Alternatives to War by Colonel Dan Smith, USA (Ret.)

“Long War” Plans Fall from Pentagon on Capitol

Not unexpectedly, these first few days in February have seen a blizzard of white hit Washington, DC. It is, after all, the middle of winter.

What fell was not snow, however, but a blizzard of paper. First to be released publicly was the Pentagon’s third “Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),” which in 92 pages outlines overall military strategy and supporting programs planned for the next 20 years.

Not surprisingly, given this is the first QDR since September 11, 2001 the “winners” were policies and programs justified by their association – however stretched – with counterinsurgency and anti-“terrorism” activities in what the White House and the military now call “the long war.” (The last QDR, though released September 30, 2001, was essentially written before 9/11 and was only marginally changed by the events of that day.)

Specifically, the latest QDR calls for less emphasis on conventional force-on-force warfare such as dominated military thinking and preparations during the Cold War. The 2001 capabilities – homeland defense, forward basing and operations, fight and win two overlapping campaigns and still conduct “lesser included” operations – are maintained but with a decidedly “counter-terror” bent. Now the military must be able to

• defeat in the “long war” the 30 plus “terrorist” organizations that constitute the al Qaeda “network”;
• devise measures to preempt acquisition or use by “terrorists” of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons;
• persuade potential peer competitors such as China or a resurgent Russia to not even try to challenge U.S. military dominance; and
• conduct operations contributing to overall homeland security.

Moreover, U.S. forces must be capable of operating anywhere on the globe not only in unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and “counter-terror” roles but also in peace building, stabilization, and reconstruction work – the new “core competency” that the Pentagon has decreed to be of equal importance to war fighting.

Incredibly, all these missions are to be accomplished with no net increase in the number of people in uniform. The Army has temporary authority to recruit more soldiers than the normal maximum to ease the transition to its new, smaller, “modular” brigades.

• Active duty brigades will total 172 (42 combat and 75 support);
• The active duty Army, currently authorized 512,400 soldiers, is slated to drop back to its permanent end strength of 482,400 in five years (2011);
• The National Guard will have 106 brigades (28 combat and 78 support), and the Army Reserve will have 58 support battalions;
• The National Guard will be funded at its actual end strength of 333,000 rather than its authorized strength of 350,000, and the Army Reserve at 200,000 instead of its authorized 205,000;
• The number of Special Operations personnel, currently 52,000, is to increase by 7,800;
• Army Green Beret battalions will jump by one-third; s
• Navy SEAL (Sea, Air Land) teams will increase;
• A new Air Force unmanned aerial vehicle squadron will be formed;
• Army psychological operations and civil affairs personnel will get 3,500 more soldiers;
• Marine Corps active duty strength reverts to 175,000, and Reserve strength remains at 39,000 by 2011;
• The Marine Corps enters Special Operations with the fielding of a combined training-reconnaissance-strike unit of 2,600 Marines.

What the Pentagon planners are expecting is that greater participation by allied nations, improved or new technologies, and better training will enable soldiers to take on more varied missions – in effect doing more with marginally more investment. The QDR pointedly notes the $5.5 billion appropriated for upgrades to special forces information collection activities and the increase in the number of individuals undergoing special operations training each year.

Although the QDR focuses clearly on unconventional and low intensity operations as the most likely type of fighting involving U.S. forces, the document quite clearly states that “a robust nuclear deterrent…remains a keystone of U.S. national power.”

Nonetheless, four ballistic missile submarines are being converted for non-nuclear special operations missions, all land-based Peacekeeper ICBMs have been retired, and 50 of the 500 Minuteman III ICBMs are to be removed from silos. But the Pentagon, despite legislative defeats the last two years on developing new nuclear weapons, says it plans to study the feasibility and cost of a “Reliable Replacement Warhead.” (Note: U.S. nuclear weapons now in the arsenal are not “unreliable” as implied by the name of this new program, but that misleading implication is designed to be a selling point with Congress and the public.) No threat assessment by the Pentagon predicts threats now or in the foreseeable future, say the next ten years, that would call for the U.S. use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent.

The second document is the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism – NMSP-WOT in “Pentagonese.” This is the new “cold war.” The U.S. military, through its “presence,” that is, global reach, in 130 countries; military-to-military exchanges for education, training and exercises; and sales or transfers of military equipment will establish a variety of “steady state” relationships which serve as the basis for coordinated operations to disrupt or preempt “terrorist” actions by violent extremists – defined as those who oppose a people’s right to choose how to organize their lives and their society and support murdering ordinary civilians to advance the extremist agenda.

In a quite candid conclusion, the document stresses the centrality of “supporting mainstream efforts to reject violent extremism” wherever it occurs and whatever its goals. “All military members…must be aware of the culture, customs, language, and philosophy of affected populations and the enemy, to more effectively counter extremism, and encourage democracy, freedom, and economic prosperity abroad.”

The third document, released to the public February 6, is the President’s Fiscal Year 2007 Budget request. The direct Defense Department request is reported at $439.3 billion, an increase of 7% over the FY2006 appropriation. The Pentagon’s budget summary documents highlight the mission categories in the QDR – “prevail in irregular warfare operations,” “defend the homeland,” “maintain U.S. traditional superiority,” and “support service members and their families” or quality of life.

Spending on nuclear weapons programs, also a military cost, is found in the Energy Department budget request. For FY2007, this request is $15.8 billion. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) identified an additional $3.3 billion in miscellaneous military spending.

In his State of the Union Address on January 31, President Bush mentioned that his budget would reduce “non-security” discretionary spending. This suggests an opposite composite category of “security” spending – military, foreign military assistance (from Foreign Operations in the State Department request), homeland security, and veterans administration (taking care of those who provided for the nation’s security in the past), and another category “non-security” which really are the human security programs at home and abroad.

Security in FY2007 breaks out as follows (in billions of dollars):

Comparing this total to the other main tool of foreign relations – the non-military-related part of the International Affairs account: $28.9 billion – gives a clear picture of just how imbalanced U.S. international priorities are: $533.4 to $28.9

This analysis was prepared by Col. Dan Smith, U.S. Army (Ret.). Dan, a West Point graduate and Vietnam veteran, is FCNL's Senior Fellow on Military Affairs.

Reviewed: 02/08/2006

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