| This review
was intended to provide guidance for future U.S. nuclear
strategy, doctrine, force structure, and infrastructure.
In the past two years, this review has led to dramatic
changes in U.S. nuclear weapons policy.
The NPR rightly argues that the international security
environment has dramatically changed in the last two decades.
It contends that a nuclear posture based on the threat
of nuclear war with the Soviet Union is no longer appropriate.
However, these truths did not lead the Administration
to advocate nuclear disarmament. Rather, the Administration
argues for maintaining thousands of nuclear weapons for
the foreseeable future. According to the NPR, nuclear
weapons will continue to "play a critical role in
the defense capabilities of the United States, its allies
and friends." Additionally, the NPR promotes a more
"flexible" role for nuclear weapons. Nuclear
weapons will no longer solely be used to deter a nuclear
war, but also will be used to destroy new threats. That
is, the Administration wants to maintain a large number
of nuclear weapons with a wider range of possible uses
for an indefinite future.
Preemption and Nuclear Weapons
One of the most important policies to come out of the
Cold War was the idea that nuclear weapons are not to
be used. Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev, at their 1985
Geneva summit, agreed that "a nuclear war cannot
be won and must never be fought."14
At no time did either nation sign a treaty saying this,
but it was made clear that nuclear weapons are weapons
of last resort.
The norm of non-use is being challenged
by the policy statements of the current Bush Administration.
The NPR proposes "greater flexibility" with
respect to nuclear forces, and it suggests that nuclear
weapons are useful to "hold at risk a wide range
of target types." Stated simply, nuclear weapons
are no longer only weapons of deterrence, but they
can be used in a variety of roles, including on the
battlefield, even as a first resort. |
"Because
deterrence may not succeed, and because of the potentially
devastating consequences of WMD use against our forces
and civilian population, U.S. military forces and
appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability
to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including
in appropriate cases through preemptive measures.
This requires capabilities to detect and destroy an
adversary's WMD assets before these weapons are used."
-
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction, 200213 |
In December 2002, the Bush Administration clarified its
policy in the "National Strategy to Combat Weapons
of Mass Destruction." (A classified version of this
document, called the National Security Presidential Directive
17 (NSPD 17), was signed by President Bush in September
2002.) Based on what has been reported about NSPD 17,
President Bush would consider authorizing the first use
of U.S. nuclear weapons in the event that a hostile state
attacks U.S. forces, allies, or territory with chemical
or biological weapons and/or as a preemptive U.S. strike
on sites believed to store or manufacture chemical, biological,
or nuclear weapons.
New
Nuclear Weapons
The NPR shifts the primary focus of U.S. nuclear capabilities
away from the ability to deter and counter a Russian nuclear
attack and toward the actual use of nuclear weapons in
response to various contingencies. The indiscriminate
nature of the nuclear weapons currently available in the
U.S. arsenal makes them inappropriate for this new mission.
In order to deter their use, Cold War-style nuclear weapons
were designed to be so deadly that any use of these weapons
would lead to unacceptable loss of life. To expand the
possible uses of nuclear weapons, the U.S. would need
to modify existing nuclear weapons or develop new ones.
Therefore, to implement this strategy of greater nuclear
flexibility, the Administration is advocating new, more
"usable" nuclear weapons.
Consistent with the recommendation of the NPR, in its
annual request to Congress for fiscal year 2005, the Administration
asked for $27.6 million to conclude a three-year study
by the Department of Energy on a Robust Nuclear Earth
Penetrator (RNEP). This weapon and similar designs are
sometimes referred to as "bunker busters" because
they would be designed to burrow into the ground to destroy
underground military facilities that are protected by
concrete or rock.
Some proponents of RNEP claim that, because the weapon
would penetrate the earth before detonation, it would
be a "clean" nuclear weapon. In reality, the
explosion would have extremely deadly results. Contrary
to public belief, these weapons are very powerful and
their blasts would not be contained underground. Their
yield is on the order of several hundred kilotons to over
one megaton compared to the weapons that destroyed Hiroshima
and Nagasaki that were in the range of 14 to 21 kilotons.16
If detonated in a city, tens of thousands of people could
receive a fatal dose of radiation within the first 24
hours. More would be killed or injured by the extreme
pressures of the blast and thermal injuries arising from
the heat of the explosion. 17
Still more casualties would result from the fires and
the collapse of buildings resulting from the seismic shock
produced by the explosion. According to Sen. Jack Reed
(RI), "These weapons will bust more than a bunker.
The area of destruction will encompass an area the size
of a city. They are really city breakers, not bunker busters."
