Alternatives to War by Colonel Dan Smith, USA (Ret.)

In July 1776, a mere eight days after the proclamation of the Declaration of Independence, a committee of the Second Continental Congress submitted its recommendations on the shape of the post-war government and the division of powers between the center and the local levels of governance. That report recommended the creation of a central government with the power to tax, to control (and sell) the “western lands,” and to provide for mutual defense.

By the time the draft went to the states for ratification, all that was gone – as was inter-state harmony. Small states demanded equal voting rights in the national legislature, while the more populous states feared they would end up subsidizing the central government when it came to paying for armed forces (taxation without commensurate representation – a variation of the colonists’ complaint against Parliament). States whose territory opened onto the vast continental interior wanted control over those lands, while states without direct access demanded that the central government retain control. This latter arrangement would ensure that revenue derived from the sale of these vast tracts would be distributed equally among the states – even though the colonists had never had title to them in the first place.

Finally, in November 1777, Congress sent the weakened Articles to the 13 colonial legislatures. Four years later, the Articles were ratified and remained the basic law for just over seven years (June 1788). A few of the more salient features were:

• no central executive or federal judiciary. The only “judicial” power at the center – to resolve disputes between states – belonged to Congress;
  
• ongress had to solicit voluntary “donations” from the individual states to meet ordinary costs of daily governance;
  
• the unicameral Congress raised the armed forces, but without approval of nine states, it could not coin or print money, declare war, or enter into treaties;
  
• Congress had power to create and maintain a postal system and control development of the western lands.

Despite the obvious failure of the Articles, opposition to a strong central government persisted. The debates that ensued in the run-up to ratification evoked some of the best known verbal duels in the Federalist Papers and the broadsheets of the day.

Empowering Democratic Divisions

The dilemma was to create a system that would work equally in three different yet intersecting contexts. The first dealt with striking the proper, sustainable balance between national and local levels of governance. Too much federal power could smother individual and states’ rights; too little would undermine collective responses to potential threats to individual or community security.

The second context was majority-minority rights. The will of the majority had to be respected if the concept of a one person-one vote representative democracy was to have any practical meaning. Simultaneously, protecting all the rights and privileges of each minority (or a minority of states) was crucial to continuation of the proposed union.

The rationale given by the Federalist supporters of the proposed Constitution with its strong central authority seemed counterintuitive. They argued that the very size and diversity of populations of the various states were actually the best protection against the tyranny of the majority and the dominance of the central government. Why? Because the interests that might coalesce around one policy, such as import tariffs, would be different from the interests that coalesce around subsidizing farming or ranching activities. And these would differ from the interests (in today’s world) opposed to commercial or residential development of land around national parks.

Another way to put the solution is the familiar “some you win, some you lose.” And, in a sense, the larger the space, the larger and more diverse the people, and the more complex the society, the more issues there would be around which factions and then majorities could form, break apart, and re-form on another issue.

The Federalists thought the chief danger to their “strength in combined diversity” approach would be the arbitrary collapse of the process or forming and dissolving factions. As soon became apparent, the real danger lay within the federal authority in the failure of the three branches to confine themselves to their powers as enumerated in the Constitution. Throughout the nation’s first 212 years, the problem was largely confined to periods of protracted war – the Civil War, and the four major wars of the 20th century – abated at the end of each conflict. After which the nation tended to return to the status quo ante. We face new challenges to the balance of powers today in an environment where the line between war time and peace time is blurring.

In the U.S., the worst of all possible political worlds is one in which not only are the White House and Congress controlled by one party, but the Senate majority is at least 67, which precludes the effectiveness of any filibuster. After November 7, 2006, George Bush will no longer have the opportunity to exercise his “unitary presidency.” Should the White House change hands in 2008 and the Democrats retain control of Congress, the “new majority” will have to be watched as closely as the Republicans have been.

For only if the nation cherishes and applies its diversity in a bipartisan fashion to the challenges of the day will it find the right combinations to ameliorate the inequities afflicting the U.S. and the world.