Issues: Military Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy

The operative question for judging the efficacy of any NSS is: "How will the security of the United States be better than it is now?"

Without doubt, the United States is by far the most powerful military and economic nation in the world. And while there are other multinational economic centers, there is not on today's horizon any coalition of nations that could mount a military challenge to United States dominance.

But there is a difference between having power and being able to wield it effectively -- to convert it into influence. The strategic doctrine of preemption or "anticipatory self-defense" eschews influence for intimidation (at a minimum) if not outright military action against states and other entities considered threats to the United States.

This list is liable to be long considering it may include all those seeking "dangerous technologies," those "compromised by or harboring terrorists," and even those who fail to live up to international agreements. Thus the Bush strategic doctrine is enunciated as the new norm rather than a rarely invoked exception adapted to the new technologies of war.

• Introduction
• Sections 1 & 2. Overview, Aspirations
• Section 3. Strengthen Alliances
• Section 4. Work With Others
• Sections 5 & 6. Weapons of Mass Destruction; Free Markets and Free Trade
• Sections 7, 8, & 9. Expand the Circle of Development Agendas for Cooperative Action; Transform America's National Security Institutions
• Summary Comments
• A Thumbnail Comparison of the Last Clinton and First Bush National Security Strategies

Morever, two different rationales are conflated into the new strategic doctrine. One is action to forestall or to mitigate incipient violence -- as could have been done in Rwanda in 1994 by reinforcing the UN contingent already in the country. In fact, the UN Charter implicitly recognizes this type of preemption in its Chapter VII provisions for interventions when conditions in a country threaten international peace and security. In its admission that "no nation can build a better, safer world alone," the NSS makes a rhetorical bow to this rationale.

The second type of preemptive action, as a shield to preclude an attack, seems to be the main sense in which the NSS employs preemption. And it is in this sense that "action" will inevitably be military. But unlike earlier interpretations that a hostile action must be palpably imminent before a preemptive attack can be launched -- one limited by the severity and extent of the threat -- the NSS states that "America will act against...emerging threats before they are fully formed." This stance short-circuits the traditional assessment of threats as a combination of capability and intention. It assumes that any nation not aligned with the United States that is developing or acquiring modern technology useful for weapons does so with the intention of attacking the United States directly or through sub-national surrogates.

As already mentioned, having power and using it effectively are different conditions. If one nation is unable to induce others to do what it wants, how does that one state accomplish its objectives -- anticipatory preemptive military action? This course presents a classic conundrum summarized by the question, "What's the exit strategy?" For whether used as the first or last resort, the military works well only in getting one in; it generally cannot get one out. This is particularly true when the real objective is not defeating an opposing military force but engineering a political end such as regime change.

In the end, the conflation of moral value with economic value (Section 6) reveals the real thrust of this document. It is a 21^st century version of the Puritan's idea that wealth, prosperity, and power are signs of God's favor, that those who enjoy material success are being rewarded because they are spiritually "successful." (One would think that the rash of recent corporate scandals would have discredited this notion once and for all.) This is not in keeping with the "spirit of humility" that should underpin effective coalition leadership.

This analysis was prepared by Col. Dan Smith, U.S. Army (Ret.). Dan, a West Point graduate and Vietnam veteran, is FCNL's Senior Fellow on Military Affairs..

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