisan congressional support for significant additional funding. He or she also should continue to promote effective international cooperation and develop a more consistent approach to countering non-state actor-instigated mass violence.

## Implement

As crucial as it will be to demonstrate leadership and articulate a comprehensive prevention agenda, it is equally important that the next president support whole-of-government solutions that bring to bear the skills and expertise of multiple actors. The new administration should pursue a range of initiatives that will more effectively coordinate policy and planning within and across agencies; strengthen and expand embassies' capacity to track, prevent, and respond to potential atrocity crises; bolster intelligence collection; revisit targeted economic sanctions; and foster professional development opportunities.

As was the case with the GPTF report, our focus is on the future. The Obama Administration's track record on atrocity prevention deserves a full review and analysis, but that is not the purpose of this report. Although its initiatives have informed our findings, they represent only the first steps toward institutionalizing prevention and response into U.S. policy.

## 1. CONSISTENTLY DEMONSTRATE LEADERSHIP

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Although strong verbal commitments are important and worthwhile, stopping mass atrocities requires more than words. If the next president does not demonstrate clearly and often that preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a national security priority, then public promises, policy innovations, and improved tools will mean little. In addition, the next president will need to be willing to act when the United States has the capability to prevent an emerging atrocity crisis from spinning out of control.

This is not a task that can be undertaken half-heartedly; it requires a fundamental commitment to early prevention and, when necessary, to utilizing the full set of tools available to slow or stop atrocities once they are underway. As the crisis in Syria demonstrates, all the planning in the world means little if the international community fails to act. On rare occasions, this may mean military intervention, but in most cases, it instead will require a carefully targeted response in close coordination with the United Nations, regional and sub-regional organizations, key allies and partners, national governments, and local civil society.

The president must be ready and willing to work with Congress to secure the resources and personnel needed to organize effectively to prevent and respond to mass atrocities. The next administration should engage Congress consistently and treat those members most inclined to support the APB process as full partners.

Leadership is not merely a function of the executive branch. Although this report focuses on what the next administration should do, it is important to acknowledge that both Congress and civil society have an important and necessary role to play in U.S. efforts to prevent and respond to mass atrocities.

Congress is best placed to solve some of the challenges facing the APB as an institution, particularly when it comes to the question of adequate resources. For this to happen, congressional leaders will need to recognize and acknowledge the strategic importance of preventing and responding to mass atrocities. To date, this has not been the case: neither the House Foreign Affairs Committee nor the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have held hearings on atrocity prevention, and the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission has not made it a “central focus

of its work,” as recommended by the GPTF.<sup>5</sup> Most importantly, Congress has not funded prevention at the baseline recommended by the GPTF or formally authorized the APB.<sup>6</sup>

Similarly, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have an obligation to engage and demand action from both the next administration and the next Congress. In the past, advocacy campaigns have helped mobilize public support for greater USG engagement on, attention to, and resources for preventing and responding to atrocities. More recently however, NGOs have struggled to generate and sustain the level of grassroots advocacy necessary for meaningful engagement, even when confronted by major atrocity crises in Syria, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic.

## FOR THE PRESIDENT



U.S. government works

**1-1. Revise and reissue Executive Order 13729.** The next president should announce that Executive Order (EO) 13729—including its declaration that preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a “core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States” and its codification of the APB—remains in force until he or she issues a revised version.

- The revised EO should retain the APB and reiterate the current EO’s other findings. It should also:
  - Incorporate, where relevant, this report’s recommendations.
  - Require APB representation at the under secretary or equivalent level in order to ensure that agencies and departments send appropriately senior officials to participate in its meetings. The current system of requiring assistant secretaries (or their equivalents) to serve as representatives at APB meetings has led many agencies to send deputy assistant secretaries and even office directors instead.
  - Mandate that whenever the APB discusses a particular country, regional bureaus/offices must participate at the assistant secretary or higher level.

- Extend the current EO’s provisions on training and coordination to all member departments and agencies.
- Remove the current EO’s requirement that deputies concur on a request from the APB to the Intelligence Community (IC) to “allocate resources so as to permit a collection surge for countries where the Board determines . . . that there are ongoing or acute risks of mass atrocities that merit increased attention in accordance with the National Intelligence Priority Framework [NIPF] and available resources.”<sup>7</sup>
- Add a provision that, in cases where an emerging atrocity crisis is not in accordance with the NIPF, the APB can seek deputies’ authorization to reallocate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to permit greater collection and analysis.
- Current APB membership should be retained, with the addition of relevant senior officials from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).

**1-2. Engage and involve Congress.** The next administration should consistently engage Congress, providing periodic updates to members and maintaining regular contact with relevant congressional staff.

### **Budgeting**

- As will be noted in greater detail below, the next administration should announce within the first three months of taking office that the president’s proposed Fiscal Year 2018 (FY18) and subsequent budgets will include a new Early Prevention and Response (EPR) account.
- The EPR account should include both new money for existing programs such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Complex Crises Fund and the Department of State Human Rights and Democracy Fund.

**If the next president does not demonstrate clearly and often that preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a national security priority, then public promises, policy innovations, and improved tools will mean little.**

- The FY18 and subsequent budgets should also include funds for the work of the APB as well as for additional dedicated analysts in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), NGA, Department of Treasury (Treasury), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), USAID, and the Department of State (State).

### **Liaison**

- The White House should organize a special meeting of the APB early in the new administration that would take place on Capitol Hill with the participation of interested members of Congress and their staff.
- The IC should share its monthly APB briefings on countries of particular concern with members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee.<sup>8</sup>
- The sub-APB should convene quarterly meetings with interested congressional staff.

### **Internal Coordination**

- The briefing materials prepared for APB meetings should include an update on current legislative activity related to atrocity prevention, including upcoming hearings on countries of concern and the names of those scheduled to testify.
- The APB should work with departments and agencies to ensure that information on atrocity concerns is incorporated into relevant testimony, including annual hearings on departmental budgetary priorities.
- A senior official in the White House Office of Legislative Affairs should attend all APB meetings.
- State, USAID, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the IC should each identify a staff person within their legislative affairs offices who can track atrocity issues, regularly update and respond to inquiries by congressional staff, and ensure the participation of sub-APB members in the drafting of—and preparatory meetings for—relevant testimony.

**1-3. Ensure that atrocity prevention remains a named priority in key strategic planning documents.** Over the past eight years, every major national security planning document—including the 2010 and 2015 National Security Strategies, the 2010 and 2014 Quadrennial Defense Reviews, and the 2010 and 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Reviews (QDDRs)—have identified atrocity prevention and response as a priority. The next administration should continue this practice.

**1-4. Establish a Presidential Advisory Council.** The next administration should establish a Presidential Advisory Council on Atrocity Prevention and Response, modeled on similar boards such as the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board and the U.S. Advisory Council on Human Trafficking.

- The Council should include prominent individuals with knowledge of atrocity prevention and response issues.
- It should provide the president and federal agencies with independent information and advice, including rigorous reviews of existing policy and a periodic review of the effectiveness of the APB.
- It should have the authority to review and comment on the APB’s annual report to the president.



Architect of the Capitol, CC BY 2.0

## FOR CONGRESS

**1-5. Fully fund and authorize atrocity prevention initiatives.** Leaders in both parties who recognize the importance of prevention and response should emphasize their support to their own colleagues (and the incoming administration) and encourage greater engagement, funding, and bipartisan support.

- As outlined below, Congress should support this report's proposal to create a new Early Prevention and Response account, regardless of whether the administration itself does so.
- Congress should also fully fund related budget accounts and line items that contribute to early prevention.
- Congress should formally authorize the APB without a sunset provision.
- The Senate Foreign Relations Committee should question nominees for key Cabinet posts about how their departments/agencies will contribute to the next administration's atrocity prevention and response initiatives.

**1-6. Strengthen Congress's own capacity to track prevention and response measures.** Congress should organize itself so that atrocity prevention and response is given greater attention.

- House and Senate leadership should formally assign jurisdiction over atrocity prevention and response to the relevant Foreign Affairs/Foreign Relations subcommittees. Subcommittees should assign responsibility for the issue to a specific staff member.
- The Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) should incorporate atrocity prevention and response into their work, regularly holding meetings on issues of concern.<sup>9</sup>
- Senators and Representatives should establish an Atrocity Prevention Caucus.



## FOR NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

**1-7. Organize and sustain a strong public advocacy campaign.** Although this report focuses on recommendations to the next administration and Congress, we believe that civil society must play an essential role in building public support and encouraging buy-in for these initiatives.

- We therefore challenge NGOs working on prevention and protection—in particular members of the PPWG—to renew and reinvigorate past efforts to build the kind of “permanent constituency” for atrocity prevention envisioned by the Genocide Prevention Task Force.<sup>10</sup>
- Members of the PPWG should explore organizing and mobilizing a strong national constituency to lobby Congress and the next administration. Other like-minded groups should join this effort. This is particularly important given the closure of some of the grassroots organizations that had led similar campaigns in the past.
- Members of the PPWG (and other U.S.-based NGOs) should make a concerted effort to engage with and listen to civil society groups in atrocity-affected countries so that advocacy in the U.S. and with the international community is grounded in, and informed by, local needs and realities.
- Support from foundations and major donors will be essential for this initiative to be successful. This is particularly true of work on prevention, which has received less attention from most funders.<sup>11</sup>
- Consistent engagement with the next administration also will be crucial. NGOs should seek clarification from the administration on how it will implement EO 13729’s promise of “outreach, including regular consultations, with representatives of nongovernmental organizations with expertise in mass atrocity prevention and response and other appropriate parties.”<sup>12</sup>



## 2. PRIORITIZE AND INSTITUTIONALIZE EARLY PREVENTION

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If the goal of development is “the process of expanding opportunity,” as USAID has put it, mass atrocities represent the polar opposite: they reverse economic growth, fracture trust, destroy infrastructure, and atomize civic participation. As USAID’s field guide on preventing mass atrocities notes, “Mass atrocities destroy human and physical capital, cause mass displacement and humanitarian emergencies, and disrupt productive social and economic activity across all domains.”<sup>13</sup>

The recommendations outlined in this report largely focus on initiatives designed to prevent, mitigate, or stop mass atrocity crimes. However, we believe that a longer-term focus is also crucial. Early prevention—which this report defines as *initiatives (including post-conflict stabilization, transitional justice, and reconstruction) that aim to reduce social marginalization and conflict; strengthen legitimacy, accountability, and resilience; and promote respect for human rights*—can play a critical role in helping fragile societies develop the capacity and resilience to reduce the risk of mass violence.

