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The shock and dismay of this loss were evident,
even in a country inured to war after 23 years, where
the Taliban and al Qaeda had been defeated two years earlier,
where 5,500 UN peacekeepers under NATO command had begun
to move into cities other than the capital of Kabul, where
the vital 300-mile, Kabul-to-Kandahar road was virtually
completed, and where a traditional loya jirga
was meeting to review, revise, and approve a draft constitution
that is to be submitted to the people in a referendum
in the spring,
But there was even more dismay at the reaction of an
unidentified U.S. spokesman: "If non-combatants surround
themselves with thousands of weapons and hundreds of rounds
of ammunition and howitzers and mortars, in a compound
known to be used by a terrorist, we are not completely
responsible for the consequences" (BBC online,
December 10, 2003).
In fact, it is the Afghans and others allied with the
U.S. who are feeling the consequences of war in Afghanistan.
Increased violence in Afghanistan over the last few months
is generally attributed to reorganized and re-supplied
remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda, bolstered by new
recruits motivated by anti-infidel, anti-western, and
anti-U.S. sentiments. Security has deteriorated to such
an extent that foreign UN field workers have been instructed
not to
travel to or within six provinces bordering Pakistan,
and fully 20 percent of the country is currently off-limits
to U.S. civilians and diplomats because of inadequate
security. Half of the 9,000 recruits for the new national
army have quit, calling into question the ability of the
Karzai government to field the 10,000-strong Central Corps
by election time in June 2004. Afghan military patrols
are attacked daily, and rocket attacks and bombings are
frequent occurrences. In late December, at least four
large bombs were detonated in Kabul, including one at
the UN's headquarters in Kabul and a suicide bomb at Kabul's
airport. Deaths from armed conflict are still running
at about 100 per month.
Meanwhile, the deliberations in the loya jirga
seemed to mirror verbally the combat in the streets. One
of the 100 women who are delegates (out of 502) denounced
the maneuvering of the warlords and other factions and
so angered her targets that she had to be provided a security
detail. As the meeting spilled over into 2004, there were
other divisions over the role and duties of a prime minister
as a balance to the strong presidential system favored
by the United States, and over the number of languages
to be officially recognized. Moreover, the chief UN representative
in Afghanistan predicted that the country will still be
too unstable to hold free and fair elections in June as
currently scheduled. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's
representative Lakhdar Brahimi expressed frustration at
the international community's failure to send more military
forces because of the danger, while it blithely dispatches
civilian missions into the same dangers: "I told
the Security Council, You told me to go to Afghanistan.
Now when I tell you I have some security concerns, you
tell me: 'You stay there, but it's too dangerous for our
soldiers.' What kind of lousy logic is that?" (Financial
Times, December 16, 2003).
Iraq
"Collateral damage" also has become a routine
daily occurrence in Iraq as the "victorious"
coalition tries to eradicate a stubborn resistance to
its occupation. With Saddam Hussein's capture by U.S.
forces on December 13, Washington, echoed by London, Madrid,
Rome, and Warsaw, seemed to signal cautious optimism that
the "end of the beginning" was at hand in Iraq.
Military commanders speculated that a spasm of retaliatory
attacks on coalition forces and members of the various
new Iraqi security organizations would not last with Saddam's
removal from the scene. As attacks decreased, the much-delayed
reduction of U.S. ground forces in Iraq would be implemented.
With fewer targets, commanders predicted the number of
daily attacks against occupation force installations would
fall from the year-end average of 25-30 and, in turn,
new casualties would drop.
They have not. As the first bell tolled the arrival of
2004, 478 U.S. military personnel had died from all causes
since the start of combat operations in Iraq on March
19, 2003. Another 2,300 had been wounded, and approximately
11,000 had been medically evacuated for one reason or
another. Reported British dead and wounded stood at 54
and 52, respectively, while other allied countries participating
in the occupation had lost 49 soldiers. Iraqi military
dead and wounded may never be known; civilian deaths are
conservatively estimated at nearly 10,000 and rising daily.
The obviously troubled post-war occupation and strong
opposition from key Iraqi religious leaders have compelled
the Bush Administration to make major changes to its original
vision of a secure, U.S.-friendly (and U.S.-shaped) Iraq.
An early warning sign, seemingly ignored by Washington,
was the opposition from the U.S.-appointed Interim Governing
Council (IGC) to the deployment of 10,000 Turkish soldiers
to help control the insurgents operating in central Iraq.
(The reported quid pro quo was U.S. lobbying for Turkey's
membership in the European Union and U.S. action to destroy
remnants of the anti-Turk Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK)
who reside in the mountains of northern Iraq.)
As "anti-occupation" sentiment among ordinary
Iraqis began to coalesce, the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) greatly accelerated the timetable for turning over
as much authority as possible to Iraqis (July 1, 2004)
even though Iraq's reformed civil and security structures
appear too fragile to bear the load they are now expected
to assume. Recruitment for the army, police, border guards,
and other security forces is haphazard; training is inadequate,
and the "wash-out" rate is as high as 50 percent,
with most quitting. Moreover, the U.S. has postponed plans
to abolish armed militias such as the Kurdish pesh merga
and the Shi'ite Badr Brigade and has winked at the creation
of other "private" armed groups associated with
members of the IGC. At the same time, the CPA is creating
a special 800-strong, anti-terror strike battalion to
accompany U.S. forces on raids to ferret out insurgents
and former regime officials.
Early U.S. insistence on a new constitution before elections
has given way to the creation of a "basic law"
by the IGC under which elections will be conducted for
a provisional national legislature that will choose a
provisional government from its members. This provisional
government will oversee the drafting of a new constitution
that will be subject to a national referendum, followed
by elections for a permanent government. Plans to privatize
some 200 state-owned and inefficient businesses have been
shelved for fear that thousands more people will be thrown
out of work in a country where unemployment reaches 60
percent in some areas.
This
analysis was prepared by Col. Dan Smith, U.S. Army (Ret.).
Dan, a West Point graduate and Vietnam veteran, is FCNL's
Senior Fellow on Military Affairs.
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