Middle East: Irresistible Resistance
“The doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.”
-
Article 10, New Hampshire State Constitution
“We have to resist any way we can.”
-Khamiz Essaid, Gaza resident
As the calendar flipped to August, Washington was steamy. Partly it was weather: temperatures rose above 100o (F). But mostly the heat came from the winds of war in the eastern Mediterranean. Within 17 days, Israel’s Defense Force (IDF) found itself fighting on two “fronts”: against militants from Hamas in the Gaza strip and the more highly organized Hezbollah (Party of God) in southern Lebanon.
The Gaza stand-off may soon be resolved. But Israel – encouraged by the White House – stands in danger of replicating in Lebanon the mistakes the U.S. made in Iraq, with grave consequences for the entire Middle East.
The capture of three IDF soldiers by armed militants, one on June 25 along the Gaza-Egyptian border and two on July 12 along the Lebanese-Israeli boundary, precipitated the current fighting. In Gaza, an already weakened, cash-starved but democratically elected Hamas-dominated government could do little to block the IDF dragnet searching for the missing soldier. (The U.S. ended foreign aid when Hamas took power in late March and Israel refused to forward tax receipts it collects for the Palestinians.) During its sweep, the IDF seized 24 elected members of the Palestinian parliament and 7 ministers of state. Palestinian fatalities after five weeks number 160 with hundreds more wounded. Israel has set two conditions to end its physical re-occupation of Gaza: return the captured soldier and stop firing Qassam unguided rockets (range about 10 miles) into Israel from Gaza.
While the IDF did not respond to the June 25 Gaza clash for three days, mere hours passed before its initial attempt to free the two IDF soldiers captured by Hezbollah. This, together with the observation by Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni that the fight with Hezbollah “is bigger than the captured soldiers,” suggests to some observers that Israel was looking for a pretext to go after Hezbollah. Certainly Israel’s air force was primed: its rapid destruction of five bridges, a power plant, and extensive cratering of Lebanon’s roads fueled speculation that a “preventive” attack was being readied for late summer to try to preclude a further increase in Hezbollah’s capabilities.
If this rationale sounds like the Bush administration’s logic in 2002-2003 “justifying” a preventive assault on Iraq, it is but one example of how, in Lebanon, Israel is in danger of repeating the major miscalculations by the U.S. in Iraq that have so roiled the broader Middle East. Specifically:
- Israel’s rapid departure in 2000 from south Lebanon deprived it of first hand information about Hezbollah’s activities over the past six years. Similarly, the U.S. lost a key observation post on Iraq when UN inspectors had to leave just before the December 1998 U.S. bombing campaign. The result was a major intelligence failure six and five years later, respectively.
- White House and Pentagon officials anticipated a quick, sharp campaign against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Israeli officials thought effective Hezbollah resistance would last less than a week – definitely not three weeks plus.
- After nearly five years fighting in Afghanistan and 40 months in Iraq, the “world’s only remaining superpower” finds its military prowess in question because it has been unable to defeat armed opponents employing classic asymmetrical and terror tactics. Similarly, even if it does crush Hezbollah’s militant infrastructure in Lebanon, Israel’s reputation as the eastern Mediterranean’s invincible military power has been lost forever.
- Lurking in the shadows of Iraq in 2003 was the suggestion of “unfinished business” with Saddam stretching back to the 1991 Iraq war. The same psychology seems in play in the IDF with Hezbollah. Many Arab states and groups believe Hezbollah “defeated” Israel when the IDF abandoned south Lebanon in 2000 – and Hezbollah filled the vacuum.
- Despite nearly 60 years of military dominance, Israel continues to see itself as a “victim” whose survival rests solely on possessing and using, if necessary, unlimited military power. Nearly 60 months since September 11, 2001, George Bush seems to believe that, to avoid again being a “victim” of evil, the U.S. can re-write treaties and other international agreements as it chooses.
The driving dynamic in the Bush and Olmert administrations is fear – not of oppression or victimization but of being unable to create and sustain fear in others. One need look no further than New Hampshire’s constitution to identify why this strategy is doomed: no people will quietly endure forever arbitrary power and oppression.
Violence, in other words, only begets more violence – which is why “War is not the answer” – and never will be.
This
analysis was prepared by Col. Dan Smith, U.S. Army (Ret.). Dan,
a West Point graduate and Vietnam veteran, is FCNL's Senior
Fellow on Military Affairs.
Reviewed:
08/02/2006
More on Alternatives to War |