All too often, what is called atrocity “prevention” is little more than a last-minute response. As the Fragility Study Group put it in its recent report, “complete state failure and descent into violence cannot be the only call to action.”<sup>14</sup> When the international community fails to act until the killing already has started, then the political and financial cost of action inevitably will skyrocket.

It takes an average of forty years—two generations—for countries to restore the rule of law after extreme violence such as civil war, mass atrocities, or genocide.<sup>15</sup> The human and financial toll behind that figure is staggering, as are the implications for U.S. national security. And as Syria so amply demonstrates, mass atrocities can lead to outcomes that directly threaten American power, including violent extremism, regional instability, resource disruptions, and the fracturing of the international system.

Policies that emphasize early prevention can help limit such developments and, in the process, save lives, strengthen social norms against violence, and enhance national, regional, and international stability.

**2-1. Make early prevention a priority—and make the case to Congress and the American people as to why it’s important.** Even before taking office, the next president should announce that prevention will be a priority in his or her administration.

- The president-elect should task his or her transition team to draft a comprehensive policy on early prevention, including development of a dedicated budget account. Transition team members should seek the feedback and input of relevant congressional staff and civil society representatives.
- Upon taking office, the president should announce a major initiative on early prevention modeled on existing programs—such as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and Feed the Future—that have enjoyed strong bipartisan support.
  - The president should instruct the National Security Advisor to establish a senior-level working group to flesh out the details.
  - The president should then announce the initiative in a major address.
- The president also will need to make it clear to members of his or her senior national security team (including department and agency heads) that they will need to devote sufficient resources to develop and implement the initiative and that early prevention should not be deferred or set aside in favor of other priorities.
- Bipartisan engagement and support will be crucial to the initiative’s long-term success. As early as possible, the next national security advisor and secretary of state should brief congressional leaders and secure their buy-in.

**Early prevention—which this report defines as initiatives (including post-conflict, stabilization, transitional justice, and reconstruction) that aim to reduce social marginalization and conflict; strengthen legitimacy, accountability, and resilience; and promote respect for human rights—can play a critical role in helping fragile societies develop the capacity and resilience to reduce the risk of mass violence.**

- Once the initiative is rolled out, the administration should empower and encourage APB members to reinforce the message in public meetings, media interviews, and social media.



**2-2. Give greater priority to supporting and strengthening local civil society.** Local civil society serves as a bulwark against atrocities. Strengthening it is one of the best hopes for advancing the atrocity prevention agenda in the coming years.

- The next administration should make funding for strengthening local civil society a major pillar of the early prevention initiative. In particular, it should prioritize giving local civil society in affected communities the tools they need to alert populations against potential or unfolding atrocity situations.
- State and USAID should set a goal of doubling funds going directly to building the capacity of local civil society over the next four years. The new funds could support a range of local initiatives, including mediation and peacebuilding; early warning and response systems; human rights monitoring and documentation; advocacy; and community-based justice and economic development.
- The administration should explore other measures that could facilitate more effective U.S. support for local civil society.
  - State and USAID should work to move beyond supporting national-level and capital-based organizations to reach those local communities most directly impacted by mass violence.
  - State and USAID should develop more flexible procurement policies that permit direct funding, smaller grants, and longer implementation timelines.
  - State and USAID program officers should be encouraged to explore ways that grants can more frequently target local partners rather than international NGOs or for-profit consortia.

- The administration should work with Congress to exempt funding for local civil society from current legal requirements that goods and services be sourced from U.S. vendors.
  - The administration should work with Congress to explore whether there are ways that existing statutes prohibiting “material support” to members of certain groups could be adapted to permit the funding of initiatives by international, national, and local NGOs working to prevent non-state actors from committing atrocities.
  - The White House should direct Treasury to quickly issue waivers to ensure critical USG-sponsored atrocity prevention initiatives can proceed without risking violations of existing laws or sanctions.
- Local civil society leaders and communities facing the threat of mass violence have invaluable information and experience that can inform USG risk assessment and mitigation initiatives.
    - Embassy staff should regularly reach out to and learn from local activists on the front lines, particularly those located outside the capital.
    - Whenever feasible, the sub-APB should meet with visiting local civil society representatives.

**2-3. Support the design and development of more effective performance monitoring and project evaluation mechanisms.** The next administration should task the USAID Learning Lab to identify, design, and develop systematic collection and analysis tools that can help inform policy decisions on, and resource allocations to, future early prevention initiatives.

It takes an average of forty years—two generations—for countries to restore the rule of law after extreme violence such as civil war, mass atrocities, or genocide. The human and financial toll behind that figure is staggering, as are the implications for U.S. national security.

### 3. ENSURE DEDICATED FUNDING AND PERSONNEL

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A commitment to prioritizing early prevention will mean little without a corresponding pledge to allocate sufficient funding and personnel to implement it. Major initiatives require significant funds, not only to ensure their success but also to force the national security bureaucracy to take them seriously. The Obama Administration's insistence that its atrocity prevention initiatives be "revenue-neutral" made it harder to convince departments and agencies to support the allocation of additional resources and personnel.

We believe that it is possible for the next president to make a compelling argument that funding early prevention can help forestall open-ended crises that are far more damaging to American interests and power and far costlier to the American taxpayer. As one recent study put it, these issues "may seem like a distant or abstract concern. They are not. They are at the center of much of today's regional disorder and global upheaval."<sup>16</sup>

Unfortunately, decades of partisan budget battles and expensive wars have warped U.S. budgeting processes in favor of short-term fixes. The growing use of the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget to fund DoD, State, and USAID programs that otherwise would have fallen victim to cuts mandated by the sequestration process has only further exacerbated the problem.<sup>17</sup> This reliance on what was supposed to be a temporary mechanism made necessary by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has helped obscure the fact that since 2010, non-OCO USG international affairs funding is down 30 percent, a troubling development that could put a range of U.S. interests and capabilities at risk should a future president or Congress decide to end the practice.<sup>18</sup>

It therefore is critical that any proposal to rethink and significantly expand dedicated funding and personnel for early prevention be part of a broader campaign to reverse the precipitous decline in discretionary spending on foreign affairs (including overseas development assistance) over the past decade. It would be a serious mistake to treat a new early prevention initiative as either a slight-of-hand OCO-driven budget maneuver or part of a zero-sum game whereby money for other equally important programs get reallocated, reduced, or cut.

**3-1. Ensure dedicated funding for early prevention.** As part of the rollout of the new initiative on early prevention, the president should emphasize that additional funding is critical.

- The administration's FY18 and subsequent budget requests should include a distinct Early Prevention and Response (EPR) account.
- We recommend a baseline of \$2 billion as a starting point for consideration and discussion, with the understanding that determining a final number will require significant additional analysis and review in the context of a broader initiative to reinvigorate USG spending on international affairs.
  - This figure would roughly double existing funding for conflict prevention, atrocity response, human rights, and democracy programs.<sup>19</sup>
  - To provide a point of contrast, the current administration's FY17 budget request seeks roughly \$3 billion for peacekeeping operations.<sup>20</sup> That figure has grown in recent years due to ongoing crises, and increasingly has been funded via OCO.
  - In addition, the proposed \$2 billion figure would be consistent with similar accounts such as Development Assistance (\$2.95 billion in FY17) and Disaster Assistance (\$1.96 billion), and far less than the money set aside for accounts such as PEPFAR (\$4.19 billion) or Foreign Military Financing (\$5.7 billion).
  - It would also be consistent with the United Kingdom's cross-agency Conflict, Stability, and Security Fund, which had a budget of roughly \$1.5 billion in 2016.
  - Congress should ask the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct a review of USG expenditures (including security assistance) related to the crises in Syria, Mali, Libya, Ukraine, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic. The GAO findings should help put into stark contrast the differential cost between responding to major crises and making strategic investments in early prevention.

**3-2. Expand funding for existing and proposed programs.** The current administration's FY17 budget proposal includes roughly \$300 million for programs whose funds have been used to help prevent violent conflict and ensure timely and effective responses in situations where atrocities do occur.

- The next administration's FY18 and subsequent budget requests should set aside \$700 million of the proposed EPR account to support the following initiatives:
  - Complex Crises Fund (USAID);
  - Those funds (including the Human Rights Grants Program) managed by the Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (USAID);
  - Transition Initiatives (USAID);
  - Human Rights and Democracy Fund (State); and
  - National Endowment for Democracy.
- The next administration's budget request also should set aside \$100 million within the new EPR account to support the creation of an Atrocities Prevention Fund, which was first proposed by Congress during its consideration of the FY17 budget. The new fund should be overseen by the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights and administered by the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations.

**3-3. Hire additional staff in key offices.** A portion of the Early Prevention and Response account should be set aside to hire additional policy experts, program specialists, intelligence analysts, and administrative personnel in bureaus and offices whose work supports or complements that of the APB. These include:

- Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (State/CSO);
- Office of Global Criminal Justice (State/GCJ);
- Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (State/DRL);
- War Crimes Division, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State/INR);
- Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Affairs (USAID/DCHA);
- Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI);
- Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs (DoD);
- Open Source Enterprise, Directorate of Digital Innovation (CIA);<sup>21</sup>
- Global Issues Mission Center (CIA);



- Office of Foreign Assets Control (Treasury);
- Office of Human Rights and Special Prosecutions (Department of Justice);
- Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Unit, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Department of Homeland Security); and
- International Human Rights Unit (FBI).

We believe that it is possible for the next president to make a compelling argument that funding early prevention can help forestall open-ended crises that are far more damaging to American interests and power and far costlier to the American taxpayer.

**3-4. Convert key State and USAID funds to no-year appropriations.**<sup>22</sup> All too often, contingency funds can find themselves with unused monies at the end of the fiscal year—an outcome that Congress or administration officials can regard as sufficient justification to slash their budgets. To prevent future such occurrences and ensure that funds are available for urgent needs, the administration should request Congress to include language in the FY18 State and Foreign Operations Authorization Bill that State/DRL's Human Rights and Democracy Fund, State/CSO's proposed Atrocities Prevention Fund and State/IO's proposed Mechanism for Peace Operations Response will remain available until expended without fiscal year limitation.

