Section
8. Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other
Main Centers of Global Power
According to the NSS, "Organizing coalitions -- as broad
as possible...and consistent consultations among partners
with a spirit of humility" are how the United States "will
implement its strategies." NATO, the European Union, and
ANZUS are mentioned, as are the bilateral agreements between
the United States and a number of Asian nations. China,
Russia, and India are labeled as "potential great powers"
whose growing world presence could re-energize "old patterns
of great power competition." Yet the potential is also
present for consensus on basic principles, among which
is the need to combat global terrorism.
Comment Significantly,
every relationship, even those in which there are contentious
issues (e.g., India's nuclear weapons and missile programs,
Taiwan's status, Russia's "dubious record" on combating
proliferation) ultimately is cast at least in part in
terms of the reaction to Sept. 11th or the subsequent
"war on terrorism." The administration seems to use these
two as the touchstones of its foreign policy.
Section
9. Transform America's National Security Institutions
to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First
Century
The NSS forthrightly asserts that "It is time to reaffirm
the essential role of American military strength. We
must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge
[by being able to] assure our allies and friends; dissuade
future military competition; deter threats against U.S.
interests, allies, and friends; and decisively defeat
any adversary if deterrence fails....The
United States will require bases and stations within and
beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary
access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of
U.S. forces....Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade
potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up
in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the
United States." Innovation in the military
and better intelligence coordinated with the Pentagon,
domestic law enforcement agencies, and allies will be
key. After detailing intelligence improvements, the NSS
shift gears, stating that the government will "rely on
diplomacy to interact with other nations...non-governmental
organizations, and international institutions." Yet three
paragraphs later the NSS categorically rejects what many
consider to be a landmark international institution: the
International Criminal Court.
The last few paragraphs return to familiar themes: the
struggle for the future is a "struggle of ideas"; the
"distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing";
while respecting "the values, judgment, and interests
of our friends and partners...we will be prepared to act
apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require."
Comment: Only
after nearly two pages about the military and intelligence
is diplomacy mentioned. Before that, and overshadowing
it, is the statement that the United States will not allow
any other nation even to challenge its military dominance.
The NSS offers two ways that this dominance will be maintained.
The first is by an extension of the current basing system
and access arrangements -- a somewhat "benign" form of
military occupation. The second is by making "hard choices
in the coming year and beyond to ensure the right level
and allocation of government spending on national security.
The United States Government must strengthen its defenses
to win this war" on terrorism.
What is left unsaid is what specific actions -- diplomatic,
military, and economic -- the United States would be willing
to take to ensure this dominance in the wake of a determined,
sustained challenge by another power. But undoubtedly
one course will be to continue increasing the amount of
money spent on Pentagon programs.
This
analysis was prepared by Col. Dan Smith, U.S. Army (Ret.).
Dan, a West Point graduate and Vietnam veteran, is FCNL's
Senior Fellow on Military Affairs.
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