Top lieutenants
lived ostentatiously. Corruption was rife. The Palestinian
legislature and court system had no independent power.
The Palestinian Authority was in practice the rule of
one man. Moreover, by 1998, local Palestinians were already
deeply concerned by the failure of PA negotiators to win
a settlement freeze, prevent new large-scale Israeli land
seizures, or prevent new and unprecedented restrictions
on Palestinian movement, especially the closing off of
access to Jerusalem to West Bank and Gaza residents.
Today,
over 90% of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians want fundamental
reform of the Palestinian Authority. On a wide range
of questions there is an overwhelming consensus:
-
95% want not only new elections as soon as possible
but a guarantee of periodic elections;
-
82% want the head of state elected for a limited
term;
-
95% believe reform should include dismissal of cabinet
ministers;
-
85% support full freedom to form political parties;
-
82% want freedom of the press without state censorship;
-
78% believe the judiciary must be independent of the
executive branch of government;
-
92% support adoption of a basic law or constitution.33
There
is, in sum, broad public support for the democratization
of Palestinian politics and establishment of the rule
of law.
There
are a number of obstacles, some of them obvious, to realizing
the popular will for Palestinian democracy and the rule
of law. As long as Israel imposes siege, round-the-clock
curfews and draconian travel restrictions in the West
Bank and Gaza, new elections are physically impossible.
Under these conditions, political parties cannot meet,
campaigns cannot be run, candidates cannot appear, voter
registration cannot take place, and polling places cannot
be prepared.
However,
a need to create conditions conducive to holding free
and fair elections, including an end to lethal attacks,
a period of calm, a lifting of siege conditions, curfews
and travel restrictions, would provide a compelling political
rationale for the Palestinian and Israeli actions required
in any event to ease the current situation. Preparation
for new elections would also provide an ideal opportunity
to establish an international presence in the West Bank
and Gaza, in the form of election monitors or a peacekeeping
force, to provide a measure of security and stability.
Another
obstacle to moving toward Palestinian democracy and the
rule of law is the fear that new elections will result
in the victory of "radical" (by which is meant militant
Islamic) elements in Palestinian society. This is a fear
voiced variously by members of the Palestinian Authority,
"liberal" or "secular" Palestinians, and Arab, Israeli,
and U.S. government officials. But, while opinion polls
indicate Yasser Arafat's Fatah organization and the Islamic
movement today enjoy about equal support, neither group
commands a majority. Elections would almost certainly
result in the need for a coalition government, assuming
that, as Palestinians wish, a parliamentary majority would
be required to exercise power in a reformed Palestinian
Authority. Any Fatah-Islamic, Fatah-liberal or national
unity coalition that might result would be forced by coalition
politics to hew to a centrist line. All parties in parliament,
moreover, would have to act with a view to the next elections
that would be only a few years off, if the popular will
is fulfilled.
A
third obstacle to reform of the Palestinian Authority
is the pressure from Israel and the United States for
certain specific reforms that, in Palestinian eyes, fall
far short of (and may even impede) the thorough democratic
reform demanded by Palestinian public opinion. Israeli
and U.S. demands for reform have focused on replacing
Yasser Arafat, restructuring the security services and
strengthening budgetary controls. While a majority of
Palestinians support some version of these goals, emphasizing
them instead of emphasizing such things as periodic elections,
constitutional government, and separation of powers leads
many to conclude that "reform" simply means a Palestinian
Authority with a foreign-picked leadership and a more
repressive security apparatus. Such a reformed PA might
be less corrupt than the present, but less representative
of the popular will. Thus, "reform" is discredited and
the possibility of real reform recedes. The way to overcome
this obstacle is simple, but of fundamental importance:
outside support for reform needs to focus on helping Palestinians
forge the institutions and mechanisms of genuine self-government,
not on setting up a second, more efficient authoritarian
regime to replace the one that has failed.
An
excellent blueprint for Palestinian reform was prepared
by a task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations
in 1999. The task force was chaired by former French
Prime Minister Michel Rocard, and included former British
Foreign Minster Douglas Hurd, former German Foreign Minister
Han-Dietrich Gencher and the former chair of the U.S.
House Committee on International Relations, Congressman
Lee Hamilton. The task force report, "Strengthening Palestinian
Public Institutions" was authored by two Palestinian academics
in consultation with a group of Palestinian and international
experts. The report's recommendations (see
accompanying box) in essence mirror the Palestinian
popular demand for democratization and establishment of
the rule of law.34
When
the report was released in the spring of 1999, it raised
hopes among many Palestinians that its implementation
would become European and, especially, U.S. policy toward
the Palestinian Authority. These hopes were quickly disappointed
by subsequent events.
|