**3-5. Bring OMB to the table.** Given the scope and ambition of the Early Prevention and Response account, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will have a crucial role to play in planning for and developing the proposal. To ensure sustained engagement on, and appreciation for, the initiative, the Associate Director of National Security Programs at OMB should participate in meetings of the APB.

## 4. PROMOTE GREATER INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

U.S. interests are best advanced when the international community is able to work together in a timely fashion to prevent or respond to a crisis. Unfortunately, such events have been few and far between. All too often, by the time the world comes to an agreement on a course of action—if it is able to reach consensus—there are few remaining options other than direct military intervention. This usually means deploying a peacekeeping force, and the negotiations over the timing, nature, and size of the mission can drag on for months while the crisis continues to metastasize. The end result is either a costly and under-resourced peacekeeping operation or international paralysis in the face of a humanitarian disaster.

Although there will always be situations where certain governments attempt to obstruct or slow a coordinated international response, there is still much that can be done. Closer and earlier cooperation and collaboration with the United Nations (UN), regional and sub-regional organizations, international and local civil society, and like-minded partners and friends can help build early international support for effective action, particularly in the realm of early prevention. Furthermore, as one study has noted, a more progressive diplomatic posture on cooperation would help encourage “greater support for the United States if it must act alone or outside of Security Council authorization.”<sup>23</sup>

**Closer and earlier cooperation and collaboration with the United Nations, regional and sub-regional organizations, international and local civil society, and like-minded partners and friends can help build early international support for effective action, particularly in the realm of early prevention.**

**4-1. Support existing UN efforts to give greater priority and attention to preventing mass atrocities.** There will be another major political transition in 2017 in addition to the inauguration of a new American president: the selection of António Guterres of Portugal as the next United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG).

- The next president should instruct his or her ambassador to the UN to work closely with Guterres to sustain the important work of previous UNSGs Ban Ki-moon and Kofi Annan to mainstream the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide into UN institutions, policies, and procedures.<sup>24</sup>



- The United States should strongly encourage increased funding for institutions and mechanisms that already support human rights, atrocity prevention, and the responsibility to protect: the Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide; the Human Rights Up Front initiative; the Peacebuilding Commission; and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

**4-2. Reinforce and expand existing U.S. efforts to promote accountability and justice.** The next president should endorse and recommit to current initiatives to bring perpetrators and enablers of genocide and atrocities to justice, recognizing that accountability is a crucial component of any broader prevention strategy.

- The president should announce that the United States will continue to honor its treaty obligations, including the Convention against Torture and the Geneva Conventions.
- The president should announce that the United States has an obligation to act under the terms of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
- The president should signal early in his or her administration that the United States will continue to engage and (when feasible) work with the International Criminal Court (ICC) as well as regional and national-level tribunals, reconciliation commissions, and other transitional justice mechanisms.

- The administration should submit to Congress—and Congress should pass—proposed legislation to make the commission of crimes against humanity a felony under Title 18 of the U.S. Criminal Code.
  - The law’s provisions on jurisdiction should be consistent with those in existing U.S. statutes on genocide, child soldiers, torture, piracy, and terrorism.
  - The Department of Defense should drop its opposition to the measure.
- The administration should propose a revision to the existing war crimes statute that would make its provisions on jurisdiction consistent with those in existing U.S. statutes on genocide, torture, piracy, and terrorism.
- The Department of State and USAID should strengthen and increase current funding for transitional justice, reconciliation, and peacebuilding, incorporating and responding to the needs and concerns of survivors.
- The Departments of State and Justice should explore ways to reinforce and support initiatives by countries to bring those responsible for mass atrocity crimes to justice through domestic legal mechanisms.
- The United States Sentencing Commission should revise current sentencing guidelines on visa fraud so that judges can give longer sentences to war criminals and genocidaires who have entered the United States under fraudulent circumstances.

**The next president should recommit to bringing perpetrators and enablers of genocide and atrocities to justice.**

**4-3. Strengthen the capacity of peacekeeping operations to protect civilians from mass atrocity threats.** Although both the international community and the USG continue to work to improve the capacity of the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organizations to deploy peacekeepers, there are still not enough trained and equipped forces to meet the needs of current operations. In addition, many peacekeeping operations have continued to struggle to implement their mandate to protect civilians.



U.S. government works

- Congress should significantly increase funding for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI); the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA); and the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP). Such funding should be contingent on these programs incorporating more intensive training on human rights, accountability, and zero tolerance for sexual assault.
- State and DoD should explore how to strengthen the airlift/transport capabilities of potential troop contributing countries (TCCs), including potentially by providing additional fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and flight training.
- It is unclear whether the APB has input on which TCC units the USG trains and supports. If it is not already doing so, the APB should work with State and DoD officials to identify opportunities to train forces with sufficient capacity and located in close proximity to countries currently identified as at significant risk of mass atrocities.<sup>25</sup>
- DoD should explore ways that the United States could provide additional operational, logistics, airlift and intelligence support to existing and future peacekeeping operations.

## 5. ADDRESS THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN ATROCITIES

Historically, states have been the primary perpetrators of mass atrocities and genocide. From the Holocaust to Syria, regimes (and their proxies) have been—and will likely continue to be—responsible for the vast majority of such crimes. In recent years, however, non-state actors (NSAs), including both rebel militias and terrorist groups, have increasingly committed mass atrocities. The most notorious example is the Islamic State’s attacks on Yazidis and Christians in Iraq—which the United States has declared to constitute genocide—but it is hardly the only one. Over the past decade, numerous NSAs have committed atrocities;<sup>26</sup> the leaders of several groups have been indicted or are being investigated by the ICC. In addition, individuals not formally affiliated with—but nonetheless inspired by—these groups have committed terrorist attacks that, had they been committed by states or NSAs, would be described as atrocities.<sup>27</sup>

With the exception of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the international community has been slow to adapt the atrocity prevention framework to counter NSA violence. This is in large part the product of the rise of the Islamic State and other groups that have (either directly or via lone wolf proxies) attacked targets

in Europe and the United States. As a result, many NSAs—especially those who have targeted the United States or its allies—are viewed as a separate phenomenon, requiring a response outside of the atrocity prevention framework.

To counter groups that fall into this second category, the Obama Administration has adopted a set of strategies—known

collectively within the USG as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)—that includes the development of “community-oriented approaches to counter hateful extremist ideologies that radicalize, recruit or incite [individuals and groups] to violence.”<sup>28</sup> Although U.S. officials have emphasized that CVE initiatives target all extremist groups, actual policy implementation has focused almost exclusively on Islamist radicals.



The CVE narrative is driving not only policymaking but also budgetary and personnel decisions. In fact, atrocity prevention initiatives have on more than one occasion been reframed as CVE to garner greater senior interest and engagement. As a result, many inside and outside the USG now regard atrocity prevention as “a long-term project that is generally not foremost on the minds of senior officials,” as one analysis put it.<sup>29</sup>

This is unfortunate, as groups as different from one another as the LRA, Islamic State, and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam share a near-identical belief in the utility of mass violence as a means to advance their broader strategic vision. As a result, there is significant commonality between the approaches and goals of atrocity prevention and CVE.

**The international community has been slow to adapt the atrocity prevention framework to counter violence by non-state actors.**

**5-1. Develop new tools designed specifically to counter atrocities committed by NSAs.** To its credit, the APB and its constituent agencies have devoted considerable time and resources to developing a set of policy instruments—such as visa bans, targeted sanctions, development assistance, and public diplomacy—that, if used properly, can help slow or stop atrocities. In the case of NSAs, however, these have proven to be of limited value, as they are more effective when the target is a government rather than a rebel or terrorist group.<sup>30</sup>

- The next administration should explore whether there are other mechanisms that would be more effective in situations where the main perpetrators are non-state actors.
- The APB should hold a special meeting on NSAs, with the goal of developing an approach that can be applied to a wide range of non-state actors.
- The IC should identify NSAs with the capacity to commit atrocities in its annual risk assessment of mass atrocities.

**5-2. Affirm that countering violent extremism and preventing mass atrocities are mutually reinforcing initiatives, sharing many of the same strategies, tactics, goals, and outcomes.**

- Within the first ninety days of the president taking office, the national security advisor should chair a Principals Committee meeting to discuss how to better coordinate and break down stovepipes between CVE and atrocity prevention.
- Within the National Security Council (NSC), the senior directors responsible for CVE and atrocity prevention should each assign a member of their team to track and coordinate CVE and atrocity prevention policymaking and implementation.



## 6. STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND POLICY COORDINATION, PLANNING, AND LESSONS LEARNED

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At its best, the APB has served as an incubator for innovative structural reform and creative thinking about emerging crises. Its utility has declined precipitously when it has instead served as a mechanism for information-sharing and follow-on discussion. More broadly, policy coordination across and within agencies remains a challenge, particularly among functional and regional bureaus in the Department of State and USAID. This is unsurprising: the regional-functional divide has long interfered with effective policy coordination on a range of issues. Similarly, efforts to coordinate planning and lessons learned processes have lagged both within and across agencies.

**6-1. Consolidate NSC coordination on early prevention, atrocity response, and stabilization under a single senior director.** In recent years, State, USAID, and DoD have established offices to coordinate policy and planning on conflict prevention, atrocity response, civilian protection, post-conflict stabilization, and (in the cases of USAID and DoD) humanitarian assistance. Within the NSC, however, these issues are currently spread out over multiple directorates. As part of a broader effort to streamline and reform the NSC, the next administration should consolidate these policy functions under a single senior director in order to ensure a degree of interagency cross-issue coordination and planning comparable to that currently undertaken at the departmental level.

**6-2. Strengthen the authority and refine the focus of the APB.** The APB should continue to serve as the primary coordinating and decision-making body for USG policy on atrocity prevention and response.

- The APB should prioritize decision-making over discussion. It should focus on deliberating options, setting policy, signing off on recommendations from the sub-APB and relevant Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs), and adjudicating disagreements.

