During the Cold War, the United States adverted direct war with the Soviet Union by threatening total nuclear annihilation. Due to the unthinkable consequences of nuclear war, the probability of a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and USSR was low. With the end of the Cold War, the threat of a nuclear exchange between superpowers drastically declined. Yet, the probability that one or several weapons of mass destruction (WMD) might be used to attack the U.S. may have increased. The Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy argues that “The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology.” As these two cases above and the anthrax attacks in 2001 demonstrate, the end of the Cold War did not end the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The continued existence and proliferation of these weapons still allows for the possibility that they might fall into the hands of a terrorist groups. A terrorist attack with WMD on the U.S., or any other nation, could have cataclysmic consequences.
The 50 or so years of the Cold War left thousands of tons of sensitive weapon material poorly protected and accounted for throughout the world. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the world’s arsenals contain some 30,000 assembled nuclear weapons and enough separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium to make nearly a quarter million nuclear weapons.3 The collapse of the Soviet Union left tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, and the material for tens of thousands more weapons in poorly guarded facilities with a crumbling command structure.
In addition to its nuclear arsenal, Russia still possesses the world’s largest stockpile of chemical weapons. Russia has 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons at seven storage sites.4 The Soviet Union had the largest and most advanced biological weapons program in history. Although it is believed that Russia destroyed all its offensive biological stockpiles, this cannot be verified. A significant amount of biological weapons may still exist in Russia.5 Additionally, at the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had trained more than 60,000 scientists and engineers in the biological weapons sciences.6 To date, many of those individuals have not found gainful employment and therefore, there is a serious risk that they may sell their expertise to the highest bidder.
During the Cold War, the Soviets did not have to seriously consider the security of their WMD. The Soviet Union was a closed society with closed borders. Soviet weapons facilities were located in isolated areas where the KGB watched over everyone. This is no longer the case. The fear that sensitive materials or expertise of former weapons scientists may aid terrorists groups is a serious global concern.
In addition to the Russian arsenal there are unsecured nuclear materials located at hundreds of sites throughout the world. Many of the worlds 130 highly enriched uranium (HEU)-fueled research reactors have little security. At some locations there is no more security than a chain link fence.7 The attacks of September 11 demonstrated that the threat of a terrorist attack causing massive destruction is real. If even a small amount of nuclear, chemical or biological material were stolen and used in an urban area, the consequences could be catastrophic.
Nunn-Lugar and Related Programs
As the Soviet Union began to break apart in 1991, some members of Congress became aware of the dangers posed by the dissolution of a nuclear superpower. Thousands of tons of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons material were spread across 11 time zones in Russia and the former Soviet Union. Russian leaders, knowing that their ability to account for and control their arsenal was in doubt, requested U.S. cooperation in securing and protecting Russia’s arsenal and weapons-usable materials.
Led by Senators Sam Nunn (GA) and Richard Lugar (IN), Congress laid the framework for handling the threats posed by insecure stockpiles of WMD. Since 1991, this cooperative initiative has evolved to a broad set of programs across different agencies, primarily the Defense, Energy and State Departments. Together, these programs have helped to protect, secure, and begin destroying nuclear warheads, delivery vehicles (such as bombers, missiles, and submarines), and hundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable material. Additional programs have helped redirect weapons scientists and engineers from defense work to civilian employment. These scientists, many of whom live under severe economic distress due to Russia’s economic climate, may want to sell their skills to terrorist groups or states. Helping to redirect the skills of the weapons scientists to productive civilian industries reduces the likelihood that a terrorist group or non-nuclear state could construct a nuclear weapon.
These programs have significantly reduced the threat posed by WMD built from stolen Russian material or the expertise of former Soviet weapons scientists. According to a task force assembled by the Energy Department, "to the best of our knowledge, no nuclear weapons or quantity of nuclear weapons-usable material have been successfully stolen and exported, while many efforts to steal weapons-usable material have been intercepted by Russian and international police operations."8 Threat reduction programs have led to significant accomplishments. Some of the significant accomplishments include the following:
These are impressive results, yet much work remains unfinished. A majority of Russia’s weapons-grade material remains inadequately secure. Current programs are making headway, but have finished less that half the job. The urgency of the threat demands that more work be done and the pace at which it is completed be greatly increased.
Funding Issues
Over the past twelve years, Congress has appropriated around $7.9 billion on programs aimed at helping Russia and former Soviet states reduce the threats posed by their WMD. The U.S. is currently spending roughly $1 billion per year on all cooperative threat reduction programs, which totals less than one percent of all U.S. defense spending.11
The U.S. has also established an initiative to raise additional nonproliferation funds from the global community. In June 2002, the G-8 (composed of France, United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, and Russia) met in Canada and agreed upon an initiative entitled the “Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,” or more commonly known as “10 plus 10 over 10.” This program committed the G8 to raise up to $20 billion over ten years to fund nonproliferation projects in Russia and other nations. The U.S. agreed to contribute $10 billion for this project while the other members are responsible for the remaining $10 billion.12 The $10 billion to be contributed by the U.S. does not effectively change current spending levels. Nevertheless, the new initiative is important because it puts the U.S. on record as supporting threat reduction programs over the long term. Additionally, it puts other G-8 nations on record as financially supporting threat reduction. The G-8 partnership will hopefully serve as a starting point for further cooperative initiatives.
More Must Be Done
President Bush promised in his 2003 State of the Union Address that “we will do everything in our power” to keep terrorist from attacking the U.S. with WMD. The Administration has failed to live up to this pledge. There is a significant gap between the urgency of the threat and the current response. There is much more that must be done to protect America from this threat.
