



## *The World at War—January 1, 2004*

*“Every innocent who is killed has brothers, uncles, sisters and nephews—and behind them, the tribe. If ten people are killed, how many people are saddened?”*

—Sadokham Ambarkhil, Deputy Governor, Pakita Province, Afghanistan, December 2003

### *Introduction*

As 2004 began, FCNL registered 24 significant ongoing armed conflicts (1,000 or more deaths) and another 38 “hot spots” that could slide into or revert to war. The total number of actual conflicts is three more than the 1998 all-time low of 21 in the 15 years of this annual survey. It is the second consecutive year with a large decrease (from 30 in 2003 and 38 in 2002). In addition to Washington’s “world wide war on terror” (WWWT), the distribution by region of the remaining 23 significant armed conflicts as of January 1, 2004, was as follows: Asia, 9; Africa, 7; Middle East, 3; Americas, 3; and Europe, 1.

### *The “Global War on Terror,” Two Countries, Two Years*

**Afghanistan:** It could have been Iraq, which in December 2002 was a war-in-waiting.

But this particular tragedy struck not Iraq but Afghanistan in early December 2003. Within the space of a single week, two military operations by U.S. forces killed 15 innocent Afghan children. In one of the incidents, an entire family of six children and two adults died when a wall collapsed on them during a U.S. assault intended to capture or kill a suspected militant.

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The shock and dismay of this loss were evident, even in a country inured to war after 23 years, where the Taliban and al Qaeda had been defeated two years earlier, where 5,500 UN peacekeepers under NATO command had begun to move into cities other than the capital of Kabul, where the vital 300-mile, Kabul-to-Kandahar road was virtually completed, and where a traditional *loya jirga* was meeting to review, revise, and approve a draft constitution that is to be submitted to the people in a referendum in the spring,

But there was even more dismay at the reaction of an unidentified U.S. spokesman: “If non-combatants surround themselves with thousands of weapons and hundreds of rounds of ammunition and howitzers and mortars, in a compound known to be used by a terrorist, we are not completely responsible for the consequences” (*BBC Online*, December 10, 2003).

In fact, it is the Afghans and others allied with the U.S. who are feeling the consequences of war in Afghanistan. Increased violence in Afghanistan over the last few months is generally attributed to reorganized and resupplied remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda, bolstered by new recruits motivated by anti-infidel, anti-Western, and anti-U.S. sentiments. Security has deteriorated to such an extent that foreign UN field workers have been instructed not to travel to or within six provinces bordering Pakistan, and fully 20 percent of the country is currently off-limits to U.S. civilians and diplomats because of inadequate security. Half of the 9,000 recruits for the new national army have quit, calling into question the



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**Document Number:** G-03-020F

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ability of the government of President Hamid Karzai to field the 10,000-strong Central Corps by election time in June 2004. Afghan military patrols are attacked daily, and rocket attacks and bombings are frequent occurrences. In late December, at least four large bombs were detonated in Kabul, including one at the UN's headquarters in Kabul and a suicide bomb at Kabul's airport. Deaths from armed conflict are still running at about 100 per month.

Meanwhile, the deliberations in the *loya jirga* seemed to mirror verbally the combat in the streets. One of the 100 women among the 502 delegates denounced the maneuvering of the warlords and other factions and so angered her targets that she had to be provided a security detail. As the meeting spilled over into 2004, there were other divisions over the role and duties of a prime minister as a balance to the strong presidential system favored by the United States, and over the number of languages to be officially recognized. Moreover, the chief UN representative in Afghanistan predicted that the country will still be too unstable to hold free and fair elections in June as currently scheduled. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's representative Lakhdar Brahimi expressed frustration at the international community's failure to send more military forces because of the danger, while it blithely dispatches civilian missions into the same dangers: "I told the Security Council, 'You told me to go to Afghanistan. Now when I tell you I have some security concerns, you tell me: "You stay there, but it's too dangerous for our soldiers."— What kind of lousy logic is that?' " (*Financial Times*, December 16, 2003).

**Iraq:** "Collateral damage" also has become a routine daily occurrence in Iraq as the "victorious" coalition tries to eradicate a stubborn resistance to its occupation. With Saddam Hussein's capture by U.S. forces on December 13, Washington, echoed by London, Madrid, Rome, and Warsaw, seemed to signal cautious optimism that the "end of the beginning" was at hand in Iraq. Military commanders speculated that a spasm of retaliatory attacks on coalition forces and members of the various new Iraqi security organizations would not last with Saddam's removal from the scene. As attacks decreased, the much-delayed reduction of U.S. ground forces in Iraq would be implemented. With fewer targets, commanders predicted the number of daily attacks against occupation force installations would fall from the year-end average of 25-30 and, in turn, new casualties would drop.

They have not. As the first bell tolled the arrival of 2004, 478 U.S. military personnel had died from all causes since the start of combat operations in Iraq on March 19, 2003. Another 2,300 had been wounded, and approximately 11,000 had been medically evacuated for one reason or another. Reported British dead and wounded stood at 54 and 52, respectively, while other allied countries participating in the occupation had lost 49 soldiers. Iraqi military dead and wounded may never be known; civilian deaths are conservatively estimated at nearly 10,000 and rising daily.

The obviously troubled post-war occupation and strong opposition from key Iraqi religious leaders have compelled the Bush Administration to make major changes to its original vision of a secure, U.S.-friendly (and U.S.-shaped) Iraq. An early warning sign, seemingly ignored by Washington, was the opposition from the U.S.-appointed Interim Governing Council (IGC) to the deployment of 10,000 Turkish soldiers to help control the insurgents operating in central Iraq. (The reported quid pro quo was U.S. lobbying for Turkey's membership in the European Union and U.S. action to destroy remnants of the anti-Turk Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) who reside in the mountains of northern Iraq.)

As "anti-occupation" sentiment among ordinary Iraqis began to coalesce, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) greatly accelerated the timetable for turning over as much authority as possible to Iraqis on July 1, 2004, even though Iraq's reformed civil and security structures appear too fragile to bear the load they are now expected to assume. Recruitment for the army, police, border guards, and other security forces is haphazard; training is inadequate, and the "wash-out" rate is as high as 50 percent, with most quitting. Moreover, the U.S. has postponed plans to abolish armed militias such as the Kurdish pesh merga and the Shi'ite Badr Brigade and has winked at the creation of other "private" armed groups associated with members of the IGC. At the same time, the CPA is creating a special 800-strong, anti-terror strike battalion to accompany U.S. forces on raids to ferret out insurgents and former regime officials.

Early U.S. insistence on a new constitution before elections has given way to the creation of a "basic law" by the IGC under which elections will be conducted for a provisional national legislature that will choose a provisional government from its members. This provisional government will oversee the drafting of a new constitution that will be subject to a national referendum, followed by elections for a permanent government. Plans to privatize some 200 state-owned and inefficient businesses have been shelved for fear that thousands more people will be thrown out of work in a country where unemployment reaches 60 percent in some areas.

## South Asia

**India and Pakistan:** These "Central Front" wars, terrible enough in themselves, have always carried the risk of generating unintended consequences in a very volatile part of the world. Ominously, as 2003 drew to a close, this risk assumed concrete form. Within 11 days in late December, two attempts were made to assassinate Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf. Pakistani security agencies suggested the assassins were from or allied with al Qaeda and the Taliban and were seeking revenge for Musharraf's recent efforts to crackdown on these organizations and their bases in the rugged and unruly Afghan-Pakistan border areas.