- Information-sharing should be limited to a brief review of the IC’s deep-dive and a policy background brief, both of which should be distributed to APB members in advance of each meeting.
- Whenever feasible, the chair of the APB should seek joint APB-IPC meetings on those countries identified by the IC as being at significant or high risk of mass atrocities.
- Primary responsibility for tracking and responding to country situations rightly should remain with the relevant regional senior directorates, IPCs, regional bureaus, and country teams. However, the chair of the APB and his/her staff should monitor the work of country-specific IPCs and, when necessary, push for greater attention on atrocity situations.
- The Presidential Directive establishing the organization of the National Security Council should explicitly identify the APB as an entity distinct from, and more senior than, working-level IPCs.

**Policy coordination across and within agencies remains a challenge, particularly among functional and regional bureaus in the Department of State and USAID.**

**6-3. Give the APB the authority to bring crisis situations to the attention of deputies.** Although other provisions in this report should help minimize the regional-functional divide, there will be situations where area specialists do not share the APB’s concerns about a particular country. In cases where the Board concludes that a critical situation merits a stronger interagency response, it should have the explicit authority to seek a deputies-level review of a particular situation even if the relevant regional officials do not agree. However, the APB should do so only in those cases where it has specific recommendations requiring action.<sup>31</sup>

#### **6-4. Use the proposed Early Prevention and Response account to ease the regional-functional divide.**

Much of the regional bureaus' resistance to atrocity prevention has been driven by the Obama Administration's decision to make the initiative "revenue neutral." As a result, there is a widespread perception that atrocity prevention is yet another unfunded mandate that is demanding the reallocation of already stretched accounts.

Embassies and regional bureaus have been more open to engaging when funds have been available to support proposed prevention and response programming.



- The administration should instruct State/CSO and USAID/DCHA to make funds from the EPR account available to support projects in countries identified by the IC as at significant or high risk of mass atrocities.
- Regional bureaus and embassy country teams<sup>32</sup> then would be able to seek funds to support specific programs, projects, and short-term staffing needs that support atrocity prevention and response.
- CSO and DCHA should communicate to regional bureaus and country teams that participation in relevant APB and sub-APB meetings, cooperation in the drafting of policy background briefings, and support for the deployment of Atrocity Assessment Framework missions will improve the chances of their applications for funding being approved.

#### **6-5. Prepare in-depth policy background briefs on countries of particular concern.**

<sup>33</sup> As valuable as the IC's country-specific deep dives have been, there is no comparable process in place to provide the APB with an in-depth written briefing on current U.S. policy on a given country of concern.<sup>34</sup>

- In advance of each APB meeting, the Department of State, in coordination with the embassy and IPC, should prepare a policy background brief (PBB) for each country on that month's agenda.

- Each PBB should summarize current U.S. policy on that country, including interests, goals, and objectives. Each should also:
  - Describe the existing U.S. footprint in a given country (including foreign assistance and security cooperation, the trade relationship, the size of embassy, and the status of mission personnel);<sup>35</sup>
  - Identify gaps in USG capacity (e.g. understaffed embassy, no USAID mission) and inhibitors to future action (e.g. security risks, poor roads, poor infrastructure);
  - Pinpoint potential international partners and their capacities, including contributors to peacekeeping operations and whether the U.S. may need to provide airlift, intelligence, or logistics support;
  - Assess where additional resources could be drawn from—and when they could best be deployed—should the United States choose to undertake a response; and,
  - Discuss potential operational constraints, logistics requirements, and the impact of further action on other USG policies and programs.
- CSO, in conjunction with the relevant State regional bureau, should be responsible for coordinating the PBB process. Each PBB should be briefed to the sub-APB in advance of the APB meeting.
- Although the goal should be to draft, maintain, and regularly update PBBs on all countries identified by the IC as at significant or high risk of mass atrocities, the initial focus should be on preparing them for the APB meetings.

There is no process in place to provide the APB with an in-depth written briefing on current U.S. policy on a given country of concern.

**6-6. Better utilize existing planning mechanisms.** There are existing planning mechanisms that could be used more effectively to support USG atrocity prevention and response efforts.

- The APB should work with State/CSO and USAID/DCHA to coordinate preparation of Atrocity Assessment Frameworks (AAFs) for any country identified by the IC as at significant or high risk of mass atrocities.<sup>36</sup> Once an AAF is completed, the sub-APB should hold a joint meeting with the relevant IPC to review its recommendations and, when relevant, recommend specific policies and programs to the relevant agencies, offices, and country team.
- DoD should explore how it could further incorporate atrocity prevention and response into general planning guidance.
  - The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities should continue to ensure that mass atrocity prevention response options (MAPRO) are incorporated into general planning guidance, including the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF),<sup>37</sup> relevant campaign and contingency plans, strategic guidance statements, and in the case of relevant operations, planning and execute orders.
  - All Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) that include countries identified in the IC's annual assessment of at-risk countries should incorporate MAPRO into their theater campaign plans (TCPs).
- The Joint Staff's Directorate for Joint Force Development (J7) should:
  - Integrate mass atrocity prevention and response concepts, including existing doctrine on mass atrocity response operations (MARO) into JP 3-0 (*Joint Operations*);<sup>38</sup>
  - Incorporate an analysis of the conditions that could lead to mass atrocities and genocide into the *Joint Operating Environment* and *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*.<sup>39</sup>

**6-7. Develop and implement a standard lessons-learned process to evaluate the USG response to atrocity crises.** Although the APB has helped spark innovations in early warning and successful policy interventions, it has not yet developed a consistent lessons-learned process that could inform future contingency planning and resource allocation.

- Each lessons-learned analysis should look at decisions made both before and during the policy response.
- The process should draw on and benefit from the Joint Lessons Learned Program managed by J7.

- Given that bureaus and offices will have a perception bias in favor of their own policy responses, lessons-learned processes should be delegated to an independent outside reviewer such as the National Defense University.
- All APB member departments and agencies should be mandated to participate in and cooperate with any lessons-learned process. Affected agencies, bureaus, and offices should be given the opportunity to comment on reports, but not the authority to edit, rewrite, or block their release.

## 7. INVOLVE AND EMPOWER U.S. EMBASSIES

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The Department of State’s post-Benghazi tendency to draw down U.S. embassies at the moment when countries are at greatest risk of mass atrocities has meant that even those posts with the capacity to track a crisis often find themselves operating with a skeleton crew at the very moment that the APB is pushing for greater attention and engagement. In many cases, atrocity crises occur in places where the United States has only limited diplomatic representation. These posts would not have had sufficient resources to mobilize or manage a more effective on-the-ground response even if they had not been evacuated or closed. This has meant that U.S. officials often have had to fly blind at the moment they most needed up-to-date, actionable information.

### **7-1. Use funds from the Early Prevention and Response account to support embassies in countries at significant or high risk of mass atrocities.**

- The administration should set aside part of the new Early Prevention and Response account to fund the deployment of personnel (including additional security) to embassies in those countries named in the IC’s annual assessment.<sup>40</sup> Embassies could use these funds to facilitate:
  - Deployment of temporary duty (TDY) personnel to support new prevention and response initiatives;
  - Specialized support, including additional security, USAID mission advisors and, where there are no permanent positions, defense, legal, and intelligence specialists; and,
  - Expansion of existing or establishment of new programs and initiatives that reduce social marginalization and conflict, increase legitimacy, strengthen accountability and resilience, and promote respect for human rights.

In many cases, atrocity crises occur in places where the United States has only limited diplomatic representation. This has meant that U.S. officials often have had to fly blind at the moment they most needed up-to-date, actionable information.

- The Department of State should focus on building capacity in small embassies in high-risk countries that have traditionally struggled to retain a full complement of staff. EPR account funds should not be used to supplement existing staff and programs in those countries—such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria—where there is a risk of atrocities but the United States already has a substantial presence.
- As noted above, State/CSO and USAID/DCHA should work with regional bureaus and embassy country teams to make available additional funds for new programming, including assistance for local civil society, independent media, peacebuilding, democratic governance, power-sharing, and other initiatives that can contribute to stability and help prevent conflict.
- To encourage engagement with, and support for, local civil society, embassy country teams should play a central advisory role in determining allocation of funds.

**7-2. Require embassies in countries identified by the IC as being at significant or high risk of mass atrocities to regularly track and report on atrocity concerns.<sup>41</sup>**

- Each year, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights should jointly send an ALDAC<sup>42</sup> reporting on the findings of the IC's annual assessment. The cable should:
  - Identify all countries on the IC list and lay out why each was determined as at risk;
  - Be distributed via DoD and IC channels; and,
  - Be distributed to all Geographic Combatant Commands.

- Embassies in countries identified as at significant or high risk should be required to take certain steps:
  - Assign a dedicated officer responsible for tracking warning signs of mass atrocities;
  - Provide monthly updates on country conditions;
  - Include a section on the presence of risk factors for mass atrocities (using the recognize-prevent-respond framework presented in USAID's *Field Guide: Helping Prevent Mass Atrocities*<sup>43</sup>) in the relevant chapter of the Department of State's annual *Country Report on Human Rights Practices*;
  - Participate in relevant meetings of the APB and sub-APB;
  - Work with State/CSO to determine the feasibility of conducting an assessment mission, using the State/USAID Atrocity Assessment Framework;
  - Require all newly deploying personnel to complete a mandatory course on atrocity prevention; and
  - Participate in any lessons-learned processes.
- Ambassadors and deputy chiefs of mission in countries of concern should be required to participate in a session on atrocity prevention during the annual Chiefs of Mission conference.

**7-3. Resolve existing bureaucratic roadblocks limiting the ability of State and USAID to rapidly deploy additional personnel in situations where there is a critical need.** As a recent study noted, “State and USAID lack the personnel structures, staffing patterns, family support structure, and required expertise to deploy a large number of people in a short time. Additionally, the resources and funding of these institutions prevent them from having such a surge capacity. The risk in not addressing these issues is great; history will likely repeat itself when these agencies are again asked to surge their staffs.”<sup>44</sup>

- The Under Secretary of State for Management and Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights should appoint a joint task force to explore how existing personnel structures can be adapted to ensure rapid deployment of TDY personnel to embassies in countries at imminent risk of mass atrocities.



