Indeed, it
seems that most countries confronted with armed opposition
groups have conveniently assumed that such organizations
have substantive links to international terrorism. And,
where Washington finds it convenient for other reasons
such as muting UN Security Council opposition to U.S.
proposals, such groups (for example, China's Uighur rebels)
now find themselves on the State Department's list of
terrorist organizations.
But
the Bush Administration faces international complications
in waging this war. The White House is under increasing
pressure from key members of Congress to reassess Pakistan-U.S.,
Yemen-U.S. and Saudi-U.S. relations. As recently as August
2002, Pakistan is believed to have transferred nuclear
plans and materials to North Korea, one of the "axis of
evil," in exchange for ballistic missile parts. After
pledging not to buy missiles or missile parts from North
Korea, Yemen was caught trying to take delivery of 15
Scud missiles in mid-December. A number of financial
transactions between prominent Saudi individuals, including
some with connections to the royal family, and known or
suspected terrorists, have introduced new strains in diplomatic
relations with Riyadh. One report says that the problem
is so serious that a National Security Council task force
recommended that the White House give the Saudis 90 days
to close down these conduits to terrorist organizations
or the United States will unilaterally act to do so.
Given Saudi Arabia's key military facilities and U.S.
dependence on Saudi oil (currently about 17% of U.S. oil
imports), this approach may be rejected.
Meanwhile,
in the United States, Pres. Bush finally secured passage
of legislation establishing a Department of Homeland Defense.
The Pentagon created a new four-star "Northern Command"
(by combining Space and Strategic Commands) to coordinate
military support for the new Department and to integrate
surveillance of external air, sea, and land approaches
to the U.S. mainland with surveillance of interior U.S.
airspace. And running as a steady undercurrent to all
the organizational changes in government involving over
170,000 individuals are terrorist alert warnings from
intelligence or law enforcement agencies or, in some cases,
very senior administration officials.
This
"war on terror" confronts the Administration with a fundamental
dilemma. On one hand, the Administration believes it
is necessary to keep the U.S. public engaged and alert
to help preclude new attacks. On the other, the constant
warnings have a tendency to induce complacency when nothing
happens, especially when a warning about possible "significant
events" is not accompanied by a change in the color-coded
alert level. The natural reversion to business as usual
as September 11 recedes into history has been reinforced
by Administration calls for people in the U.S. to indulge
themselves rather than make sacrifices, as in previous
wars "for the duration." Put another way, instead of
flashing ration cards, the White House wants people in
the U.S. to flash their credit cards.
Moreover,
the "war on terror" is being waged on incomplete terms.
Because governments are composed of and operate through
an array of formalized organizational structures, there
is an unconscious predisposition to concentrate on the
need to disrupt or destroy an opponent's organization.
This works when the enemy is another government; it misses
the mark when the enemy is a transnational, loosely organized,
decentralized collection of individuals and small groups
motivated by an intangible fervor, such as the many so-called
affiliates of al Qaeda. With no nation-state to defend,
these groups are highly independent and can function with
the bare minimum of hierarchy. If traditional financial
channels are closed to them (and as of Dec. 1, 2002, only
$113 million in alleged terrorist financial assets worldwide
had been identified and frozen), they employ the informal
hawala system (money exchange, somewhat analogous to letters
of credit) or couriers to move funds. Instead of traceable
cell phones, they use Internet cafes or single use, disposable
cells.
Winning
the "war on terror" fundamentally requires addressing
the conditions that give rise to the extreme fervor that
impels suicide bombings and other killing of innocent
civilians. A good starting point would be to lower the
profile of policies and programs that are perceived by
others as oppressive and serving only U.S. interests.
If the history of the U.S. is any guide, most people want
the opportunity to control their own lives, to be free
from threats of physical harm and from unwarranted interference
by outside authority. When these are missing for significant
periods, extremists are better able to imbue a sense of
justice denied and to identify a "responsible" entity
against which hatred can be directed.
Hatred,
and the terrorism it impels, will never be completely
eradicated. Thus, the end of the "war on terror" may
come only when the United States decides to declare victory
and return the residual battle to law enforcement. An
opportunity to make this adjustment without seeming to
be arbitrary will be when the number of annual terrorist
actions, as compiled by the Department of State, returns
to its pre-September 11, 2001 levels.
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