Issues: Nuclear Weapons

Since large nuclear arsenals were created to wage the intimidation battles of the Cold War, many people assumed that as the Cold War withered away, so did the threat of nuclear war. Tragically, this was not the case. Although the likelihood of a nuclear war between superpowers has diminished over the past ten years, the nuclear threat remains. Some experts are even arguing that the threat of a nuclear attack may in fact be greater today than during the Cold War.

The nuclear threat has dramatically changed in the past two decades. The possibility of a massive deliberate nuclear attack against the U.S. is far less than the risk of an unintended or unauthorized launch, the use of a nuclear weapon in a regional conflict, or the threat of nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists.

• Introduction
• The Cold War is Over- The Nuclear Threat is Not
• The Bush Administration's Policies
• Alternative Policies for a More Secure World
• Conclusion
• Additional Resources
• Table 1 The Countdown to Nuclear War
• Table 2 Nuclear Weapon Status of Select States
• Map of Nuclear Weapon States

Unlike the relatively predictable nuclear stalemate between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, these threats are very difficult to control. In February 2001, President Bush correctly said, "The grave threat from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons has not gone away with the Cold War. It has evolved into many separate threats, some of them harder to see and harder to answer."²

Hair-Trigger Alert

Although the threat of a nuclear attack from Russia has greatly decreased, the U.S. and Russia still court nuclear disaster. Both states each still have about 2,500 nuclear warheads on hair-trigger alert. This means that both countries have nuclear weapons that are ready to fire thousands of warheads in as little as three minutes.

The continued deterioration of Russia's radar and early warning systems is of great concern. The poor conditions of Russian facilities, substandard training and pay, and low morale of personnel increases the likelihood of mistakes. The security of the United States-and the world-now rests with an increasingly fragile and vulnerable Russian nuclear infrastructure.

(Click here for related graphic, "Table 1, The Countdown to Nuclear War.")

The danger of Russian nuclear weapons is far from hypothetical. In 1995, the United States and Norway launched a research rocket from an island off Norway's northwest coast. Within seconds, Russia's early warning system indicated a possible nuclear attack. This triggered Russia's emergency nuclear decision process. President Boris Yeltsin was within minutes of ordering a nuclear strike on the U.S. when a Russian radar crew saw the rocket was headed out to sea.⁴

The U.S. has experienced close calls as well. On numerous occasions U.S. missiles and aircraft were prepared for an immediate nuclear retaliation against the Soviet Union, due to a computer failure or the misinterpretation of a computerized war training exercise. Dozens of close calls have transpired on both sides for years.⁵ Maintaining weapons on high alert risks a small mistake quickly becoming a nuclear holocaust.

In addition to misinterpretations and accidental launch, keeping weapons on hair-trigger alert leaves arsenals vulnerable to unauthorized launches. An unauthorized attack is more likely with fewer steps needed to implement it. With nuclear missiles armed and ready to fire, the need to secure the command and control of nuclear weapons is great. Russia's desperate economic condition exacerbates this situation. The government can no longer afford to pay many of its guards at nuclear sites, leaving many nuclear weapons facilities unsupervised and vulnerable.

Nuclear Terrorism

In 1997, retired Russian Gen. Alexander Lebed announced that at the time of the demise of the Soviet Union, Moscow lost track of more than 100 suitcase-sized nuclear weapons.⁶ In October 2001, U.S. intelligence sources received a report that "terrorists" had acquired a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb and were planning to smuggle it into Manhattan.⁷ Fortunately, both these reports turned out to be false or lacking sufficient evidence. However, these events illuminate the frightening reality that it was impossible at the time for the U.S. to dismiss these reports as untrue. Such events could indeed happen.

The two cases above illustrate that the continued existence of nuclear weapons allows for the possibility that they might fall into the hands of violent extremist groups. An attack with nuclear weapons against the U.S., or any other nation, could have devastating consequences. According to the Washington Post, after an October 2001 briefing on al Qaeda's nuclear ambitions, President Bush ordered his national security team to "give nuclear terrorism priority over every other threat to the United States."⁸

Proliferation

Nuclear proliferation, or the spread of nuclear weapons, is one of the greatest threats in the world. There are eight countries known to possess nuclear weapons. In order of their acquisition of nuclear arms, they are, the United States (1945), Russia (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960), China (1964), Israel (1967⁹), India (1974), and Pakistan (1989). Additionally, some analysts believe that North Korea may possess one or two nuclear warheads.