- State should explore whether the “bullpen” model utilized by USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) may be worth duplicating for deploying TDY personnel to countries identified as at significant or high risk of mass atrocities. OTI maintains a roster of personal service contractors (PSCs) who can be hired on short notice and deployed quickly, largely avoiding many of the pitfalls and additional costs that come with reassigning more permanent staff.<sup>45</sup>

## 8. STRENGTHEN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

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One of the signal accomplishments of the Atrocities Prevention Board is the degree to which it has been able to request, consume, and utilize timely, actionable intelligence on those countries at greatest risk of mass atrocities. The Intelligence Community’s monthly updates have helped give the APB the strong evidentiary basis it needed to draw interagency attention to below-the-radar crises in the Central African Republic, Burundi, Guinea, and regions within Burma and South Sudan. The first-ever National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the global risk of mass atrocities and the prospects for response by the international community was well-received throughout the USG and helped inform the APB’s long-term planning. As far as is known, there has not yet been a case where the IC has failed to identify a country at significant or high risk of mass atrocities.

That said, there is still more that could be done to translate early warning into action. The next administration should ensure that the IC has the capacity and resources to continue to build on its successes to date.

**The Director for National Intelligence should create a new National Intelligence Manager position with responsibility for tracking potential and ongoing atrocities.**

**8-1. Create a new National Intelligence Manager position.** The Director for National Intelligence (DNI) should create a new National Intelligence Manager (NIM) position with responsibility for tracking potential and ongoing atrocities.<sup>46</sup>

- The NIM should serve as principal advisor to the DNI and CIA director on atrocity issues. He or she also should:
  - Oversee integration of atrocity prevention into the National Intelligence Priorities Framework;
  - Ensure that the National Intelligence Council undertakes quadrennial updates to the NIE;
  - Explore how the APB could work with the CIA's Political Instability Task Force;
  - Make sure that the IC has allocated the resources necessary to track multiple countries of concern and that collectors are appropriately focused on atrocity issues;
  - Confirm that tradecraft schools have developed and implemented training courses on atrocity issues.
- The NIM should continue the practice of preparing, in coordination with the APB, an annual update to the IC list of countries of concern.
  - The update should be divided into a three-tiered hierarchy (at risk, at significant risk, at highest risk) that can help the APB and relevant IPCs assess and respond to potential hotspots.
  - The update also should indicate clearly whether conditions are improving or worsening in each country, the current collection posture, and plans for enhancing future collection.<sup>47</sup>
  - When relevant, the update should include an assessment of non-state actors (NSAs) that have the capacity or will to commit mass atrocities.
  - The update also should begin to include a review and assessment of the previous year's forecast.

**8-2. Strengthen, institutionalize, and expand intelligence collection and distribution.**

The IC has had to support the APB with limited resources and personnel.

- The DNI should instruct the Open Source Enterprise in the CIA's Department of Digital Innovation to create a permanent atrocities analysis team to collect and summarize for the APB credible independent reporting by media (including social media) and local, national, and international civil society organizations.



- The DNI should instruct the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) in the Department of State each to assign appropriate permanent full-time-equivalent positions to collect information and report on potential and ongoing atrocity situations.
- The IC should include its annual assessment of countries at risk as well as its monthly country deep-dives in the relevant briefing materials and books prepared for senior officials, including the president, vice president, secretaries of state and defense, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- The DNI should continue to include an analysis of atrocity risks in his or her annual Worldwide Threat Assessment testimony to Congress.
- The NIM should work with the APB to explore how like-minded countries could better share intelligence on potential atrocity situations, taking into consideration the need not to compromise sources and methods.<sup>48</sup>

### **8-3. Explore whether other existing information-gathering processes could be adapted to supplement atrocity prevention initiatives.**

- State, in cooperation with the IC, DoD, Treasury, Justice, and the FBI, should establish two small atrocity investigation units, modeled on the Department of State's Foreign Emergency Support Teams, to collect first-hand testimony and forensic evidence on large-scale violence against civilians.<sup>49</sup> The units could be drawn from across the government or contracted out, but they would need to be pre-established and easily deployable.

- Given the fact that complex humanitarian crises and mass violence are often closely interconnected in space and time, USAID and its partner agencies should explore whether the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) could be used to monitor, track, and provide early warning on potential atrocity situations.<sup>50</sup>

## 9. REVISIT THE ISSUE OF TARGETED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

At the time of the rollout of the APB, the White House also announced that the president had signed Executive Order 13606, “Blocking the Property and Suspending Entry Into the United States of Certain Persons With Respect to Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria via Information Technology” (GHRIVITY), which authorized economic sanctions and visa bans against those who use information technology to commit or facilitate grave human rights abuses in Syria and Iran, in the process suggesting that it might consider extending the program to cover other situations as well.<sup>51</sup> It also pledged to explore the viability of a stand-alone sanctions mechanism that could target individuals known to have committed or enabled the commission of mass atrocities, war crimes, and crimes against humanity without requiring a blanket country designation.



Citation: Roger, CC BY 2.0

The next administration should revisit the idea of a stand-alone sanctions mechanism that could target individuals known to have committed or enabled the the commission of mass atrocities without requiring a blanket country designation.

According to one analyst, the Department of the Treasury's initial enthusiasm for such measures subsequently faded when the potential size and scope of the proposals, combined with the administration's promise that atrocity prevention would be revenue neutral, raised concerns that Treasury would not have sufficient collection and analytic resources to implement them.<sup>52</sup> The next administration should revisit both proposals and consider others as well.

**9-1. Ensure that Treasury and other relevant agencies have the personnel they need to implement new sanctions regimes.**<sup>53</sup> Before any of the other recommendations in this section can be considered, Treasury and other relevant agencies will need to be assured that they will have the staff necessary to implement them. As noted earlier, a portion of the Early Prevention and Response account should be set aside to enable the IC, the FBI, and the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to hire additional dedicated analysts and establish units specifically devoted to identifying individuals who could face financial and criminal sanctions for promoting or enabling atrocities.

**9-2. Revise and reissue GHRIVITY.** The idea behind GHRIVITY was to sanction not only repressive regimes but also the companies responsible for selling them digital technology tools that could be used to monitor, track, and target citizens in the commission of human rights abuses. The next administration should expand GHRIVITY to allow the targeting of any corporation or individual who knowingly sells or distributes goods or services to regimes or NSAs that intend to use them to plan or commit human rights abuses, including atrocities. This would include not only technology, but more conventional commodities, including fuel, small arms, replacement parts, and aircraft.

**9-3. Issue a new executive order that would create a stand-alone sanctions mechanism targeting human rights abusers.** The next administration should revisit the idea of a stand-alone sanctions mechanism that could target individuals known to have committed or enabled the commission of mass atrocities without requiring a blanket country designation. Once the new personnel proposed above are hired, the new administration should quickly review and issue the current draft atrocities sanctions EO, which reportedly was shelved by the White House due to resource concerns.

**9-4. Explore utilizing other tools to counter third-party enablers' support of those responsible for atrocities.** Many states and NSAs rely on third parties—whether friendly governments, commercial entities, or individual financiers—to facilitate their acquisition of the materiel necessary to commit atrocities. In addition to expanding GHRVITY, the next administration should explore whether other existing diplomatic and economic mechanisms could be used to target these enablers.

- The Department of Justice should explore whether existing laws such as the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act and the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act could be used to seize the assets of third parties knowingly providing material support for those committing mass atrocities.<sup>54</sup>
- The IC should include in their monthly deep-dives a summary of the role of third-party enablers, including governments, transnational criminal networks, companies, banks, and supply chains that support NSAs.<sup>55</sup>
- State should instruct desk officers responsible for countries regarded by the IC as at significant or high risk of mass atrocities to work with embassies to identify individuals, commercial entities, and governments whose assistance may be enabling local capacity to commit mass atrocities.<sup>56</sup>

**9-5. Launch a new international initiative to coordinate sanctions targeting genocidaires and their enablers.**<sup>57</sup> The United States should work with key allies and partners to launch an international initiative to sanction perpetrators and enablers of mass atrocities. The next administration should task the Office of the Coordinator for Sanctions Policy in the Department of State to work with OFAC to translate the new domestic initiatives into a comparable international regime.

## 10. BUILD AN INTERNAL CONSTITUENCY

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One of the biggest challenges to building a sustained and sustainable atrocity prevention and response initiative—or any such thematic effort—is that there are few, if any, career advancement incentives for civil servants, members of the armed forces, and, in particular, the Foreign Service to get involved. Despite the growth of a small and dedicated cadre of mid-level officials committed to the APB and related initiatives, there are no long-term measures in place to encourage others to regard atrocity prevention as something that can boost their careers. If anything, the opposite is true: many Foreign Service to get involved. Officers (FSOs) regard a rotation in most of the bureaus overseen by the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights (colloquially known as “J”) or in small embassies in countries at risk of atrocities as unlikely to enhance their long-term career trajectory.<sup>58</sup>

These challenges won’t be overcome overnight. Although additional funding will in all likelihood make atrocity prevention a more appealing field, real change will require a significant transformation in the way departments and agencies mandate training for and incentivize engagement by mid-level officials.

“Despite the growth of a small and dedicated cadre of mid-level officials committed to the APB and related initiatives, there are no long-term measures in place to encourages others to regard atrocity prevention as something that can enhance their careers.”

**10-1. Mandate additional training.** Since the PSD-10 study was approved in December 2011, departments and agencies have developed and implemented a wide range of training programs. As one study has noted, “A small group of early adopters in key agencies have developed a range of new courses and materials. Although largely ad hoc, their efforts have helped promote the crucial role that training can play in ensuring that U.S. officials are prepared should an atrocity event take place.”<sup>59</sup> EO 13729’s provision that State and USAID “offer mass atrocity prevention and response training courses to all officers deployed or planning deployment to countries deemed by the IC to be at high or substantial risk for mass atrocities” is also an important development. That said, requiring





two agencies to offer a course is very different from mandating that all APB agencies and departments do so—or from requiring certain types of personnel to take it.<sup>60</sup>

- As noted above, the revised EO's provisions on training should be expanded to include all APB member agencies.
- The APB should provide clear policy guidance to all participating agencies on its training expectations and priorities. It should task the sub-APB to work with agency and departmental training programs (including the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), USAID University, and the various service academies and war colleges) to develop a common training framework and curriculum that could be adapted to the specific needs of agencies.
- As noted above, the administration should request and Congress should allocate funds for mandatory training for State and USAID personnel. It also should request appropriate sums from the relevant accounts to fund mandatory training for DoD, the IC, Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security personnel.
- Agencies should reduce barriers making it difficult for their personnel to participate in trainings conducted by other departments.