But there may be other factors at work. In November, Musharraf declared a unilateral cease-fire along the Line of Control in Kashmir. India reciprocated, extending the truce north to the Siachen Glacier. In December, Musharraf declared that Pakistan would drop its 55-year demand for a Kashmir-wide referendum on the area's future. While this was welcomed by India, the latter did not reciprocate, which angered even moderate Pakistanis and confirmed the militants in their opposition to the move. But significantly, in the month following the reciprocal cease-fire declarations, Indian officials said attacks by the militant separatists in Kashmir had fallen a third, although the drop in deaths was much lower. Overall in 2003, the number of soldiers, insurgents, and civilians killed in Kashmiri violence exceeds 2,500; estimates of fatalities since the start of the conflict range from 40,000 to 80,000. There will be more; some insurgent groups such as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Mohammad have rejected the cease-fire.

Within India itself, two long-running insurgencies that had plagued the Assam region appear to be ending. In December, a territorial council was created for the ethnic Bodo to oversee economic, linguistic, and educational improvements in four districts where Bodos predominate. Similarly, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), whose operations base in Bhutan came under sustained assault by the Royal Bhutan Army in late December, has called for peace talks with India. A number of prominent ULFA leaders recently surrendered to the Indian



Army, including the group's ideologist who said that "armed rebellion cannot bring independence." But this sentiment is not shared by insurgents in other parts of India; in Andhra Pradesh, the People's War Group continue their 23-year old rebellion which claimed more than 225 lives in 2003, up from 191 in 2002 (*South Asia Report*, October 6, 2003). Elsewhere, negotiations between New Delhi and Naga separatists to end 50 years of conflict stalled over the latter's demand for a "greater Nagaland" incorporating into the present Nagaland state any neighboring areas inhabited by ethnic Nagas.

**Bhutan and Nepal:** While Bhutan and Nepal seem to be making headway on resolving the nationality status of 100,000 people stranded for years in a UN refugee camp in Nepal, the on-off seven-month peace talks between the Kathmandu government and anti-government Maoists broke down in late August. The main sticking point appeared to be the Maoists' demand for a constituent assembly to write a new constitution. The government offered to open the current constitution to amendments, but insisted that the constitutional monarchy, multi-party democracy, and national unity were non-negotiable (*Financial Times*, August 19, 2003). In the ensuing three months, the government claimed it had killed more than 1,000 insurgents, a staggering number considering that only one major encounter took place and most observers place total deaths since the insurgency began in 1996 at just over 8,000.

**Sri Lanka:** Peace talks in Sri Lanka also encountered trouble, but the insurgents of the Tamil Liberation Front continued to observe the cease-fire with Colombo, where a power struggle developed between the president and prime minister. Norway, which had been acting as a mediator between the government and the Tamils, placed the peace process on hold until the government feud was resolved. At year's end, the U.S. strongly urged the two factions to settle their dispute and resume the peace talks before the Tamils lost confidence in the process, abandoned the idea of expanded regional autonomy within a unified Sri Lanka, and resurrected their original demand of 20 years for complete independence. A cease-fire has been in effect since February 2002, but the Tamils never surrendered their weapons. Thus, the longer the government fac-

tions squabble, the greater the danger that a conflict that has claimed 65,000 lives will reignite.

## *East Asia*

**Indonesia and the Philippines:** Indonesia and the Philippines captured headlines in 2003 for their part in the war on "terrorists with global reach." Prominent among the various groups is Jemaah Islamiah, which is believed to have operatives not only in Indonesia and the Philippines but also in Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, and possibly Cambodia and Vietnam (*BBC online*, August 15, 2003). Jemaah Islamiah is believed responsible for the car bombing of the Jakarta Marriott Hotel in July, but its continued cohesion is questionable as it has lost three key leaders.

Elsewhere in Indonesia, promising peace talks between Jakarta and Free Aceh Movement (GAM) insurgents broke down in May when the parties could not capitalize on a previous agreement giving limited autonomy to Aceh. A six-month martial law declaration was swiftly followed by the first wave of an estimated 40,000 government troops sent into the area to deal with the estimated 5,000-member GAM. Aceh had been an independent sultanate before incorporation into Indonesia in 1949; the current secessionist drive, which started in 1976, has left more than 11,000 people dead. In November, the six-month declaration of martial law was extended in the province.

**Malaysia:** Following a cease-fire declared in late May 2003, promising talks between Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were briefly interrupted in August when the MILF revealed its chairman had suffered a fatal heart attack the previous month. However, the two sides resumed meetings in Malaysia in an effort to end the 31-year-old conflict that has taken at least 120,000 lives. Manila has also tried to revive official peace talks with the Maoist New People's Army, but has not been successful. The group has been blamed for attacks in October against police posts and in December against government troops, the latter occurring on the same day that the traditional Christmas truce was announced. The other main armed opposition



group, the regional kidnap-for-ransom Abu Sayyaf, lost two of its leaders in 2003, with the second, Galib Andang, captured in mid-December.

**Solomon Islands:** In July, lawlessness in the Solomon Islands drew the intervention of a six-nation, combined military and police regional peace-keeping force numbering 2,300 men led by Australia. Bands of ethnic “militia” from different islands had terrorized the islanders for five years, killing hundreds. Although paralyzed by the fighting, the government managed to get legislation approved endorsing the intervention. Faction leaders declined to challenge the intervention force, and the level of fighting subsided. By late October, part of the military force was able to withdraw. Much remains to be done in terms of rebuilding the institutions of government and restoring confidence in the ability of the islanders to govern themselves.

**North Korea:** On the Asian mainland, tensions remain between the U.S. and North Korea. The next meeting in the sporadic talks between the two nations, along with South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China, is set for January 2004, but little progress is expected. In China itself, the government seems to be accelerating its crackdown on the 11 million Muslim ethnic Uighurs who inhabit Xinjiang province. Chinese officials cite the convergence of “ethnic splittism, religious extremism, and violent terrorism” as the reason they named four groups as terrorist organizations. Moreover, in September, Beijing claimed that “Islamic separatists” based in Xinjiang were being trained by Taliban adherents in camps in Pakistan (*BBC Online*, December 15, 2003).

### *Middle East*

**Israel and Palestine:** The struggle between Israel and the Palestinian Authority over the fundamental formula of “land for peace” continues, fueled by reciprocal violence in the form of assassinations and incursions into cities, towns, and refugee camps by Israelis and suicide bombings and other attacks on Israeli civilians by Palestinians and anti-Israeli groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad. Moreover, judging from Israeli retaliatory actions against its neighbors, hard-liners remain in the ascendancy in the Sharon government despite

publicly voiced reservations by Israel’s top general about the chances for success of the current policies. In July, for the first time in the 18 months since Israeli forces pulled out of the “buffer zone” it maintained in southern Lebanon, Israeli warplanes bombed that country. Israeli warplanes also attacked a guerrilla “training camp” in Syria, another “first” in that Israel had not bombed Syrian territory for 18 years. Meanwhile, Israel is pressing forward full tilt on constructing a barrier wall—what Sharon says is a security fence—that makes deep deviations from the international “Green Line.” These inroads amount to a land grab in the name of “protecting” Israeli settlements which should be dismantled, not retained; effectively transforms the West Bank into a series of disconnected Palestinian enclaves; and renders impossible the creation of a viable Palestinian state. The Israeli actions are completely at odds with the letter and spirit of the U.S.-backed “road map” formally unveiled May 1, 2003, accepted with some reservations by Sharon, and endorsed by the UN Security Council in November (Resolution 1515 (2003)). As if this were not enough, on December 31, Sharon’s cabinet approved \$56 million for doubling Israeli settlements on the Golan Heights which Israel captured from Syria in the 1967 war and subsequently illegally annexed.