18
Mini-nuke advocates believe that these weapons provide
a more credible deterrent than high-yield, Cold War-style
nuclear weapons. The rationale being that because current
U.S. nuclear weapons are so deadly, it is unlikely that
any president would use them and potential adversaries
know that. Mini-nuke advocates believe that in order to
deter attack, U.S. nuclear weapons must be seen as a usable
threat. According to Dr. Stephen Younger, then at the
Los Alamos National Laboratory and later a Pentagon official
in the Bush Administration, "a reliance on high-yield
strategic weapons could lead to 'self-deterrence,' a limitation
on strategic options, and consequently a lessening of
the stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons." 19
|
The
Low-Yield "Cabriolet" Nuclear Test
|

Image
courtesy of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
On January 26, 1968, researchers at the Nevada Test Site buried a 2.3 kiloton nuclear warhead 52 meters (170 feet) under hard soil - much deeper than contemporary earth penetrators can reach. The resulting explosion expelled large amounts of highly radioactive dust and debris. The base of the Cabriolet explosion pictured here stretched 2.5 kilometers (1.5 miles) wide.
|
New
Nuclear Tests
The Administration's drive to acquire new and more usable
nuclear weapons is placing at risk the 12-year-old U.S.
nuclear-test moratorium. After 1,030 nuclear test detonations,
Congress halted U.S. nuclear weapons testing in 1992.
Although the Administration has stated repeatedly that
it has no current plans to resume nuclear testing, significant
modifications to existing nuclear warhead designs or the
development of entirely new types of nuclear warheads
could necessitate the renewal of nuclear explosive testing.
While there has been little explicit
talk about ending the moratorium, the Administration
is advocating lowering the technical hurdles to resume
testing. In 2003, the Bush Administration asked Congress
to reduce the time needed to prepare the Nevada Test
Site for a nuclear test. It would currently take three
years to prepare the Nevada Test Site for a meaningful
nuclear test. The Administration would like to reduce
the time to prepare the test site for a test to 18
months. |
"While
the United States is making every effort to maintain
the stockpile without additional nuclear testing,
this may not be possible for the indefinite future."
-
Nuclear Posture Review 20 |
Maintaining
Long-Term Capacity
The NPR makes it clear that the Bush Administration has
no plans to meet its NPT disarmament obligations. While
the Administration rhetorically supports disarmament,
it is negotiating empty disarmament treaties and rebuilding
a nuclear weapons complex to maintain the stockpile for
the indefinite future.
The Treaty of Moscow, also known as
the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT),
was signed by the U.S. and Russia in May 2002. The
agreement, which expires in December 2012, orders
the U.S. and Russia to reduce their strategic nuclear
warheads to a level of 1,700 to 2,200. Current U.S.
nuclear forces include approximately 6,500 deployed
strategic warheads, out of a total stockpile of an
estimated 10,700 warheads.22 |
There
is a need for a "revitalized nuclear weapons
complex that will...be able, if directed, to design,
develop, manufacture, and certify new warheads in
response to new national requirements."
-
Nuclear Posture Review 21 |
Although SORT represents a significant cut in deployed
weapons, it does not require the destruction of a single
warhead or delivery system. SORT permits each side to
deploy up to 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads on missiles,
submarines, etc., while allowing an unlimited number of
warheads to be stored for possible later redeployment.
While the Administration claims that the SORT Treaty illustrates
its dedication to disarmament, it has simultaneously proposed
constructing a new facility to manufacture plutonium pits
for nuclear weapons. Plutonium pits are essential components
of a nuclear weapon. The size of a grapefruit, a plutonium
pit is a plutonium-filled round metal shell which, when
squeezed by high explosives, will trigger a weapon's nuclear
blast. The purpose of this proposed bomb plant, called
the Modern Pit Facility, is to maintain the nuclear stockpile
by producing replacement plutonium pits. The Energy Department
claims that the production of new pits would "ensure
the future viability of the nation's nuclear stockpile,"
thereby "ensuring the future viability of the nation's
nuclear deterrent." In other words, the Modern Pit
Facility would help ensure that the U.S. maintains its
reliance on a large nuclear weapons stockpile for years
to come. The new facility would be able to produce up
to 450 pits per year--far more than is needed to replace
aging pits of the 1,700-2,200 weapons ordered by the Moscow
Treaty.23
The
Dangers of the NPR
Lowering
the Threshold
Since the inception of the atomic era, U.S. presidents
have correctly differentiated between nuclear and conventional
weapons. U.S. policy has consistently stated that nuclear
weapons would only be used if the United States were attacked
with nuclear weapons by another nuclear state. President
Truman went so far as to place the U.S. nuclear arsenal
under the jurisdiction of the Atomic Energy Commission,
rather than the Pentagon, to separate nuclear weapons
from the conventional war-fighting arsenal.
The NPR, as well as other Bush Administration national
security documents, have reversed this policy and outline
a strategy that makes nuclear war fighting acceptable.
Developing new types of nuclear weapons for battlefield
use blurs the distinction between conventional and nuclear
arms. The danger is enhanced when the Administration leaves
open the possibility of using nuclear weapons "preemptively."