- State should:
  - Ensure that atrocity prevention and response are part of the new core curriculum for FSOs currently under development.
  - Mandate the incorporation of modules on atrocity prevention concepts into the A-100 course for new FSOs; comparable introductory courses for new civil servants; tradecraft courses for political, public diplomacy, economic, and consular officers; and the deputy chief of mission/principal officer course.
  - Instruct FSI to develop an in-depth course on atrocity prevention concepts, which will be mandatory for:
    - FSOs deploying to at-risk posts;
    - Desk officers in regional bureaus working on at-risk countries;
    - FSOs and civil servants working in State/J and its subordinate bureaus and offices;
    - Senior advisors and special assistants working for deputy, under, and assistant secretaries;
    - Civil service employees responsible for bureau planning and performance management, including monitoring and evaluation; and
    - Personnel deploying on temporary duty (TDY) of more than three months in duration to at-risk countries.
  - Develop an online course for foreign service nationals (FSNs) working in at-risk countries.
  
- USAID should:
  - Mandate that USAID personnel take the current introductory online module on atrocity prevention; and,
  - Mandate and fund USAID University to work with DCHA to develop a classroom-based in-depth course on atrocity prevention concepts based on the USAID *Field Guide* that will be mandatory for all USAID personnel deploying to at-risk posts.
  
- DoD should:
  - Instruct the service academies, war colleges, and other institutions responsible for professional military education to incorporate atrocity prevention concepts into mandatory academic programs and leadership and ethics training;
  - Require all Geographic Combatant Commands to offer training on atrocity prevention and the protection of civilians;

- Add atrocity prevention and response to the Universal Joint Task List;<sup>61</sup> and
- Order the National Defense University to develop a semester-long course on atrocity prevention and the protection of civilians.
- The APB should work with its remaining constituent departments and agencies to develop and implement mandatory training for personnel working on human rights and atrocity prevention in the following offices:
  - National Intelligence Council (ODNI);
  - Mission Center for Global Issues (CIA);
  - Open Source Enterprise (CIA);
  - Office of Human Rights and Special Prosecutions (Justice);
  - Office of Foreign Assets Control (Treasury);
  - Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Unit, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Department of Homeland Security); and,
  - International Human Rights Unit (FBI).

## **10-2. Create incentives for Foreign Service Officers to work on atrocity prevention.**

Although it is essential that all departments and agencies encourage and incentivize mid-career officials to work on atrocity prevention, the Foreign Service poses a particular challenge. Historically, FSOs have regarded a rotation in the “J” family of bureaus as likely to hinder advancement to the Senior Foreign Service. Similarly, small embassies—especially in those countries most at risk of mass atrocities—are often regarded as offering little or no opportunity to raise an FSO’s career profile.

- State and USAID should create a functional issues career track that would incentivize and reward FSOs for service in functional bureaus.<sup>62</sup> The 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review’s pledge to “strengthen incentives for Foreign Service Officers to serve in functional bureaus by seeking to add a functional elective option for admission into the Senior Foreign Service and a functional family major to the Career Development Plan” is a good start, but it is unlikely to encourage participation and interest in the way that a separate “cone” would.<sup>63</sup>

- State and USAID should develop measures to reward Foreign Service Officers who deploy to small embassies in countries at risk of mass atrocities. Salary-based incentives are not the only example, but they are illustrative. Current danger-pay allowance rates—which provide a bonus as a percentage of the FSO’s salary—are slanted in favor of those countries where the United States is heavily engaged in counter-terrorism activities. Danger pay for service in smaller posts such as those in Burundi, Guinea, and the Central African Republic should match the current top-level (35 percent) allowance received by FSOs posted in much larger embassies like those in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan.<sup>64</sup>
- State should create an “atrocities prevention and response” skill code for Foreign Service Officers.<sup>65</sup> This would allow the department to track, create incentives for, and reward FSOs with prior experience working in crisis situations.





# SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

## Recommendation 1—Consistently Demonstrate Leadership

### *For the President*

- 1-1 Revise and reissue Executive Order 13729.
- 1-2 Engage and involve Congress.
- 1-3 Ensure that atrocity prevention remains a named priority in key strategic planning documents.
- 1-4 Establish a Presidential Advisory Council.

### *For Congress*

- 1-5 Fully fund and authorize atrocity prevention initiatives.
- 1-6 Strengthen Congress's own capacity to track prevention and response measures.

### *For Nongovernmental Organizations*

- 1-7 Organize and sustain a strong and sustained public advocacy campaign.

## Recommendation 2—Prioritize and Institutionalize Early Prevention

- 2-1 Make early prevention a priority—and make the case to Congress and the American people as to why it's important.
- 2-2 Give greater priority to supporting and strengthening local civil society.
- 2-3 Support design and development of more effective performance monitoring and project evaluation mechanisms.

## Recommendation 3—Ensure Dedicated Funding and Personnel

- 3-1 Ensure dedicated funding for early prevention.
- 3-2 Expand funding for existing and proposed programs.
- 3-3 Hire additional staff in key offices.
- 3-4 Convert key State and USAID funds to no-year appropriations.
- 3-5 Bring OMB to the table.

## Recommendation 4—Promote Greater International Cooperation

- 4-1 Support existing UN efforts to give greater priority and attention to preventing mass atrocities.
- 4-2 Reinforce and expand existing U.S. efforts to promote accountability and justice.
- 4-3 Strengthen the capacity of peacekeeping operations to protect civilians from mass atrocity threats.

### **Recommendation 5—Address the Role of Non-State Actors in Atrocities**

- 5-1 Develop new tools designed specifically to counter atrocities committed by NSAs.
- 5-2 Affirm that countering violent extremism and preventing mass atrocities are mutually reinforcing initiatives, sharing many of the same strategies, tactics, goals, and outcomes.

### **Recommendation 6—Strengthen and Expand Policy Coordination, Planning, and Lessons Learned**

- 6-1 Consolidate NSC coordination on early prevention, atrocity response, and stabilization under a single senior director.
- 6-2 Strengthen the authority and refine the focus of the APB.
- 6-3 Give the APB the authority to bring crisis situations to the attention of deputies.
- 6-4 Use the proposed Early Prevention and Response account to ease the regional-function divide.
- 6-5 Prepare in-depth policy background briefs on countries of particular concern.
- 6-6 Better utilize existing planning mechanisms.
- 6-7 Develop and implement a standard lessons-learned process to evaluate the USG response to atrocity crises.

### **Recommendation 7—Involve and Empower U.S. Embassies**

- 7-1 Use funds from the Early Prevention and Response account to support embassies in countries at significant or high risk of mass atrocities.
- 7-2 Require embassies in countries identified by the Intelligence Community as being at significant or high risk of mass atrocities to regularly track and report on atrocity concerns.
- 7-3 Resolve existing bureaucratic roadblocks limiting the ability of State and USAID to rapidly deploy additional personnel in situations where there is a critical need.

### **Recommendation 8—Strengthen Intelligence Collection**

- 8-1 Create a new National Intelligence Manager position.
- 8-2 Strengthen, institutionalize, and expand intelligence collection and distribution.
- 8-3 Explore whether other existing information-gathering processes could be adapted to supplement atrocity prevention initiatives.

### **Recommendation 9—Revisit the Issue of Targeted Economic Sanctions**

- 9-1 Ensure that Treasury and other relevant agencies have the personnel they need to implement new sanctions regimes.
- 9-2 Revise and reissue GHRVITY.
- 9-3 Issue a new executive order creating a stand-alone sanctions mechanism targeting human rights abusers.
- 9-4 Explore utilizing other tools to counter third-party enablers' support of those responsible for atrocities.
- 9-5 Launch a new international initiative to coordinate sanctions targeting genocidaires and their enablers.

### **Recommendation 10—Build an Internal Constituency**

- 10-1 Mandate additional training.
- 10-2 Create incentives for Foreign Service Officers to work on atrocity prevention.

# APPENDIX I: MEMBERS OF THE EXPERTS COMMITTEE

*Members of the Experts Committee participated in their personal capacities independent of their institutional affiliations, which are listed for identification purposes only.*

**Charles J. Brown** is Managing Director of Strategy for Humanity. From 2010 to 2014, he served in the Obama Administration, the last two years as Senior Advisor on Atrocity Prevention and Response in the U.S. Department of Defense. In the past, he has held senior positions with Amnesty International USA, Freedom House, and several other NGOs. During the Clinton Administration, he was Chief of Staff in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in the U.S. Department of State and a member of the U.S. delegation to the Rome Conference on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court. He is principal author of this report.

**James P. Finkel** is the founder and co-convenor of the Atrocity Prevention Working Group. He is a Courtesy Professor of Practice at the University of Oregon's Clark Honors College and a participant in the University's Genocide Prevention Initiative. A former member of the senior civil service, he helped draft the report mandated by Presidential Study Directive 10 and participated in meetings of the Atrocities Prevention Board. He is the author of *Atrocity Prevention at the Crossroads* and *Moving beyond the Crossroads: Strengthening the Atrocity Prevention Board*.

**Richard Fontaine** is President of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), where he served as a Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow from 2009-2012. He was foreign policy advisor to Senator John McCain for more than five years, including during the 2008 presidential campaign. He has worked at the Department of State, National Security Council, and on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff.



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**Tod Lindberg** is a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He is co-author with Lee Feinstein of *Means to an End: U.S. Interest in the International Criminal Court* and the forthcoming *Allies Against Atrocities: The Imperative for Transatlantic Cooperation to Prevent and Stop Mass Killings*. He was Lead Expert for International Norms and Institutions for the Genocide Prevention Task Force.

**Bridget Moix** has worked for more than 20 years on issues of international peace and conflict and US foreign policy. She currently serves as U.S. Senior Representative for Peace Direct, a UK-based organization that supports local peacebuilders in conflict-affected countries. From 2013-2015, she was an Atrocity Prevention Fellow with the U.S. Agency for International Development and engaged with the work of the Atrocities Prevention Board. She served for nine years with the Friends Committee on National Legislation, where she lobbied to improve U.S. capacities to prevent violent conflict and helped establish the Prevention and Protection Working Group. She has also worked with the Quaker United Nations Office, Oxfam America, the American Friends Service Committee, and local peace organizations in Mexico and South Africa.