(Click here for related graphic, "Map of Nuclear Weapon States.")

In 1963, President John F. Kennedy predicted that by 1975, 15 to 20 countries would have nuclear arms. Thankfully, President Kennedy's prediction fell short, largely due to the efforts of the international arms control community, which has stalled the spread of nuclear weapons by erecting technical and political barriers to proliferation.

Technical Barriers to Proliferation

Technically speaking, it is very difficult to build a nuclear weapon. Production requires a significant level of expertise and money. More importantly, it is difficult to obtain fissile material. Fissile materials are materials in which atoms can be made to fission, or split, at an extremely fast pace, creating a chain reaction. This chain reaction creates vast amounts of energy that results in an enormous explosive force.¹⁰ The two types of materials that can be used to produce a chain reaction are plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). Neither plutonium nor HEU is found in nature, but must be produced in large, costly, and highly technical facilities. The technical barriers to proliferation are strengthened by agreements between key nuclear supplier states. These states impose strict controls over the transfer of equipment, technology, and information relevant to the production of nuclear weapons. Unless a state with nuclear aspirations steals fissile material or overcomes numerous hurdles and manufactures it domestically, they cannot craft a nuclear weapon.

Political Barriers to Proliferation

There are also political barriers to proliferation. Ultimately, a state with nuclear aspirations must look at the advantages and consequences that come from attaining nuclear weapons and make a choice. The global nonproliferation regime serves as a significant political barrier to proliferation. This regime is a network of interlocking treaties, organizations, and multilateral inspections designed to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.¹¹ The most important nonproliferation instrument today is the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970. Stated simply, the NPT was designed to hold the number of nuclear weapons states at five, while negotiations were, at an unspecified future date, conducted to secure the abolition of all nuclear weapons. Incentives were given to non-nuclear states, such as security guarantees and the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, to gain universal acceptance. The NPT has 187 parties; only Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are outside the treaty, making it the most widely adhered to arms treaty in history.

Undermining the Barriers

The technical and political barriers to proliferation are being undermined. The spread of information, knowledge, and technical capacity is making it much easier for a state to build a nuclear weapon than in the past. It is also becoming easier to obtain fissile material. The world's nuclear arsenals contain some 30,000 assembled nuclear weapons and enough separated plutonium and HEU to make nearly 250,000 nuclear weapons.¹² The collapse of the Soviet Union left tens of thousands of nuclear weapons-and the material for tens of thousands more weapons-in poorly guarded facilities.

In addition to the Russian arsenal there are unsecured nuclear materials located at hundreds of sites throughout the world. Many of the worlds 130 HEU-fueled research reactors have inadequate security. At some locations "security" entails no more defense than a chain link fence.

The political barriers to proliferation are also being undermined. The nuclear weapons states are not living up to their nonproliferation obligations. Article VI of the NPT states that "all countries agree to pursue negotiations in good faith to end the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament under international control."

After more than 30 years under the NPT, the nuclear weapons states have exhibited little interest in achieving "nuclear disarmament under international control." If the nuclear weapons states continue to violate their obligations, the bargain put forth in the NPT will fall apart. For the global community to effectively address the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons states must understand that continued possession of nuclear weapons is linked to proliferation. Unless the nuclear weapons states, including the U.S., realize this, the political barriers to proliferation will continue to erode.

² President George W. Bush, "Remarks by the President to Troops and Personnel," Norfolk Naval Air Station, Virginia, February 13, 2001.

(Webmaster's Note: Endnote #3 is associated with another web page in this series of files.)

⁴ Ibid. 4

⁵ Ibid. 5

⁶ "Lebed: Small Nuclear Weapons May be in Wrong Hands." CNN.com, October 1, 1997.

⁷ Mathew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John Holdren. Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials. Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, March 2003, 18.

⁸ Barton Bellman, "Fears Prompt U.S. to Beef Up Nuclear Terror Detection," The Washington Post, March 3, 2002, p. 1.

⁹ Little is known about Israel's nuclear weapons complex. The exact time Israel built its first nuclear weapons is classified. Some experts claim that Israel had a nuclear capability just before the Six-Day War of 1967.

¹⁰ Specter, Leonard. "Nuclear Proliferation" in Larson, Jeffery. Arms Control: Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment. Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2002, 126.

¹¹ Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar. Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002, 25.

¹² Specter, 16

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