On the Palestinian side, the new prime minister of the Palestinian Authority, Ahmed Qureia, remains hamstrung (as was his predecessor) by Yasser Arafat’s refusal to transfer control of Palestinian Authority security organs to the prime minister and his interior minister. Nonetheless, Qureia managed to convene an early December meeting in Cairo of all the main groups conducting armed attacks against Israel. The best proposal on which the factions could agree was to end all attacks against civilians in Israel proper but not Israeli troops and settlers in Gaza and the West Bank. Israel did not accept such a condition, and the tit-for-tat killing continued without pause into the new year.

But the impasse in official relations has created space for individuals and private groups to act. Three nonofficial proposals have recently been offered as means of breaking the inertia of Israeli and Palestinian officials.



- “Permanent Status Agreement,” dubbed the “Geneva Accord” as it was signed in that city on December 1, is the product of two years of talks guided by Yossi Beilin, a former Israeli Justice Minister, and Yaser Abed Rabbo, a former Palestinian Information Minister. Main features of the accord include establishment of the Palestinian state followed immediately by mutual diplomatic recognition of each other, assignment of international boundaries based on pre-1967 war lines of control, withdrawal of all Israeli settlements from areas under Palestinian sovereignty, the end of all attacks on Israelis by Palestinians and their supporters, withdrawal of Israeli Defense Forces from virtually all occupied territories, designation of Jerusalem as the capital of both the Israeli (West Jerusalem) and Palestinian (East Jerusalem) states, and conditions affecting who and how many among Palestinian refugees have the “right of return.”
- The “People’s Voice Initiative” is essentially a statement of principles drawn up by two men: Israeli Ami Ayalon, who headed the Israeli Navy and Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security service, and Palestinian Sari Nusseibeh, president of Jerusalem’s Al Qud University. The heart of this nonpartisan effort is a massive drive for signatures on petitions that will be submitted to the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority demanding an end to the bloodshed and insecurity and the beginning of cooperative social and economic conditions. The movement’s statement of principles includes two states for two nations, Jewish and Palestinian; borders based on the lines occupied prior to June 1967; a demilitarized Palestine; Jerusalem as an open city divided politically into Jewish and Palestinian neighborhoods; and the right of return limited for Palestinians to their new state and for Israelis to Israel.
- The “One Voice” plan is a global, grassroots umbrella effort whose stated objective is to amplify the voice of reason, thereby enabling moderates in Israel and the Palestinian territories to seize the initiative from “extremists” and set the agenda for resolution of the conflict. One Voice’s *modus operandi* involves a world-wide

signature campaign on a set of general principles; a wide-ranging discussion to reach consensus on 10 core issues; and concerted pressure on all regional political figures to implement the will of the majority as expressed by the consensus or suffer removal from office at the next election.

Although these initiatives indicate the depth and breadth of the longing for peace and security among both Palestinians and Israelis, the probability is slim that any of them will move officials on either side or the approach of any of the sponsors of the “road map” (U.S., UN, Russia, and European Union). What is clear, nine months after the invasion of Iraq, is that the “road to Jerusalem” does not run through Baghdad.

## *Africa*

**The Great Lakes and Central Region:** The landscape of war in Africa continued to alter appreciably in 2003. Perhaps the most significant changes are those in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and its immediate neighbors. In November, the last two rebel Mayi-Mayi organizations agreed to join the transitional government and integrate their armed members into the new national army. The government undertook to remove Rwandan insurgents—by some estimates numbering as many as 20,000—who have been using the DRC as a safe haven from which to attack Rwanda. Chief among these groups is the Hutu Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda whose leader, Paul Rwarakabije, declaring that “war is not the best solution,” voluntarily returned to Rwanda in mid-November to be embraced by the Rwanda Army chief, General James Kabarebe (*BBC Online*, November 18, 2003). Further north, near the town of Bunia, both French forces and UN peacekeepers tried to control armed clashes between ethnic Lendu (*Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie-Kisangani-Movement de liberation or RCD-K-ML*) and Hema (*Union des Patriotes Congolais or UPC*). Ethnic violence flared in April when Ugandan troops withdrew from the area, leaving more than 1,000 people dead (*UN Wire*).



Amity is growing between DRC and Uganda, partly the result of the continued repatriation of Ugandan dissidents to their country under an amnesty program. The latest group of nearly 400 people, chiefly from the West Nile Front and the Allied Democratic Forces, left DRC territory in late December 2003. Kampala is less forgiving when it comes to the Lord's Resistance Army whose leadership has steadfastly refused all overtures for peace talks. While rank and file members of the group, who frequently have been kidnapped and pressed into armed "service," still qualify for amnesty, their leaders do not.

Burundi's fragile ceasefire, arranged at the very end of 2002, survived 2003. A major test was the peaceful succession in May of Vice President Domitien Ndayizeye (a Hutu) to the presidency in place of Pierre Buyoya (a Tutsi). Although cease-fire violations had been common all along, in June a new wave of fighting broke out between the main insurgent group, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), and government forces compelling tens of thousands to flee. Finally, in October, after intensive mediation by South Africa's president and vice president, a power sharing agreement was reached between the Burundi government and the FDD. But almost immediately, the smaller National Liberation Forces (FNL), which had refused to join the negotiations, attacked Burundi's capital city. Undeterred, the government and FDD formally signed the accord on November 16, calling on the FNL to open peace talks with the government within three months or be considered a security threat. Two weeks later, the FNL complied, only to walk out the next day, claiming that the real powerbrokers, the Tutsi-dominated military, were not in the government's delegation. Nonetheless, by year's end the UN Security Council was told that 95 percent of Burundi enjoyed relative peace.

**Sudan:** Peace was also on the agenda for Sudan in 2003, although here too, its course was rocky. The process began in 2002 with a ceasefire between the government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Under the accord, the mainly Christian and animist South achieved exemption from Islamic law (Sharia) and transitional autonomy for six years, after which a referendum on independence

would take place. But negotiations foundered in July over separate armies, separate banking systems, and the conversion of Khartoum (which is in the North) into a Sharia-free zone. Mediators, including a U.S. special presidential envoy, pressed the two sides to resume discussions in August to end the 20-year civil war in which an estimated 1.5 million people died and another 4 million were displaced. In September 2003, the ceasefire was renewed for a third time as talks continued. By December 2003, agreement on a joint army and the division of oil revenue had been reached, but political control of three provinces in which neither side had undisputed military control remained unresolved. Talks were carried over to 2004.

Ironically, as Khartoum and the SPLA were talking, a renewed rebellion by the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) flared in the desert region of Darfur in Western Sudan in February 2003. The military wing of the movement, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), conducted numerous raids through the spring. In early June, a truce was mediated by officials from neighboring Chad. But August saw a two-week assault on the western town of Kutum, for which the SLA was blamed. In September, a 15-person committee was created to oversee implementation of a new three-month truce, but continued fighting caused the death toll to rise above 3,000 and sent refugee totals to half a million in November and a million in December. At year's end, discussions began on the SLM's demand for autonomy for all regions under a confederal or federal system and an end to economic disparity. Khartoum accused Eritrea of supplying the SLA and also took legal steps to brand the SLA and SLM as terrorist organizations (*Sudan News, BBC Online, UN Wire*).