These policies taken together could significantly lower
the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.
In addition to increasing the likelihood
that nuclear weapons would be used, the policies outlined
in NPR would fail to address the real security threats
facing the U.S. The most urgent national security
threats to the U.S. are not posed by nation-states,
but from violent non-state groups. Although there
are some who advocate targeting violent insurgent
groups with nuclear weapons with smaller blast yields,
nuclear weapons have no utility against these groups.
Overall, U.S. military leaders have concluded that using nuclear weapons is imprudent and unnecessary. The military has other conventional weapons that are equally effective, but that do not have the problems associated with nuclear weapons. |
For
some to say that nuclear weapons are good for them
but not for others is simply not sustainable. ...
The most powerful nations must remember that as they
do, so shall others do.
-
Statement by Nobel Peace Laureates,
2003 24 |
In addition to killing a large number of innocent
people, the use of a nuclear weapon in a battlefield environment
would contaminate a battlefield, exposing U.S. military
personnel to significant dangers. Any use of a nuclear
weapons as a response to a terrorist attack would have
tremendous political and human costs and should be rejected.
Increase
Proliferation
The threat of unconventional weapons has dominated White
House rhetoric for the past year. The main justification
for war in Iraq was its alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons.
The U.S. has strongly criticized Iran and North Korea
for moving to obtain equipment to produce weapons-grade
nuclear materials. The U.S. government has also expressed
concerns that nuclear materials could fall into the hands
of terrorist groups such as al Qaeda.
The Bush Administration is right to bring the dangers
posed by nuclear weapons to the public eye. However, at
the same time the Administration is criticizing others
for having weapons, it is upgrading its own nuclear weapons
complex. This "do what I say, not what I do"
policy is evident to all. If nuclear weapons are wrong
for Iran and North Korea, they are wrong for the U.S.
The Administration seems to believe that nuclear weapons
are only a problem when they are in the possession of
a people that do not support the U.S. Instead of reducing
the threat posed by nuclear weapons, this policy enhances
the idea that nuclear weapons are sources of power and
prestige.
As long as some states have nuclear weapons while others
do not, there will be a power imbalance leading to insecurity.
The fact that the U.S., with far and away the most powerful
conventional military in the world, continues to see nuclear
weapons as central to its security, reinforces the idea
that these weapons can bring power and security. After
its nuclear weapons tests of 1998, the Indian prime minister
stated, "India is a big country now because it has
demonstrated that it has nuclear weapons."25
As long as the United States and other powerful countries
continue to rely on nuclear weapons to safeguard their
security and assert dominance, less powerful nations will
feel the need to acquire nuclear weapons. In a statement
that sounds remarkably similar to the stated view of some
in the Bush Administration, a Foreign Ministry spokesman
from North Korea recently said, "It is the historical
truth that peace is won and defended only with strength."26
With all the nuclear dangers in the world, it is counterproductive
for the Bush Administration to start re-emphasizing nuclear
weapons in U.S. security policy. To make a safer world
for generations to come, the U.S. government must put
an end to its dependence on nuclear weapons. No real progress
will be made unless the President and Congress put the
full resources and political will of the United States
behind eliminating the threat of nuclear weapons. It will
likely be a slow and arduous process, but it is worth
the effort and far preferable to disarmament through war.
13 National Strategy to
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. December 2002, 3.
Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf.
14 Joint Soviet-United States
Statement on the Summit Meeting in Geneva. November 21,
1985.
15 Nuclear Posture Review,
34-35. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm.
16 Statement by Sen. Jack
Reed. Congressional Record. May 20, 2003.
17 Robert Nelson. Low-Yield
Nuclear Earth Penetrators. The Journal of the Federation
of American Scientists, January/February 2001. Available
at http://www.fas.org/faspir/2001/v54n1/weapons.htm.
18 Statement by Sen. Jack
Reed. Congressional Record. May 20, 2003.
19 Younger, Stephen. "Nuclear
Weapons in the Twenty-First Century" June 27, 2002.
Available at http://www.fcnl.org/issues/arm/sup/nukwpns21stcent.pdf.
20 Nuclear Posture Review,
55.
21 Ibid. 30.
22 Natural Resources Defense
Council. "Faking Nuclear Restraint: The Bush Administration's
Secret Plan for Strengthening U.S. Nuclear Forces."
February 12, 2002.
23 U.S. Department of
Energy. "Draft Supplemental Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement on Stockpile Stewardship and Management
for a Modern Pit Facility." May 2003, 2-4, 2-6.
24 Final Statement of
the 4th World Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates. Rome. November
30, 2003.
25 Thomas Graham Jr.,
"Time for a No-First-Use Policy." Christian
Science Monitor. January 28, 1999.
26 "U.S. Groups Sees
North Korea Nuke Facility." CBS News.com. January
10, 2004.
|