Many
economies, including those of three of the four big financial
supporters of the 1990-91 war - Japan, Germany, and Saudi
Arabia - are weaker today. Any war would be relatively
more expensive. Suspicions about U.S. motives, fueled
by the Bush Administration's initial unilateralism, remain
alive despite Washington's patient work to obtain a UN
Security Council resolution on new inspections. Germany
has declared it will provide no forces; use of Saudi Arabian
airbases to launch combat missions against Iraq remains
unclear; and troop contributions, as well as moral support,
from other Arab states such as Egypt and Syria may not
materialize.
Iraq has so
far skirted disaster. It accepted, two days before the
November 15 deadline, UN Resolution 1441 (2002) passed
on November 8. On December 7, one day before another
UN deadline, Baghdad submitted the required "currently
accurate, full, and complete" disclosure of all chemical,
biological, and nuclear (weapons of mass destruction or
WMD) research and weapons programs and all delivery system
developments, both manned and unmanned. Iraq so far has
also managed to avoid any significant interference or
omissions in its dealings with the UNMOVIC (United Nations
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) and
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspectors.
Both UNMOVIC and IAEA experts are still comparing their
lists of known and suspected WMD and related sites to
those provided by Iraq.
Even before
Iraq's declaration was sent from Baghdad, Washington was
denouncing it as insufficient and incomplete and putting
pressure on UNMOVIC and IAEA chiefs to bring Iraqi scientists
out of Iraq - even against their will - for interviews.
But Washington refused to reveal its own evidence to support
its charges that Saddam failed to comply with the UN demands.
Pentagon and State Department envoys fanned out to NATO
allies - notably Turkey and Germany - and to Muslim countries
in the Middle East and Asia to try to line up support
for a possible war.
Significantly,
at the end of December 2002, four U.S. aircraft carrier
battle groups were in position to launch attacks against
Iraq, and the U.S. Central Command had a large headquarters
element in its "alternate" command and control center
in Qatar. On the north, however, Turkey still expressed
reservations about its support for any action not endorsed
by a second UN resolution and reportedly turned down a
U.S. bid to send U.S. ground troops through Turkey to
establish a "northern front" against Iraq. Moreover,
the existence of an enclave of the al Qaeda-affiliated
Ansar al-Islam group in Kurdish northern Iraq could complicate
U.S. plans to use bases in this area as forward staging
posts for aircraft and special forces units should war
with Iraq begin.
This
analysis was prepared by Col. Dan Smith, U.S. Army (Ret.).
Dan, a West Point graduate and Vietnam veteran, is FCNL's
Senior Fellow on Military Affairs..
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