**Eritrea:** Severely defeated two years ago in a war with Ethiopia over their common boundary, Eritrea reportedly fears that its bigger rival will restart hostilities despite the presence of a large (4,200-member) UN peacekeeping force. Ethiopia refuses to accept the decision of a border commission that gives the village of Badme, which straddles the border, to Eritrea. In a separate development, fighting erupted in western Ethiopia between the two dominant ethnic groups, the Anuak and Nuer, over land ownership.



**Somalia:** Somalia made no progress toward re-emerging as a unified nation-state in 2003. The three-year mandate Transitional National Government of Abdulkassim Salat Hassan ended in early August with no successor regime in sight. Salat then declared that his administration would stay in office until the talks in Kenya, mediated by the UN, the African Union, and the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development resolved the issue. While these discussions managed to get all the contending factions around the table, they so far have failed to develop a formula for parliamentary representation that satisfies all parties. In the absence of sustainable progress despite 14 negotiating sessions, a dozen groups allied as the Somali National Salvation Council threatened to boycott further talks. In the meantime, clan-based fighting about land ownership broke out in the central part of the country in November and December.

Land was also the catalyst behind sharply increased tensions between the two other parts of Somalia, the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland and the self-declared independent republic of Somaliland. At issue are two "provinces" that, during British colonial rule, were administratively and geographically part of Somaliland but whose clan affiliations were with the inhabitants of Puntland. At year's end, armed units from the two regions were reported to be converging (*UN Wire*, December 30, 2003).

**North Africa:** Back north, on Chad's southeastern border and adjacent to Sudan, the government of the Central African Republic (CAR) was overthrown in a March 2003 coup, the first to succeed after six failed attempts in as many years. The new president, General Francois Bozize, cited mismanagement of the country as justification for the coup, but the African Union condemned the action as a setback for CAR's struggle to develop its economy and achieve a semblance of security. A political crisis emerged in December over alleged widespread human rights violations and atrocities committed by former fighters loyal to Bozize. Having changed his prime minister and cabinet, Bozize recalled the long-dormant "permanent" military tribunal to investigate and conduct trials where appropriate.

Among the countries of North Africa, armed conflict remains most prevalent in Algeria, where more than 100,000 have died from the civil war that began in 1991 after the military stopped elections that probably would have been won by Islamic conservatives of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). Two of the largest antigovernment movements active in Algeria (and in Europe) are the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and a splinter entity, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Army sweeps and the ebbing of popular support have reduced the number of active insurgents to around 3,000 (by government estimates), but armed clashes still claim hundreds of lives annually. That a military establishment numbering close to 200,000 cannot defeat a resistance force of 3,000 reflects the reality that only the exercise of political remedies, not military power, can resolve social grievances and injustice. In Algeria, that lesson seems unlearned not only with regard to the GIA and GSPC but also to the Berbers, who are agitating for limited autonomy and recognition of their cultural identity.

In neighboring Western Sahara, the Algerian-backed Polisario Front agreed in mid-July to a UN peace initiative that would have transformed the area into an autonomous province of Morocco administered by a Polisario transitional authority. At the end of five years, both the indigenous Sahrawi and Moroccan settlers would vote either to remain part of Morocco or to become independent. Inexplicably, Morocco refused to assent even though the UN plan closely followed an earlier Moroccan proposal. In late October, after UN Secretary General Kofi Annan urged acceptance of the UN plan, Morocco formally asked for "more time" to study the proposal (*UN Wire*, October 21, 2003).

Just to the south in Mauritania, tensions rose following the re-election in an internationally unobserved ballot of President Maaouiya Ould Taya to a "third" five-year term (he has ruled since 1978). The immediate cause of the tension was the arrest of Taya's opponent and former co-ruler, Mohammed Ould Haidallah, who was accused of plotting a coup should he not win. The suggestion was not unreasonable in that the army subdued such an attempt in May 2003, by rebel military units thought to be sympathetic to Saddam Hussein. (Although Mauritania



is an Islamic state, Taya is pro-Western and has recognized Israel.) Exact numbers killed remain murky, with references to “scores” killed and wounded.

**West Africa:** The last and still very volatile area on the continent is West Africa—chiefly Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Nigeria. In mid-September in Guinea-Bissau, a bloodless army coup ousted President Kumba Yala under whom the country’s political, legal, and economic bases were ravaged. A new civilian caretaker government was installed, and it pledged to hold parliamentary elections before the end of March. In next door Guinea, rigged elections held at the end of 2003 returned long-time president Lansana Conte to another term in office. However, Conte is believed to be quite ill, and expectations are that his successor will be chosen via armed conflict. Like other West African countries, Guinea is awash with weapons and has deep ethnic divides.

Moving down the coastline, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire remained intertwined in violence and the human suffering of tens of thousands of refugees. The combined weight of British, U.S., and French interventions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire, respectively, in support of UN and African peacekeepers, helped dampen the fighting but did not stop all of it. In Sierra Leone, security has improved to the point that the UN reduced its peacekeeping force from 17,000 to 10,000, and now anticipates ending the mission by the close of 2004. However, this may be too optimistic as the government remains weak and corruption is widespread. Liberia’s two rebel factions have generally followed the conditions of the Accra peace accord which led to former President Charles Taylor’s exile in Nigeria and the formation of an interim government. But the “success” of the transition threatens to overwhelm the government and UN authorities who oversee the demobilization and reintegration program for former insurgents surrendering weapons for cash. The UN peacekeeping force of 15,000 established to help with demobilization takes over from African peacekeepers sent by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and itself integrates many of these troops into its structure.

**Cote d’Ivoire:** Cote d’Ivoire insurgents, known as “New Forces,” agreed in late December 2003 to rejoin a unity government on January 6, 2004, after a three-month boycott. In September 2002, one of the more stable West African countries, Cote d’Ivoire, was wracked by a violent coup attempt in which thousands died and a million more were displaced. A January 2003 cease fire and subsequent power-sharing arrangement were plagued by continued violence throughout 2003, with insurgents warning in November that war could restart at any time. A combined French and ECOMOG force of 5,000 troops has been able to enforce the “peace” agreement, but a November summit of African leaders called on the UN to establish a formal peacekeeping presence in the country. Secretary General Annan is expected to ask the Security Council to authorize a force of 6,000 troops.

**Nigeria:** Even as it leads and contributes most of the troops that form various peacekeeping missions under ECOMOG’s banner, Nigeria is beset by widespread violence within its borders. In the oil-rich Niger Delta, loosely organized militias representing the three largest ethnic groups are engaged in frequent attacks on each other and civilians living in the area. Other deadly rivalries rest on a combination of ethnic and religious polarity, with the Muslim North of the country pitted against the Christian South. In late December 2003, in the northeastern state of Yobe, members of a fundamentalist movement that claims sympathy with Afghanistan’s Taliban called “Followers of the Prophet” staged a number of armed attacks on police stations, causing an estimated 10,000 civilians to flee (*UN Integrated Regional Information Network*, January 6, 2004). Other violence pits farmers against nomadic tribes that, spurred by increasing desertification of traditional lands, have been moving south seeking pasture land. In all, about 10,000 Nigerians have been killed in sectarian, ethnic, and other armed violence since 1999.

