Throughout the Cold War, the focus of U.S. nuclear weapons policy was on deterring or retaliating to a massive Soviet nuclear attack. For fifty years, the United States maintained a large strategic arsenal aimed at destroying the Soviet Union. Thankfully, the end of the Cold War led policy makers to rethink nuclear weapons strategy. The early 1990s witnessed a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, a halt to development of new nuclear weapons, and removal of most U.S. battlefield nuclear weapons. The number of personnel working on U.S. nuclear weapons also sharply decreased. Later in the same decade, the U.S. led the world in negotiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to ban all nuclear test explosions.
The administration of George W. Bush took a different view on nuclear weapons than the previous two administrations. Rather than continuing the policies of the first Bush Administration and the Clinton Administration by reducing U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons, the current Bush Administration is elevating nuclear weapons to their previous role as the central tenet of U.S. security policy. In December 2001, the Administration delivered to Congress a classified study on the Administration’s views on the role of nuclear weapons. This report called the “Nuclear Posture Review” (NPR), revealed a nuclear policy that will likely erode the accomplishments of the previous two administrations and possibly lead to a new age of nuclear danger.
Like previous administrations, the administration of George W. Bush argues that a nuclear posture based on the threat of nuclear war with the Soviet Union is no longer appropriate. But unlike previous administrations, the NPR argues for maintaining thousands of nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. According to the NPR, the role of nuclear weapons is no longer solely to deter a superpower rival such as the Soviet Union, but to deal with multiple contingencies and new threats. That is, the current Administration wants to maintain a large number of nuclear weapons with a wider range of possible uses.
The Bush Administration has dramatically shifted the nuclear weapons policy of the U.S. in the wrong direction. Although much of the rhetoric of the Administration over the past few years has focused on addressing the threat of weapons of mass destruction, the Bush Administration is recklessly increasing the very threat it wishes to advert. The Administration is proposing the development of new nuclear weapons, lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons, taking steps to maintain a large nuclear weapons stockpile for an indefinite future, and it is tearing up the treaties that have served as the backbone of international peace for decades. The world may very well be at the dawn of a new nuclear age of the United States’ own making.
New Nuclear Weapons, New Missions and New Tests
Since taking office, the Bush Administration has increasingly emphasized and relied upon military strategies to deal with threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A central goal of the Administration is to provide the President with broad military options and capabilities, including new kinds of nuclear options, to “dissuade, deter, and defeat” adversaries armed with or seeking WMD. The NPR proposes “greater flexibility” with respect to nuclear forces, and it suggests that nuclear weapons are useful to “hold at risk a wide range of target types.” To implement the strategy of giving greater nuclear flexibility, the Administration is advocating new nuclear weapons for new missions, which may lead to resumption of nuclear weapons testing at the Nevada Test Site.
First, in its request to Congress for fiscal year 2004, the Bush Administration requested that Congress repeal the decade-long ban on research and development leading to production of low-yield nuclear warheads (under five kilotons), termed “mini-nukes.” Due to its lower explosive power, this weapon might be used against a cave or on a battlefield. The prohibition was approved by Congress as part of the fiscal year 1994 defense authorization act. Known as the Spratt-Furse provision in recognition of its original sponsors, the prohibition has served as a barrier to the development and production of “mini-nukes.” Neither the U.S. nor any other country has developed mini-nukes since this law was enacted.
Second, in response to the growing number of deeply buried bunkers throughout the world, the Administration is also advocating development of a new class of earth-penetrating nuclear weapons. These weapons are sometimes referred to as “bunker busters” because they would be designed to burrow into the ground to destroy underground military facilities that are protected by 100 to 300 feet of concrete or rock. The Energy Department’s budget requests for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 includes $18 million for a study on the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP). The RNEP would use an existing nuclear weapon, redesigned for use against underground bunkers. Unlike mini-nukes, the RNEP would have the explosive power up to 70 times that of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.1
Third, the Administration’s drive to acquire new nuclear weapons could put at risk the U.S. nuclear-test moratorium. After 1,030 detonations, Congress halted nuclear testing in 1992. Although the Administration has stated repeatedly that it has no current plans to resume nuclear testing, significant modifications to existing nuclear warhead designs or the development of entirely new types of nuclear warheads could necessitate the renewal of nuclear explosive testing.
While there has been little talk of ending the moratorium on nuclear testing, the Administration is advocating lowering the technical hurdles to resume testing. In its budget request for fiscal year 2004, the Bush Administration asked Congress for $25 million to reduce the time needed to prepare the Nevada Test Site for a nuclear test. It would currently take three years to prepare the test site for a meaningful nuclear test. The Administration would like to reduce the time to prepare the test site for a test to 18 months.
Each of these initiatives – mini-nukes, nuclear bunker busters, and renewed nuclear testing – blur the line between conventional and nuclear war. For the past fifty years, U.S. presidents have correctly differentiated between nuclear and conventional weapons. Previous policy stated that since nuclear weapons are so devastating, they would only be used if the U.S. were attacked with nuclear weapons by another nuclear state. President Truman went so far as to place the U.S. nuclear arsenal under the jurisdiction of the Atomic Energy Commission, rather than the Pentagon, to separate nuclear weapons from the conventional war-fighting arsenal.
Through various security documents and speeches, the Bush Administration has articulated the rationale for its new nuclear policies. In September 2002, the Bush Administration issued its “National Security Strategy,” which clearly asserts the Administration’s willingness to take preemptive military action against potential threats. The National Security Strategy states that, “We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against” terrorist organizations or the countries that harbor them. Then, in December 2002, the Bush Administration clarifies its policy by releasing the “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” (A classified version of this document, called the “National Security Presidential Directive 17” (NSPD 17), was signed by President Bush in September 2002.) Based on what has been reported about NSPD 17, it appears that President Bush might consider authorizing the first use of U.S. nuclear weapons in the event that a hostile state attacks U.S. forces, allies, or territory with chemical or biological weapons or preemptively striking sites believed to store or manufacture chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.