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**Keith Porter** is President and Chief Executive Officer of the Stanley Foundation. Previously, he was the Foundation's Director of Policy and Outreach, playing a leadership role in its transition to a dynamic, advocacy organization focused on multilateral policy-change. He has been active in the Foundation's mass atrocity prevention initiatives for much of his nearly three decades there.

**Candace Rondeaux** is a senior program officer at the U.S. Institute of Peace and director of the Secretariat of the RESOLVE Network, a global consortium of researchers and research organizations focused on providing data driven, policy-relevant analysis and insight into violent extremism around the world. A veteran analyst of South and Central Asian affairs and international security issues, she has written extensively about the dynamics of state building and political Islam in modern Muslim majority states. She has served as a strategic advisor to the Office of the U.S. Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, South Asia bureau chief for the *Washington Post*, and a senior analyst for the International Crisis Group.

**Madeline Rose** is Senior Policy Advisor for Mercy Corps. Prior to joining Mercy Corps, she was the lead lobbyist for the Peaceful Prevention of Deadly Conflict program at the Friends Committee on National Legislation. She has worked in Congress, at the United Nations, with community-based organizations in Zimbabwe and South Africa, and in the technology community in the Silicon Valley.

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**Beth Van Schaack** is the Leah Kaplan Visiting Professor in Human Rights at Stanford Law School. In 2012-2013, she served as the Deputy to the Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice in the U.S. Department of State. From 2003 to 2012, she was Professor of Law at Santa Clara University School of Law. Her past positions include serving as an advisor to the National Institute for Military Justice.

**Lawrence Woocher** is Research Director at the Simon-Skjoldt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. In the past he has served as an Atrocity Prevention Fellow with USAID, research director of the Political Instability Task Force, and senior program officer at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He was Lead Expert on Early Warning for the Genocide Prevention Task Force.

## PROJECT STAFF

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**Julia Watson** is Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow at the Friends Committee on National Legislation. Previously, she interned at the Bureau of Conflict Stabilization Operations in the Department of State. In 2015, she graduated from Northwestern University, where she conducted research on wartime social order and served as the student body president.

## APPENDIX II: METHODOLOGY AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report is the product of a series of face-to-face meetings, phone calls, and online conversations among members of the Experts Committee on Preventing Mass Violence from May through September 2016. We drew on the knowledge and experience of current and former officials, academics, think-tank experts, and nongovernmental organization leaders. We have sought to build on the important work of the bipartisan Genocide Prevention Task Force, whose 2008 report remains an essential reference and touchstone for those seeking to construct an effective and successful atrocity prevention architecture. We have benefitted from the findings of a number of studies and reviews of U.S. government initiatives to date, as well from discussions with many of those most closely involved in the development of the GPTF, the establishment of the Atrocities Prevention Board, and subsequent governmental atrocity prevention and response initiatives.

The recommendations in this report are derived from our own deliberations, suggestions made in multiple other studies, and specific proposals drawn directly from other reports. We have sought to cite the original sources whenever possible. That said, we do not claim to speak for those whose recommendations we embrace, and acknowledge that any errors or omissions are our own.

Members of the Experts Committee participated in their personal capacities independent of their institutional affiliations, which are listed in their biographies for identification purposes only.

The Experts Committee would like to thank the Prevention and Protection Working Group for providing us with the opportunity to make these recommendations. In particular, we would like to thank Theo Sittler and Julia Watson of the Friends Committee on National Legislation (which serves as the secretariat for the PPWG) for their hard work, strong support, and good cheer, which were critical to our deliberations. We also want to thank Tod Lindberg and the Hoover Institution for serving as host of our face-to-face meetings, and Keith Porter and the Stanley Foundation for hosting a dinner discussion with USG officials.

## APPENDIX III: ACRONYMS

<b>AAF</b>	Atrocity Assessment Framework
<b>ACOTA</b>	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
<b>ALDAC</b>	State Department cable to “all diplomatic and consular posts”
<b>APB</b>	Atrocities Prevention Board
<b>APRRP</b>	African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership
<b>CIA</b>	Central Intelligence Agency
<b>CSO</b>	Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, U.S. Department of State
<b>CVE</b>	Countering Violent Extremism
<b>DCHA</b>	Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development
<b>DIA</b>	Defense Intelligence Agency
<b>DNI</b>	Director for National Intelligence
<b>DoD</b>	U.S. Department of Defense
<b>DRL</b>	Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State
<b>EO</b>	executive order
<b>EPR</b>	Early Prevention and Response account
<b>FBI</b>	Federal Bureau of Investigation
<b>FCNL</b>	Friends Committee on National Legislation
<b>FEST</b>	Foreign Emergency Support Team
<b>FEWS NET</b>	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
<b>FSI</b>	Foreign Service Institute
<b>FSO</b>	Foreign Service Officer
<b>FY</b>	fiscal year
<b>GAO</b>	Government Accountability Office
<b>GCC</b>	Geographic Combatant Command
<b>GCJ</b>	Office of Global Criminal Justice
<b>GEF</b>	Guidance for Employment of the Force
<b>GHRIVITY</b>	Executive Order 13606, “Blocking the Property and Suspending Entry Into the United States of Certain Persons With Respect to Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria via Information Technology”
<b>GPOI</b>	Global Peace Operations Initiative
<b>GPTF</b>	Genocide Prevention Task Force
<b>IC</b>	Intelligence Community

<b>ICC</b>	International Criminal Court
<b>INR</b>	Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State
<b>IPC</b>	Interagency Policy Committee
<b>ISR</b>	intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
<b>J7</b>	Directorate for Joint Force Development, Joint Chiefs of Staff
<b>JCS</b>	Joint Chiefs of Staff
<b>LRA</b>	Lord's Resistance Army
<b>MAPRO</b>	mass atrocity prevention and response options
<b>MARO</b>	mass atrocity response operations
<b>NGA</b>	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
<b>NGO</b>	nongovernmental organization
<b>NIE</b>	National Intelligence Estimate
<b>NIM</b>	National Intelligence Manager
<b>NIPF</b>	National Intelligence Priority Framework
<b>NSA</b>	non-state actor
<b>NSC</b>	National Security Council
<b>NSS</b>	National Security Staff
<b>OCO</b>	Overseas Contingency Operations
<b>ODNI</b>	Office of the Director for National Intelligence
<b>OFAC</b>	Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of Treasury
<b>OMB</b>	Office of Management and Budget
<b>OTI</b>	Office of Transition Initiatives, U.S. Agency for International Development
<b>PSC</b>	personal services contractor
<b>PEPFAR</b>	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
<b>PPWG</b>	Prevention and Protection Working Group
<b>PSD-10</b>	Presidential Study Directive 10
<b>State</b>	U.S. Department of State
<b>sub-APB</b>	working-level subcommittee of the Atrocities Prevention Board
<b>TCC</b>	troop-contributing country
<b>TCP</b>	theater campaign plan
<b>TDY</b>	temporary duty
<b>Treasury</b>	U.S. Department of Treasury
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNSG</b>	United Nations Secretary-General
<b>USAID</b>	U.S. Agency for International Development
<b>USG</b>	United States government

# NOTES

- 1 GPTF Report: Madeleine Albright and William Cohen, *Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers* [hereafter GPTF Report] (Washington: U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and others, 2008), xxi-xxii, <http://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20081124-genocide-prevention-report.pdf>  
PSD-10: White House, Presidential Study Directive 10 [PSD-10], “Creation of an Interagency Atrocities Prevention Board and Corresponding Interagency Review,” August 4, 2011, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/04/presidential-study-directive-mass-atrocities>.
- 2 See GPTF Report, xxi-xxii, and Executive Order 13729 of May 18, 2016, A Comprehensive Approach to Atrocity Prevention and Response, 81 CFR 32611 <https://federalregister.gov/a/2016-12307>.
- 3 Not all war crimes constitute or rise to the level of mass atrocities, as they can be committed by soldiers or members of a rebel group acting outside orders and against other combatants. Similarly, acts targeting an individual civilian or small number of civilians could constitute war crimes without fitting into the definition of mass atrocities unless they were part of a broader campaign.
- 4 This statement appears in both PSD-10 and Executive Order 13729.
- 5 GPTF Report, 13.
- 6 In June 2016, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee included a provision to authorize the APB—albeit with a June 30, 2017 sunset provision—in the Fiscal Year 2017 Department of State Operations Authorization and Embassy Security Act. The move followed the February 2016 introduction of a standalone bill, the Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act, that would permanently authorize the APB, among other provisions. Neither measure is expected to pass into law before the end of the 114th Congress.
- 7 Executive Order 13729.
- 8 This was first recommended in James P. Finkel, *Atrocity Prevention at the Crossroads: Assessing the President’s Atrocity Prevention Board after Two Years*, (Washington: U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Occasional Paper No. 2, September 2014) 29, <http://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20140904-finkel-atrocity-prevention-report.pdf>.
- 9 First recommended in GPTF Report, 12-13.
- 10 GPTF Report, 14.
- 11 According to a recent joint study by the Foundation Center and the Peace and Security Funders Group, “Grantmaking around conflict prevention accounted for a very small proportion of overall dollars in peace and security.” Only 10 percent of private foundation support for peace and security programs targets the escalation stage of conflict. See Alexandra I. Toma and Rachel LaForgia, *Peace and Security Funding Index: An Analysis of Global Foundation Grantmaking* (Washington: The Foundation Center and Peace and Security Funders Group, 2016), <http://peaceandsecurityindex.org/wp-content/themes/peaceandsecurity/images/PSFG-report.pdf>.
- 12 Executive Order 13729.
- 13 USAID, *Field Guide: Helping Prevent Mass Atrocities*, April 2015, 11, <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/Field%20Guide%20Mass%20Atrocities.pdf>.
- 14 William J. Burns, Michele A. Flournoy, and Nancy Lindborg, *U.S. Leadership and the Challenge of State Fragility*, September 2016, 12, <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/US-Leadership-and-the-Challenge-of-State-Fragility.pdf>.
- 15 World Bank, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development* (Washington: World Bank, 2011), 12, [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011\\_Full\\_Text.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf).
- 16 *U.S. Leadership and the Challenge of State Fragility*, 2.
- 17 See U.S. Department of State, “[FY17] Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs,” February 9, 2016, 2; 137-157, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/252179.pdf>. In the administration’s FY17 budget proposal, OCO funds cover 66 percent of contributions for international peacekeeping activities, 67 percent of migration and refugee support, and 94 percent of international disaster relief. U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, “International Affairs Budget Proposal Slightly Down: Growing Concern Over U.S. Ability to Keep Pace with Global Challenges,” (hereafter USGLC 2016), February 9, 2016, 2-5, <http://www.usglc.org/downloads/budget/USGLC-Budget-Analysis-FY2017.pdf>.