## *Europe*

In Europe, the brutal war between Russia and Chechnya drags on with Western governments seemingly exhibiting less and less interest. The fairness of the October 2003 election of Ahkmad Kady-



rov, former rebel and Moscow's choice, as Chechnya's new president was challenged by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, but not by Washington. Kadyrov reportedly has assembled a 3,000-strong personal army that is more feared than Russian soldiers. As for Russia proper, suicide bombings usually attributed to Chechen "terrorists" killed more than 300 people in 2003, while in Chechnya itself unnamed "officials" said that "disappearances" and deaths during the year exceeded 2,000.

**Georgia:** In neighboring Georgia, the 10-year presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze ended when a bloodless revolution toppled the government following widespread allegations of rigged legislative elections. An overwhelming majority, hoping for better times, elected Western-educated Mikhail Saakashvili as the new president on January 4, 2004. His pro-West orientation may cause tension with Moscow, which sees Georgia as part of its "near abroad."

**Turkey and Cyprus:** Hints of a thaw in the 30-year stand-off on the divided island of Cyprus emerged in late 2003 as politicians in the breakaway Turkish North held informal exchanges with counterparts from the Greek South. Driving these overtures is the island's looming membership in the European Union (EU); the north would be excluded unless it reconciles with the South.

In an under-reported spill-over from the U.S. effort to induce Turkey to send up to 10,000 troops to Iraq for "peacekeeping" duties, Washington undertook to help Turkey subdue the estimated 5,000 fighters of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) after they ended a four-year truce with Ankara in September. The PKK, labeled a terrorist group by the U.S., said that the Turkish government failed to grant cultural and political rights to the Kurdish population in Turkey. U.S. troops have had at least one encounter along the Iraq-Turkey border with "unknown forces" suspected to be members of the PKK (*BBC Online*, September 2 and November 11, 2003). During the PKK's 15-year struggle that ended in 1999, more than 30,000 people were killed.

**Corsica:** Violence returned to the French-controlled island of Corsica following the rejection of a referendum in July to reform the island's administrative and political structures and the conviction of eight separatists charged with killing a French official in 1998. However, in November, after a spate of unrest and clashes with police, a new open-ended truce was declared. The population of Corsica is split over the question of separation or greater autonomy from France, a "debate" that has supported a 20-year, low-level rebellion. Those agitating for outright independence are blamed for some 200 violent incidents (bombings, drive-by shootings) in 2003 alone.

**Spain:** By contrast, the long-running Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) rebellion against Madrid was severely weakened in 2003 by concerted action by French and Spanish authorities—arrests, and the closing down of financial support—and a backlash against Basque violence that resumed in 2000 following a 14-month lull. After September 11, 2001, both the U.S. and the EU declared the ETA an international terrorist organization, which created new pressures on the group. At issue now is how much autonomy should be given to the 800,000 Basques.

## *The Americas*

**Colombia:** Colombia remains at war internally, with the government pursuing both the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), even though one of the FARC's leaders issued a call in October 2003 for "serious negotiations." By contrast, Bogotá has issued amnesty for members of right-wing paramilitaries (collectively known by the acronym AUC) who turn in their weapons and agree to stop fighting. Restrictions on U.S. assistance to the Colombian military that made a distinction between counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency training and equipment ended as 2003 started, although congressional restrictions on the number of U.S. military advisors and contractors were unchanged.

In September 2003, for a second time, the U.S.-funded program for interdicting and, if necessary,




shooting down suspected drug-ferrying aircraft over Colombia and Peru was suspended after a Colombian air force pilot, without U.S. concurrence, strafed and destroyed a private plane that had been forced down. New rules in effect do not require U.S. concurrence; Colombian pilots are “encouraged” to seek U.S. approval before firing, although disapproval does not constitute a veto. The U.S. role centers on helping to detect and monitor suspect planes. The program has not been restarted in Peru, where two U.S. citizens were killed when their missionary plane was downed by a Peruvian jet. However, Brazil is contemplating a similar effort, but one without any U.S. connection. (*New York Times*, January 8, 2004).

**Peru:** Peru succeeded in capturing two senior members of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) insurgency that plagued the country for nearly two decades. After being dormant for a number of years, the group seemed to be staging a comeback in 2003. How many insurgents there are and the sources of their weapons and financing remain

unclear. On a related note, Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission published its report in August. While it said the Shining Path was responsible for beginning the strife that killed 69,000, only about half the total deaths were attributed to the insurgents. The others were blamed on the army.

**Venezuela:** Lastly, Venezuela remains on edge due to border clashes with Colombian paramilitaries and even Colombian government forces. In December, a series of small clashes left seven Venezuelans dead. Bogotá believes that Venezuela’s president, Hugo Chavez, may be supporting Colombian leftist guerrillas. Meanwhile, Chavez continues to encounter sometimes violent unrest to his presidency within Venezuela, particularly because of his open and close ties to Cuba’s Fidel Castro. Yet among the poor of Venezuela, he remains popular, which means he might well defeat any recall election or referendum as the constitution requires more than a simple majority in a recall. In the last regular election, Chavez received 60 percent of the votes.

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**Table 1: Ongoing Significant Conflicts**

<b>Main Warring Parties</b>	<b>Year Began</b>	<b>Contributing Causes*</b>	<b>Other Foreign Involvement</b>
U.S. World-wide War on Terror vs. "terrorists with global reach"	2001	September 11 attacks	UN, multiple countries
<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>			
Coalition Provisional Authority and Governing Council vs. Iraqi resistance	2003	Invasion and occupation	U.S., UK, Australia, Spain, Italy, Poland, Ukraine, Denmark, others
Israel vs. Hamas, Hezbollah, Jihad, others	1975	Religious and territory	U.S., UN, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Islamic individuals
Israel vs. Palestinian Authority; Al-Aqsa Intifada	1948-1994; 2000	Independent state	U.S., UN, European Union, Jordan, Russia, Egypt,
<b>ASIA</b>			
Afghanistan: Kabul govt. vs. al Qaeda, Taliban and regional warlords	1978	Ethnic, religious, and territory	U.S., UN, NATO, Russia, Iran, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan
India vs. Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front**	1989	Ethnic and religious	UN, Pakistan, U.S.
India vs. Assam and Manipur insurgents (ULFA and NDFB)	1982; 1986	Independence	UN, Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh
India vs. Pakistan	1948	Ethnic and religious	U.S., UN
People's Republic of China vs. Uighur East Turkestan independence movement	1982	Independence	None
Indonesia vs. Aceh separatists	1969-2002 and 2003	Autonomy, economic and religious	None
Philippines vs. New People's Army	1969	Ideological and independence	None
Philippines vs. Abu Sayyaf	1999	Criminal and terror	U.S., Malaysia, Libya, Indonesia
Nepal vs. Maoist insurgents	1996	Ideological	None
<b>LATIN AMERICA</b>			
Colombia vs. National Liberation Army (ELN)	1978	Drug trade, socio/economic and political	U.S.
Colombia vs. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	1978	Drug trade, socio/economic and political	U.S.
Colombia vs. Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)	1981	Drug trade and political	Renegade elements in Colombian army



