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Israel imposed a six-week closure
on Palestinian Hebron, but not on the Israeli settlements
in Hebron. A number of Israeli cabinet ministers at the
time recognized the importance of the Ibrahimi Mosque
attack for the future of the Oslo process and argued that
the government should immediately remove the Israeli settlers
living in buildings in the center of Hebron, both to eliminate
an explosive flash point and to signal an intention to
evacuate settlements as part of the peace process. The
Israeli cabinet, however, decided against the evacuation
of the Hebron settlers.7
Abdul
Jawad and others also cite Israeli-imposed closures and
curfews restricting Palestinian movement, especially the
closure of Jerusalem to all West Bank and Gaza residents
except a few given special permits, and Israel's failure
to release as many political-security prisoners as Palestinians
expected as other factors that diminished Palestinian
support for Oslo.8
The closures and restrictions on movement had an economic
impact that was widely felt. The number of Palestinians
able to travel to work in Israel fell sharply, unemployment
increased, and business activity was disrupted. Overall,
instead of the expected economic dividends of Oslo, the
Palestinian standard of living declined 20 percent from
1993 levels. 9
Most
Palestinian observers would agree with the Israeli analyst
Ze'ev Schiff, senior military affairs correspondent for
the leading daily Ha'aretz,
that the Palestinian Authority (PA) also took actions
that contributed to the collapse of the Oslo process.
Schiff cites the failure of the PA to collect illegal
weapons held by Palestinians, the arming of the semi-independent
Tanzim militia, smuggling large quantities of arms, ammunition
and explosives into the West Bank and Gaza, and increasing
the size of the Palestinian security forces well beyond
the levels permitted by Oslo.10
On
the Israeli side, noting another factor often mentioned
by Palestinians, Schiff says that "considerable responsibility
devolves on Israel because of its deliberate foot-dragging
and its disruption of the timetables contained in
the agreements - for example, in the implementation
of the various stages of the redeployment. As a result,
the Palestinians reached the conclusion that Israel
was pushing them into accepting small- scale interim
agreements which keep on being renewed endlessly and
are never carried out."11 |
"But
above all, there was the relentless expansion of
the existing settlements and the establishment of
new settlements, with a concomitant expropriation
of Palestinian land."
Ze'ev
Schiff, senior military affairs correspondent
for Ha'aretz, on the failure
of Oslo and the outbreak of violence.
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"But
above all," Schiff writes in his analysis of the failure
of Oslo and the outbreak of violence, "there was the relentless
expansion of the existing settlements and the establishment
of new settlements, with a concomitant expropriation of
Palestinian land. Israel is responsible for creating
new facts, which will affect the final agreement, in the
course of negotiations. This was pronounced in and around
Jerusalem, and elsewhere as well. The territories that
were seized shut in the Palestinians from all sides.
Their conclusion was that the prospect of being able to
establish a viable state was fading right before their
eyes."12
On this point Salah Abdul Jawad and other Palestinian
analysts are in complete agreement with Schiff. None
of Israel's actions have from their perspectives been
as harmful to the hopes raised by Oslo than the dramatic
expansion of Israeli settlements in every year since the
Oslo accords of 1993.13
In
retrospect, it seems clear that it was not only the mistakes
of the Palestinian and Israeli leaderships that led to
the collapse of Oslo but also the American failure to
challenge effectively any of the harmful Palestinian and
Israeli actions. Schiff formulates the "great mistake
of the American mediators" as the failure "to clamp down
on the Palestinian Authority" and "put pressure on it
when it violated agreements and waged violence" or to
"come out forcefully against the Palestinians' incitement.
On the other side, they did not take steps to ensure that
the Oslo timetables were met and they made do with noncommittal
statements and mild wrist-slapping about the new settlements
established by Israel. The Americans' point of departure,
as they explain today, was that if all the parties involved
rush forward, the violations will be forgotten."14
Palestinian analysts might differ somewhat in emphasis
but would agree with Schiff's main point that the U.S.
was far too lax in pressing the parties to observe the
letter and spirit of the Oslo accords.
While
careful Israeli and Palestinian analysts place responsibility
for the collapse of the Oslo process on policies and events
from 1993 to 2000, another explanation for the Oslo failure
has gained wide currency. This explanation focuses on
the unsuccessful Camp David summit conference of July
2000. As Deborah Sontag wrote in a long July 2001 New York Times
article examining the failure of Oslo, "a potent, simplistic
narrative has taken hold in Israel and to some extent
in the United States. It says: Mr. Barak [then Israel's
Prime Minister] offered Mr. Arafat the moon at Camp David
last summer. Mr. Arafat turned it down, and then 'pushed
the button' and chose the path of violence." A variant
version places the sole blame on Mr. Arafat for rejecting
an even better offer at talks in the Egyptian resort of
Taba in January 2001.15
Against
this interpretation Ms. Sontag quotes Israel's foreign
minister at the time, Shlomo Ben-Ami, who said that the
Taba talks were suspended not by Mr. Arafat's rejection
of Israel's offer but by Israel, because Israeli elections
were imminent and "'the pressure of Israeli public opinion
against the talks could not be resisted.'" She also reports
that Joseph Alpher, one of the Israeli experts who advised
Prime Minister Barak at Camp David, argues that the Palestinian
uprising was caused by the failures of the seven-year
post-Oslo period, not by the impasse at Camp David.16
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Two
American officials who were closely involved with
the negotiations echo Alpher's view. Ms. Sontag cites
Dennis Ross, who told the Jerusalem Post "one of the
lessons I've learned is that you can't have one environment
at the negotiating tables and a different reality
on the ground." And Rob Malley, who headed the National
Security Council's Middle East desk in the Clinton
Administration, told a public gathering "If the fundamental
equation had to be land for peace, how can it have
any meaning and any relevance when, on the one hand,
land was being taken away on a daily basis and, on
the other hand, the peace was being maligned on a
daily basis."17
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"The
great mistake of the American mediators was that
they did not clamp down on the Palestinian Authority
and did not put pressure on it when it violated
agreements and waged violence. Nor did they come
out forcefully against the Palestinians' incitement. On the other side, they did not take steps to ensure
that the Oslo timetables were met..."
Ze'ev
Schiff, senior military affairs correspondent
for Ha'aretz, on the failure
of Oslo and the outbreak of violence. |
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