Deploying nuclear weapons with a battlefield mission would vastly shift the nuclear weapons policy of the United States in the wrong direction. Unlike President Reagan who claimed that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,”2 President Bush is advocated a new class of nuclear weapons designed for war fighting. This could significantly lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. The U.S. should be working to deemphasize nuclear weapons, not making them more usable by legitimizing nuclear war fighting.
Maintaining Long-Term Capacity
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been the backbone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime since its inception in 1970. According to the NPT, "All countries agree to pursue negotiations in good faith to end the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament under international control," (Article VI). It is becoming clear that the Bush Administration has no intent to abide by this NPT obligation.
The Treaty of Moscow – also known as the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) – was signed by the U.S. and Russia in May of 2002. The agreement, which expires in December 2012, requires the U.S. and Russia to reduce their strategic nuclear warheads to a level of 1,700 to 2,200. Current U.S. nuclear forces include some 6,500 deployed strategic warheads, out of a total stockpile of an estimated 10,700 warheads.3 Although SORT represents a significant cut in deployed weapons, it does not require the destruction of a single warhead or delivery system. SORT permits each side to deploy up to 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads, while allowing an unlimited number of warheads to be stored for later redeployment. Not one nuclear weapon is required to be destroyed under the SORT Treaty.
At the same time that the Administration is claiming that the SORT Treaty represents a significant step toward nuclear disarmament4, it has proposed constructing a new facility to manufacture plutonium pits for nuclear weapons. Plutonium pits are essential components of a nuclear weapon. About the size of a grapefruit, a plutonium pit is a plutonium-filled round metal shell which, when squeezed by high explosives, will trigger a weapon's nuclear blast. The purpose of this proposed bomb plant, called the Modern Pit Facility (MPF), is to maintain the nuclear stockpile by producing replacement plutonium pits. The Energy Department claims that the production of new pits would "ensure the future viability of the nation's nuclear stockpile," thereby "ensuring the future viability of the nation's nuclear deterrent."5 In other words, the MPF will help the U.S. maintain its reliance on a large nuclear weapons stockpile for years to come. The MPF would be able to produce up to 450 pits per year – far more than is needed to replace aging pits of the 1,700 to 2,200 weapons required by the Moscow Treaty. 6
The Moscow Treaty and the Modern Pit Facility show the world that the agreement codified in the NPT is in real danger. The 188 states that are party to the NPT are classified in two categories: nuclear-weapon states (NWS)—consisting of the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom—and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). Under the treaty, the five NWS commit to pursue general and complete disarmament, while the NNWS agree to forgo developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. If the U.S., as the premier nuclear weapons state, continues to heavily rely on nuclear weapons and ignores Article VI of the NPT, the agreement codified in the NPT may well wither away and spur further proliferation.
A New Nuclear Age?
CIA Director George Tenet recently said, “The 'domino theory' of the 21st century may well be nuclear.”7 Fortunately, the world is not at Armageddon yet. There is still time to turn back. If the U.S. chooses to change its nuclear weapons policies, the world may escape unharmed from the Bush Administration’s nuclear revolution. Yet, if the U.S. continues along its current path, the world may be at the precipice of a new age of nuclear danger.
Weapons of mass destruction have dominated White House rhetoric for the past year. The main justification for war in Iraq was its alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons. The U.S. has strongly criticized Iran and North Korea for moving to obtain equipment to produce weapons-grade nuclear materials. The U.S. government has also expressed concerns that nuclear materials could fall into the hands of terrorist groups such as al Qaeda.
The Administration is right to bring the dangers posed by nuclear weapons to the public once again. However, at the same time the Administration is criticizing others for having weapons, it is upgrading its own weapons complex. This “do what I say, not what I do” policy is evident to all. If nuclear weapons are unacceptable for Iran and North Korea, they are unacceptable for the U.S. The rhetoric coming out of the White House is not that nuclear weapons are evil; it is that bad people with nuclear weapons are evil. This policy will not address the heart of the issue; namely that nuclear weapons continue to be seen by some as sources of power and security. The fact that the U.S., an unrivaled conventional military power, continues to see nuclear weapons as central to its security reinforces the idea that these weapons can bring power and security.
With all the nuclear dangers in the world, it seems counterintuitive for the Bush Administration to start reemphasizing nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy. The White House’s pursuit of new nuclear capabilities and weapons signals this Administration’s belief that these weapons are not only acceptable to have, but are usable, even against non-nuclear states. This is a dangerous message for the U.S. to send to the rest of the world. In order to make a safer world for generations to come, the U.S. government must put an end to its dependence on nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the Bush Administration is moving in the opposite direction.
End Notes
1. Statement by Senator Carl Levin (MI), Congressional Record, May 20, 2003
2. President Ronald Reagan, “Statement on the 40th Anniversary of the Bombing of Hiroshima,” August 6, 1985.
3. Natural Resources Defense Council. “Faking Nuclear Restraint: The Bush Administration’s Secret Plan for Strengthening U.S. Nuclear Forces,” February 12, 2002.
4. "Statement of the U.S. Mission to the UN Concerning Article VI of the NPT," Provided to the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Geneva, Switzerland, May 1, 2003.
5. U.S. Department of Energy, "Draft Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on Stockpile Stewardship and Management for a Modern Pit Facility," May 2003, 2-4, 2-6.
6. Ibid. 2-6.
7. CIA Director George Tenet before the Senate Intelligence Committee, February 11, 2003.