**Table 1: Ongoing Significant Conflicts** *(continued)*

Main Warring Parties	Year Began	Contributing Causes*	Other Foreign Involvement
<b>EUROPE</b>			
Russia vs. Chechnya	1994; 1996	Independence	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Georgia
<b>AFRICA</b>			
Algeria vs. Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	1991	Religious vs. secular rule	UN, France, U.S.
Democratic Republic of Congo vs. indigenous insurgents	1997	Political and socio/economic using ethnic divisions	France Angola, Chad, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Burundi, African Union, UN
Liberia vs. Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)	2001	Power	UN, Guinea, Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), U.S.
Nigeria: communal violence	1970	Religious, ethnic and economic	None
Somalia: Somoliland, Puntland, other factions	1978	Power and ethnic	UN (humanitarian aid), U.S., Ethiopia, Kenya
Sudan vs. Sudan Liberation Movement	2003	Autonomy and ethnic	UN
Uganda vs. Lord's Army	1986	Power	Sudan
<p>* Causes are simplifications and should not be regarded as the full explanation for what is often a very complex set of circumstances.</p> <p>** Principal groups are Hizbul Mujaheddin, al-Badr, Lashkar-i-Taiba, and Hargat ul-Ansar, backed by the Jamiat-e-Islami movement.</p>			



**Table 2: Low-Level Political Violence or Conflicts  
in Suspension that May Restart**

<b>Parties to Conflict</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Contributing Causes*</b>	<b>Foreign Mediation/ Involvement</b>
<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>			
Iran vs. Kurds	1961-	Independence	None
Turkey vs. Kurds (PKK)	1961-	Independence	None
Israel vs. Syria and Lebanon	2001-	Water, land, and peace	UN, U.S., Turkey
<b>ASIA</b>			
India: Hindu vs. Muslim communal violence	1948-esp. 2002	Religious	None
India vs. Insurgents in Arunachal Pradesh, Tripura, and Nagaland	1980-	Ethnic unification in separate states	None
Indonesia vs. West Papua separatists	1963-01	Economic and ethnic	None
Indonesia vs. Christians and Muslims in Maluccan Islands	1977-esp. 2001- 2002	Religious and territory	None
Indonesia vs. Christians and Muslims on Suluwesi Island	1977-esp. 2001-2002	Religious and territory	None
Myanmar (Burma) junta vs. minorities, Indian Assam rebels, and National League for Democracy	1942-2003 1988	Ethnic and drug trade; borders; democracy	U.S., UN, Association of South East Asian Nations
People's Republic of China vs. Tibet	1949-	Autonomy and religious	None
Philippines vs. Moro National Liberation Front	1984-2001	Religious and autonomy	None
Philippines vs. Moro Islamic Liberation Front	1984-2003	Religious and autonomy	None
Solomon Islands: Gov't vs. Malaita Eagle Isatabu Freedom Movement	1988-2003	Ethnic and economic	Australian-led multinational force and peace monitoring mission
Sri Lanka vs. Tamil Eelam	1978-2002	Ethnic, religious, and independence	India
<b>AFRICA</b>			
Angola vs. UNITA	1975-2002	Economic and ethnic	U.S., UN, South Africa
Burundi: Tutsi vs. Hutu	1988-2003	ethnic	UN, South Africa



**Table 2: Low-Level Political Violence or Conflicts  
in Suspension that May Restart** *(continued)*

Parties to Conflict	Duration	Contributing Causes*	Foreign Mediation/ Involvement
Central African Republic vs. army rebels	1997-2003	Economic and power	UN, France, Libya, Chad
Chad vs. Movement for Democracy and Justice	1998-	Religious and power	Libya
Cote d'Ivoire vs. army rebels	2002-2003	Power	France, UN
Ethiopia vs. Eritrea	1998-2000	Territory	African Union, UN, U.S.
Guinea Bissau vs. army rebels	1998-	Power	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), UN
Rwanda: Tutsi vs. Hutu	1990-2001	Political using ethnic divides	U.S., UN, Democratic Republic of Congo
Sierra Leone vs. Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	1989-2001	Ethnic and power	UN, Nigeria, ECOMOG, Guinea, Liberia, Burkina Faso, Gambia, UK
Sudan vs. Sudanese People's Liberation Army	1983-2002	Ethnic and religious	U.S., Iran, Uganda
Zimbabwe: racial strife	2000-	Political using ethnic and racial divides	None
<b>EUROPE</b>			
Armenia vs. Azerbaijan	1990-1994	Nagorno-Karabakh	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Bosnia: Serbs vs. Croats vs. Muslims	1990-1996	Final shape of Bosnia-Herzegovina	NATO Stabilization Force under UN mandate, Russia, others
Cyprus: Greeks vs. Turks	1974-	Power	UK, UN, U.S., European Union (EU)
Kosovo: Albanians vs. Serbs and other minorities	1998	Power, ethnic, autonomy	NATO and others in Stabilization Force, EU, OSCE, UN
Macedonia vs. National Liberation Army (ethnic Albanian)	2001	Ethnic and cultural	NATO, Russia, and others, EU, OSCE, UN
Moldova vs. Transdniester Region	1991-	Ethnic and autonomy	U.S., OSCE, Russia, Ukraine
Republic of Georgia vs. Abkhazia and South Ossetia	1992-1993	Independence	UN, OSCE, Russia, U.S.
UK vs. IRA splinter groups	1969-1997	Ethnic and religious	U.S.



**Table 2: Low-Level Political Violence or Conflicts  
in Suspension that May Restart** *(continued)*

Parties to Conflict	Duration	Contributing Causes*	Foreign Mediation/ Involvement
<b>AMERICAS</b>			
Haiti gov't. vs. opposition factions	1991-1994; 2000-	Economic and power	UN, U.S.
Mexico vs. Zapatistas (EZLN)	1983-	Socio/economic using religion and ethnic divides	None
Peru vs. Sendero Luminoso	1981-2002	Ideology and drug trade	None
Venezuela vs. legal opposition	2002-	Economic and power	U.S., Organization of American States
Venezuela vs. Colombia	2002-	Border violations	None
*Causes are simplifications and should not be regarded as the full explanation for what is often a very complex set of circumstances.			



# Organizing for Peace—January 1, 2004

*“What kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war....I am talking of a genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living....Not merely peace for Americans; but peace for all men and women; not merely peace in our times, but peace for all time.”*

John F. Kennedy, American University speech, June 10, 1963

## Introduction

Last year’s “Organizing for Peace” described the general institutional components on which the international community relies when there is a requirement for a “peace operation.” In those instances when military forces are not required, the United Nations Secretary General may dispatch personal representatives or create “offices” or missions to advise and promote good governance and national or regional stability. Such work is the essence of the peaceful prevention of deadly conflict. In the aftermath of armed conflict the United Nations (UN), through action by the Security Council, can deploy “blue helmets” led by an experienced military commander to perform one of two missions:

- (1) If authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the force may simply monitor or assist, as required, formerly warring parties as they move along a diplomatic spectrum from implementing and observing the cessation of fighting to either a new governmental structure (following a civil war) or a new diplomatic relationship (following cross-border conflict).
- (2) If fighting is still occurring but the Security Council decides that “extraordinary” circumstances warrant intervention by the international community (e.g., to halt massacres of noncombatants or to get critical relief supplies to refugees), it may invoke Chapter VII of the Charter to initiate a peace-making or peace enforcement operation in which the rules of engagement permit greater latitude to the intervening troops to employ force to achieve their mandate.

Also described last year is the important “second layer,” the various regional organizations that either have been formed for security reasons (e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or have assumed a security dimension because of perceived threats to one or more of their members, sometimes

from another member state or from internal unrest within a state. Where security is an “add-on” function, the mechanisms (if any) for restoring peace tend to be ad hoc structures. Such efforts, particularly if the Security Council endorses them, provide a valuable alternative when the UN cannot itself agree to intervene.