- 18 The 30 percent figure is base budget only. When OCO is included, the decline is 'only' 12 percent. USGLC 2016, 4.
- 19 This is an approximation based on the FY17 budget. It is difficult to determine an exact figure, as State no longer provides a precise breakout on some accounts, including Governing Justly and Democratically. State, FY17 Congressional Budget Justification, *passim*.
- 20 This figure includes \$2.4 billion for Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities, \$150 million for a proposed contingency Mechanism for Peace Operations Response, and \$475 billion for Peacekeeping Operations. State, FY17 Congressional Budget Justification, 3-4.
- 21 In October 2015, the DNI Open Source Center was renamed the Open Source Enterprise and incorporated into the CIA's Directorate of Digital Innovation.
- 22 USAID's Complex Crises Fund already is a no-year appropriation.
- 23 Lee A. Feinstein and Tod Lindberg, *Allies against Atrocities: The Imperative for Transatlantic Cooperation to Prevent and Stop Mass Killings* (Washington: U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Stanley Foundation, forthcoming), 38. Advance draft provided to members of the Experts Committee.
- 24 For a detailed set of recommendations on what the next UN Secretary-General should do on atrocity prevention and response, see Richard Gowan, Lawrence Woocher, and Daniel Solomon, *Preventing Mass Atrocities: An Essential Agenda for the Next UN Secretary-General* (Washington: U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, September 2016), <https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/Preventing-mass-atrocities.pdf>.
- 25 First recommended in Charles J. Brown, *The Worst Crisis You've Never Heard Of: The Obama Administration and the Struggle to Prevent Atrocities in the Central African Republic* (Washington: US Holocaust Memorial Museum, forthcoming), 47.
- 26 They include al-Qaida, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, the Lord's Resistance Army, the Taliban, Boko Haram, al Shabab, Seléka, the anti-balaka, M23, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and the Janjaweed, among others.
- 27 For more on this issue, see Sofia Sebastián and Jonas Claes, "Atrocity Prevention through Dialogue: Challenges in Dealing with Violent Extremist Organizations," U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report 390, September 2016.
- 28 The White House, "FACT SHEET: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism," February 18, 2016, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism>.
- 29 Feinstein and Lindberg, *Allies against Atrocities*, 1.
- 30 This point was highlighted recently in Daniel Solomon, "Advancing Research on Mass Atrocities Perpetrated by Non-State Actors," June 15, 2016, <https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20160630-sudikoff-rapporteurs-report.pdf>.
- 31 First recommended in Brown, *Worst Crisis*, 44.
- 32 Country teams are embassy-based and chaired by the ambassador. They include the heads of all embassy sections as well as representatives of other USG agencies at post. They are responsible for developing a mission strategic plan in coordination with relevant bureaus back in Washington.
- 33 First recommended in Finkel, *Atrocity Prevention at the Crossroads*, 3-4.
- 34 The current procedure is for the relevant NSS senior director and/or a senior official from the Department of State regional bureau to share views once the IC deep dive is briefed. They are not asked to prepare a written summary in advance of the APB meeting.
- 35 These sub-bullets are a variation on a recommendation first made by Brown, *Worst Crisis*, 45.
- 36 According to a State/USAID working paper, AAFs "help decision-makers and country watchers understand the dynamics that underpin a situation where there are indications of atrocity risk or where atrocities are underway." Each AAF attempts to identify potential perpetrators, enablers, and targeted groups; core grievances; societal resiliencies; potential triggers and warning signs; and windows of opportunity for prevention. See U.S. Department of State and USAID, "Atrocity Assessment Framework: Supplemental Guidance to State/USAID Conflict Assessment Frameworks," <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241399.pdf>.



- 37 According to JP 5-0 (*Joint Operation Planning*), the GEF “provides two-year direction to [Combatant Commands] for operational planning, force management, security cooperation, and posture planning. [It] is the method through which OSD translates strategic priorities . . . into implementable direction for operational activities.” U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “JP 5-0: Joint Operation Planning,” II-3, August 11, 2011, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp5\\_0.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf).
- 38 First recommended in Maj. Alison F. Atkins, *Atrocity Prevention and Response During Armed Conflict: Closing the Capability Gap* (Ft. Leavenworth: Army Press, January 2016), passim, <http://armypress.dodlive.mil/files/2016/02/APOJ16-2-Atkins-1Jan16.pdf>. As Atkins notes, the current doctrinal approach, which focuses exclusively on peace and stability operations, fails to recognize that U.S. forces may confront or have to respond to atrocities during kinetic operations.
- 39 First recommended in Atkins, *Atrocity Prevention and Response During Armed Conflict*, 13.
- 40 First recommended in Brown, *Worst Crisis*, 44-45.
- 41 First recommended in James P. Finkel, “Moving Beyond the Crossroads: Strengthening the Atrocity Prevention Board,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 9, no. 4 (2015): 144, <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1361&context=gsp>.
- 42 An ALDAC is a Department of State cable to “all diplomatic and consular posts.”
- 43 See USAID, *Field Guide: Helping Prevent Mass Atrocities*, particularly 14-26.
- 44 Peter Erickson et. al., *Lessons from the Civilian Surge in Afghanistan, 2009-2014* (Princeton: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2016), 1, [http://www.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/content/591f\\_Final\\_Final\\_20160208.pdf](http://www.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/content/591f_Final_Final_20160208.pdf).
- 45 First recommended in Erickson et. al., *Lessons*, 11.
- 46 First recommended in Finkel, *Atrocity Prevention at the Crossroads*, 25.
- 47 First recommended in Finkel, *Beyond the Crossroads*, 143.
- 48 First recommended in Feinstein and Lindberg, *Allies against Atrocities*, 12.
- 49 According to the Department of State, FESTs are interagency on-call groups of experts deployed at the request of a U.S. embassy in response to terrorist incidents overseas. They can include experts from DoD, the FBI, and other agencies “as circumstances warrant.” U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST),” undated, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/fest/>.
- 50 According to its website, FEWS NET is “a leading provider of early warning and analysis on acute food insecurity. . . [providing] objective, evidence-based analysis to help government decision-makers and relief agencies plan for and respond to humanitarian crises.” Its products include monthly reports and maps detailing current and potential food insecurity situations, alerts on emerging crises, and specialized reports on a range of issues that have the potential to contribute to food insecurity. See Famine Early Warning Systems Network, “About Us,” <http://www.fews.net/about-us>.
- 51 Executive Order 13606 of April 22, 2012, Blocking the Property and Suspending Entry into the United States of Certain Persons With Respect to Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria via Information Technology, 3 CFR 13606, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2013-title3-vol1/pdf/CFR-2013-title3-vol1-eo13606.pdf>.
- 52 Finkel, *Atrocity Prevention at the Crossroads*, 23.
- 53 First recommended in Finkel, *Atrocity Prevention at the Crossroads*, 29.
- 54 First recommended in Human Rights First, “How to Disrupt Enablers of Mass Atrocities: A Blueprint for the Next Administration,” February 2013, 3, <https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24328/uploads>.
- 55 Ibid.
- 56 Ibid.
- 57 First recommended in Feinstein and Lindberg, *Allies against Atrocities*, 40.
- 58 The offices and bureaus under J are the Bureaus of Conflict Stabilization Operations; Counter-Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism; Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; and Population, Refugees and Migration, as well as the Offices of Global Criminal Justice and Monitoring and Countering Trafficking in Persons.
- 59 Charles J. Brown, *An Assessment of USG Atrocity Prevention Training Programs* (Washington: U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2016), 6, <https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/03282016-USG-Atrocity-Prevention-Training-Assessment.pdf>.

- 60 Most of the following proposals on training were first recommended in Brown, *An Assessment*, passim.
- 61 First recommended in Atkins, *Atrocity Prevention and Response During Armed Conflict*, 10. The services use the Universal Joint Task List to identify “essential warfighting tasks,” giving combatant commanders the authority to develop training at the “strategic, national, theater, operational, and tactical levels.”
- 62 Currently, there are five career tracks (known informally as “cones”) in the Foreign Service: Political, Economic, Consular, Management, and Public Diplomacy. See <https://careers.state.gov/work/foreign-service/officer/career-tracks>.
- 63 See U.S. Department of State, *Enduring Leadership in a Dynamic World: The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, 2015, 75, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241429.pdf>.
- 64 First recommended in Brown, *Worst Crisis*, 44n.
- 65 First recommended in Erickson et. al., *Lessons Learned*, 23-24. According to the Foreign Affairs Manual, foreign service skill codes are “used in the personnel [data] system for both classifying positions and describing the skills of members. They are also a management tool for anticipating and generating from within the Department the skills that may be needed in the future.” 3 FAM 2620, <https://fam.state.gov/fam/03fam/03fam2620.html>.



## Prevention and Protection Working Group

The Prevention and Protection Working Group (PPWG) convened the Experts Committee on Preventing Mass Violence. The PPWG is a coalition of human rights, religious, humanitarian, anti-genocide, peace, and other organizations dedicated to improving U.S. government policies and civilian capacities to prevent violent conflict and mass atrocities, and to protect civilians threatened by such crises. The Friends Committee on National Legislation serves as secretariat for the PPWG.



### Friends Committee on National Legislation

A Quaker Lobby in the Public Interest

The Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL) was founded in 1943 by members of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers). FCNL's nonpartisan, multi-issue advocacy connects historic Quaker testimonies on peace, equality, simplicity, and truth with peace and social justice issues. FCNL fields the largest team of registered peace lobbyists in Washington, D.C.