## Ad Hoc Interventions

Very recently, a third level of “intervening for peace” has emerged. It arises from (and therefore is difficult to separate from) armed interventions to compel another country or group to capitulate to the wishes or interests of the intervening country, whether these are overtly self-aggrandizing (Panama 1989, Iraq 2003) or more benevolent (Lebanon 1983). Some of these more altruistic interventions are multinational, but many seem to be unilateral. In West Africa, for example, Britain intervened in Sierra Leone to bolster the government and quell the rampages of the Liberian-supported Revolutionary United Front (RUF). In so doing, London clearly took sides in the struggle, which the UN “blue helmets” could not do and still discharge London’s mandate. British forces and the UN “blue helmets” in Sierra Leone with their different forces with their different reporting chains and missions, inevitably created tensions; but these tensions were controlled by a “division of labor” worked out on the ground.

France has a long history of intervening in Francophone Africa, propping up faltering governments, and occasionally undermining a ruler. Most recently, the French Interim Emergency Multinational Force intervened in northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo to try to stop ethnic-based massacres and in Cote d’Ivoire to damp down residual violence in the aftermath of an attempted coup in September 2002. With a ceasefire and a program for general government reform (Linac-Marcoussis Accord) in place in January 2003, French peacekeep-



ers were joined by an African force from the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). As in Sierra Leone, the two forces operate independently but cooperate. On February 4, 2003, the UN Security Council authorized continued deployment of both the French and ECOMOG contingents under Resolution 1464 (2003), but significantly this action did not create a “blue helmet” operation. In May, the Council authorized a UN mission of unarmed observers to assist in the reconciliation process.

In neighboring Liberia, where president-warlord Charles Taylor’s regime was under severe pressure from insurgents, another dual peacekeeping-intervention occurred, this time involving ECOMOG and 200 U.S. Marines from an off-shore Amphibious Ready Group. In August, Taylor left Liberia and a new interim government was sworn in. By early October, the small U.S. contingent had withdrawn as troops from the UN mission in Sierra Leone started arriving to form, with ECOMOG, a new UN military-police mission in Liberia that may grow to 17,000.

### *More Rapid Intervention Allowed*

Some welcome this growing pattern of *ad hoc* unilateral intervention “for peace” as a form of conflict mitigation or prevention of a greater evil, particularly when the intervention ends civil war and the atrocities so often associated with civil strife. It is true that such interventions often can be mounted more rapidly than if undertaken by established institutions like the UN or even regional peace and security organizations, and thus act as a brake on the downward spiral into chaos. It is also true that in the post-intervention period, the intervening country pressures the relevant formal international security organ to assume responsibility for the intervention by “authorizing” it; raising and inserting its own “peacekeeping” forces; accepting the financial burden of the operation; and, if conflict had already started before the original intervention, conducting post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building activities.

This latter point highlights a major weakness of the *ad hoc* approach, for formal organizations may be

reluctant (and may flatly refuse) to take on peacekeeping, peace-building, and reconstitution phases, particularly if doing so would impart the appearance of legitimizing the original military intervention. The upshot, should this happen, is either a failed state on the order of Somalia if the intervening power leaves, creating a power vacuum; a dependent state such as Iraq will be beginning July 1, 2004; or—at the extreme—an occupied state such as Iraq is now with all the legal responsibilities that status imposes on the original intervening power(s).

Another major weakness of the *ad hoc* approach is that it usually comes into play in a post-violence milieu. While formal organizations often are also guilty of not intervening in time to prevent armed conflict, they at least have the potential to be involved through preventive and nonviolent means to keep tensions from spiraling out of control.

### *Argument for Crisis Action Teams*

A way out of the *ad hoc* reactive quandary may be the creation of a small, modular, highly mobile crisis action team of diplomats, legal experts, police trainers, transportation and logistics specialists, construction engineers, humanitarian aid providers, and refugee workers, complemented by a well-trained and suitably armed “on-call” rapid reaction military security unit. As a threat to peace begins to evolve, an appropriately skilled and sized crisis action unit could be pulled together and dispatched to the trouble area not for war-fighting but to prevent the start of armed conflict. The authority to initiate an intervention would have to reside in an organization’s executive to ensure timely response, but the criteria for initiating intervention should be developed and approved by the member states.

Of course, there is no single initial deployment package that will fit every circumstance. Moreover, as conditions change, whether before or after the intervention begins, adjustments to the skill set mixture will be required. One critical rule that applies to any intervention is to have enough personnel and technological capabilities to project a sense that the organization is serious in its resolve to prevent deterioration (or any further deterioration) in the security sphere.



Whether the *ad hoc* approach to peace and security gains favor may well depend on how sincerely and extensively the leading developed countries continue to participate in institutional security and peace organizations or, where there is no reason, at least voice support for these organizations. The U.S. is planning to propose an international constabulary force that will be independent of the UN (*Boston Globe*, December 26, 2003). Whether allies will respond is questionable, particularly since such a force might become captive to U.S. unilateral or near-unilateral decisions for war.

What follows is a review of how the world organizes for peace. It shows UN peace activities and missions and a number of regional organizations that have in their charter a "peace and security" function.

### *The United Nations*

There have been 56 United Nations mandated peace, humanitarian, and observer missions from June 1948 through January 1, 2004. Of these, 35 were initiated during the 1990s and three—the UN Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE), the UN Mission in Support of East Timor (UNMISET), and the UN Mis-

sion in Liberia (UNMIL)—since the start of 2000, the latter in September 2003.

As of January 1, 2004, 13 "blue helmet" missions still exist. With the full deployment of the 15,000-member Liberian stabilization force, the total number of UN peacekeepers will be just under 50,000, the biggest total since the early 1990s and an increase of some 6,000 from the same period in 2003. Actual deployed strength at the start of the year stands at 45,815 troops, military observers, and civilian police from 91 countries. They are supported by 3,241 international civilians and 6,497 local civilians. The U.S. contribution is 518 personnel spread to seven missions—494 civilian police, 22 military observers, and two "troops" with the new Liberia peacekeeping mission. In addition, there are 12 political and peace-building missions. Many observers expect that 2004 will see three new peacekeeping deployments, all in Africa: Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire, and Burundi.

These numbers do not include the 7,000 (down from 12,000) members of the Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR) from 29 nations (3,300 U.S.); the 17,000 in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) from 37 nations (4,000 U.S.); the nearly 1,900 (865 U.S.) in the Sinai Multinational

#### *New Resource*


### *U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policies: The Choice Before Us*

While the Cold War nuclear standoff has ended, nuclear weaponry is again menacing humanity. A renewed sense of urgency has emerged relating to the spread of dangerous technology to "rogue states" and their possible use by "terrorists." FCNL's latest Perspective paper, *U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policies: The Choice Before Us*, provides timely information and analysis of policy choices related to nuclear weapons. It identifies the current threats posed by nuclear weapons, describes how the Bush Administration is handling the threats, and offers alternative policies that will enhance security.

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**Figure 1: UN Peacekeeping Operations**



The figure for each year is the number of operations at the end of the year.

Note: Technically, UNMOVIC and ISAF are not peacekeeping missions. The first falls directly under the Security Council, which receives updates and monitors progress directly rather than through reports from the UN Secretary General. ISAF, although sanctioned by the Security Council, is commanded by individual countries on a six-month voluntary rotation rather than by an individual appointed by the UN Secretary General.

*Source: United Nations*

Force and Observers; or the 5,500 in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (no U.S.). Nor does it include the 11,000 (9,000 U.S.) international troops fighting in Afghanistan or the 150,000 in Iraq and Kuwait.

In June 2003, the cost of the then 11 UN missions funded through assessments for peacekeeping during the period July 1, 2003-June 30, 2004, was estimated at \$2.17 billion, down from the previous year's \$2.63 billion. The two missions that started in the 1940s, the UN Truce Supervision Organization and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan are funded from the regular UN budget (combined cost of \$35.1 million). In December, an additional \$647 million was added to the peacekeeping total, chiefly for the Liberia mission (\$565.5 million).

Costs from the first mission, begun in 1948, to date for the 56 missions is about \$28.7 billion. (Compare this total cost to the \$66 billion spent just for the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the \$165 billion allocated through December 2003 for Operation Iraqi Freedom and the subsequent occupation.) At the end of 2003, unpaid peacekeeping assessments stood at about \$1.2 billion.

### UNMOVIC

In December 1999, the Security Council also mandated a new Iraqi inspection regime, the Iraq Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), to resume the work of the UN Special Commission in searching for weapons of mass destruction. Not until November 2002, did Iraq allow the first inspectors back into the country. Iraq

**Table 1: Current Peacekeeping Missions**

<b>Mission, Name and Location</b>	<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Starting Date</b>
UN Truce Supervision Organization B Middle East	UNTSO	June 1948
UN Military Observer Group in India-Pakistan B Kashmir	UNMOGIP	January 1949
UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	UNFICYP	March 1964
UN Disengagement Observer Force B Golan Heights	UNDOF	June 1974
UN Interim Force in Lebanon	UNIFIL	March 1978
UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	MINURSO	April 1991
UN Observer Mission in Georgia	UNOMIG	August 1993
UN Mission Interim Administration in Kosovo	UNMIK	June 1999
UN Mission in Sierra Leone	UNAMSIL	October 1999
UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	MONUC	November 1999
UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	UNMEE	July 2000
UN Mission in Support of East Timor	UNMISET	May 2002
UN Mission in Liberia	UNMIL	September 2003

*Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations*

ceased its active resistance to new inspections in the wake of Security Council Resolution 1441, passed in November 2002, which threatened dire consequences for continued Iraqi defiance. The approaching U.S.-led invasion forced UNMOVIC out of Iraq in March, and the U.S. has not assented to its return. In late 2003, France and the UK suggested the commission be transformed into a permanent inspection agency, an idea not well received in Washington.

***Other UN Missions***

In addition to the 13 peacekeeping missions, the UN maintains 12 political and peace-building missions for nine countries and three regional offices staffed by 525 military advisors, civilian police, and international civilians. Eight of these 12 missions are in Africa, three in Asia-Pacific, and one each in Central America and the Middle East. Beyond these 25 missions, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has

appointed 57 special and personal representatives or envoys (nine are U.S. citizens). Nineteen—exactly one-third—of these personal envoys deal with Africa. Six countries in Africa’s Great Lakes Region are working with the Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region and the African Union to confer during 2004 on peace and development of the area.

***Regional Options***

Many regional organizations have security functions. Most promote confidence-building measures such as transparency in arms production and stockpiles, controlling arms flows into their areas, and requiring members to announce military exercises. A few have mechanisms to help diffuse or resolve disputes: monitors, assistance groups, conflict resolution conferences, and—as a last resort—*ad hoc* military commands to suppress fighting.



**Table 2: Regional Security Organizations**

<b>Organization (Acronym), Number of Members</b>	<b>Date Begun</b>	<b>Purpose and Comments</b>
<b>EUROPE</b>		
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 55	(1973) 1994	Formerly Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Conventional arms control; confidence-building measures; currently has deployed 18 advisory/monitoring missions or groups in the former USSR and Yugoslavia
European Union (EU), 15 plus 13 candidate countries	(1951) 1993	Formerly European Coal and Steel Community, then European Community. Ensure freedom, security, and justice; promote economic progress; assert Europe's role in the world. Ten of the 13 candidate countries will become members in 2004
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 12	1991	Strengthen friendship, inter-ethnic accord, trust and mutual understanding and cooperation
<b>AFRICA</b>		
African Union (AU), 53	(1963) 2002	Formerly Organization of African Unity. Promote unity; defend sovereignty of members; coordinate economic, diplomatic, educational, health, welfare, scientific, and defense policies. Seven regional economic arrangements exist among these 53 nations, some of which have taken on security functions
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 16	1977	Political-economic development; defense and security; small arms moratorium; dominated by Nigeria
Treaty of Non-Aggression, Assistance and Mutual Defense (ANAD), 7	1977	Maintain regional peace and security, with emphasis on peaceful dispute settlement. All members belong to ECOWAS, as do two observer countries, Benin and Guinea
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 11	1983	Economic development; constant war has undermined development efforts
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 7	1977	Political-economic and security cooperation; has been subject to constant strife among members. IGAD is sponsoring talks among Somali factions, but is not active in Ethiopia's dispute with Eritrea, Uganda's civil war, or peace talks in Sudan
South African Development Community (SADC), 14	1980	Peacekeeping, inter-state defense and security cooperation; dominated by South Africa
<b>ARAB/ISLAMIC</b>		
Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), 5	1989	Socio-political and economic development; national training in peacekeeping. The dispute between Morocco and Algeria over the Western Sahara has paralyzed the UMA since 1994. A new dispute broke out between Libya and Mauritania in December, 2003
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), 6	1981	Security and economic development and Arab regional unity



**Table 2: Regional Security Organizations** *(continued)*

<b>Organization (Acronym), Number of Members</b>	<b>Date Begun</b>	<b>Purpose and Comments</b>
<b>ARAB/ISLAMIC</b> <i>(continued)</i>		
Arab League (AL), 22	1945	Cooperation in safeguarding independence and sovereignty and on economic, cultural, social, and health affairs. Seven nations are party to a Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 57 plus 3 observers	1969	Strengthen Islamic solidarity; cooperate on political, economic, social, cultural, and scientific matters; safeguard national right; support the Palestinian struggle
<b>AMERICAS</b>		
Organization of American States (OAS), 35	(1910) 1948	Formerly Pan-American Union. Non-intervention in internal affairs of members; peaceful settlement of disputes; limit conventional weapons arsenals; eliminate terrorism, illicit drugs, and weapons trafficking
Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), 15, 2 associate members, and 12 observers	(1958) 1973	Formerly British West Indies Federation. Promote economic integration and coordinate foreign policies
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), 7 and 2 associate members	1981	Promote cooperation and defend members' sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence
<b>ASIA</b>		
Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 10 and 1 observer	1967	Economic, social, and cultural development; political and economic stability; forum to resolve intra-regional disputes
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 23	1994	Asian-Pacific security cooperation, confidence building, preventive diplomacy
South Asian Assn for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 7	1983	Formerly South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC). Promote the welfare of South Asians; strengthen collective self-reliance; contribute to mutual trust. The organization was rejuvenated at the start of 2004 when tensions between India and Pakistan eased
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 6	1996	Formerly Shanghai Five. Originally to resolve border disputes involving newly independent Soviet republics and China. Five other countries interested in joining/observing. A permanent secretariat is to be established in China in 2004
Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), 16 and 7 observers	1999	Economic, social, and cultural cooperation; human rights; disarmament and arms control; non-intervention and territorial integrity of members
This table lists major regional organizations that have evolved some (often minimal) security functions in addition to their original purpose.		

*Sources: United Nations, Reuters, Organization web pages*



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