Increase the Political Will
The most important element in any campaign is sustained and vigorous dedication to the cause. The highest level of government must see the campaign as vital to U.S. security for there to be substantial success. The level of sustained leadership by the Bush Administration (as it was in previous administrations) has been modest. Aside from the occasional initiative, there is not much talk among high level officials on improving security of Russian weapons and weapons materials. This marginal level of commitment stands in sharp contrast to the efforts put in by the Bush Administration to make sure terrorists do not obtain WMD from Iraq and to building a missile defense system. If a similar effort was put forth by the Administration to secure Russian WMD as was put forth in the war in Iraq, the likelihood of terrorists obtaining WMD would be vastly reduced.
According to a report by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, “If efforts to keep nuclear weapons out of terrorist hands are to succeed, a sea change in the level of sustained leadership from the highest levels of the U.S. government will be needed.”13 If making sure terrorists do not obtain WMD is the Administration’s highest priority, they should begin to treat it as such.
Increase Funding
In the response to the events of September 11, 2001, Congress approved $40 billion to fight terrorism abroad, increase homeland defense and build a ballistic missile defense system. Congress did not seek an increase of funds to keep WMD out of the hands of terrorists. In January 2001, a bipartisan Department of Energy Task Force concluded that current funding levels are not sufficient to meet the future challenges.”14 The report states that $30 billion will be needed over 10 years to secure Russian nuclear materials. The current level of $1 billion a year will not come close to achieving this goal, let alone destruction of delivery vehicles and redirecting former weapons scientists to productive non-weapons related industries. Increased funding is greatly needed. These programs must not be slowed due to lack of funds. It is crucial for the U.S. to provide as much money as is needed to secure the world’s arsenals.
Increase Inter-Agency Coordination
The current approach to threat reduction combines programs scattered through various governmental departments and private sector companies with little coordination between them. U.S. efforts in Russia are plagued with gaps and overlaps between departments. If these programs were better coordinated to complement each other, they would be far more effective.
Reduce the red tape
A dramatic acceleration of threat reduction efforts is urgently needed. According to Sen. Dick Lugar and former Sen. Sam Nunn “A great deal of critically important threat reduction work has been done, but current efforts remain far too slow to win the race to keep these deadly materials out of terrorist hands…Terrorist groups are racing to get weapons of mass destruction – we should be racing to stop them.”15
These programs are stalled due to large amounts of red tape that must be cut through by U.S. officials working in Russia. There are liability issues related to protection of U.S. companies in Russia, economic issues related to the value of civilian plutonium and uranium, and environmental issues related to how to properly dispose of materials. Additionally, Russia has slowed down the programs by not providing the U.S. access to some sites in need of security upgrades. Russia justifies these restrictions on the grounds that it is protecting its national security interests.16 Many sectors of the Russian national security establishment are still very suspicious of the U.S. and its interest in Russia’s WMD and materials. These hurdles must be overcome through increased transparency and cooperation. A firm commitment to the partnership is needed by both the U.S. and Russia.
The Role of Congress
A firm commitment to threat reduction efforts must come from both the Administration and Congress. Since Congress created these programs, it has a special mandate to see that these programs succeed. Through its control of the purse strings and oversight role, Congress can shape the future of threat reduction programs.
There is not one bill or committee charged with control of these programs, rather threat reduction policy and funds are found in a variety of bills and jurisdiction is shared by a variety of committees. Threat reduction policy and funds are located in the defense and state department authorization bills, the defense, energy and water, foreign operations, appropriation bills, as well as numerous stand alone bills. The committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, Budget, Commerce, Science, Energy, Foreign Relations and International Relations, Governmental Affairs, Select Intelligence, and others all have some jurisdiction over these programs.
The once revolutionary concept of working with governments in the former Soviet Union to reduce the spread of WMD was implemented with success due to the forward-thinking of concerned members of Congress. Many members of Congress have become frustrated with the obstacles that arise while cooperating with Russia. Congress must overcome these obstacles and maintain bipartisan support for these programs for them to succeed. Many of these obstacles will be overcome easily, others will seem impossible. Nevertheless, Congress must do all in its power to cross these obstacles and make sure these programs succeed.
Conclusion
Nunn-Lugar and other cooperative threat reduction programs are vital for reducing WMD threats in the 21st century. Though the task may seem daunting, Russia and the U.S. must work together to reduce the nuclear threat. Due the their suspicion of each other, the U.S. and the Soviet Union created weapons of WMD – now they must cooperate to eliminate them!
End Notes
1. Lebed: Small nuclear weapons may be in wrong hands." CNN.com, October 1, 1997.
2. Mathew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John Holdren. Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials. (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, March 2003), 18.
3. Ibid. 16.
4. Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar. Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2002), 122.
5. Ibid, 125.
6. Protecting America: Nuclear Biological and Chemical Weapon Threat Reduction. (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign, 2003)
7. Ibid
8. The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, January 2001), vi.
9. Defense Threat Reduction Agency Scorecard. Available online at http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/ctr_score.html Updated September 10, 2003.
10. Kenneth Luongo and William Hoehn III. “Reform and Expansion of Cooperative Threat Reduction.” Arms Control Today, 33, no. 5 (June 2003)
11. Bunn, 57
12. Whitehouse Fact Sheet: G-8 Summit -- Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, June 27, 2002 < http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020627-7.html>
13. Bunn, 121
14. The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, iv
15. Bunn, Forward by Sam Nunn and Dick Lugar
16. Testimony of Joseph Christoff. “Observations on U.S. Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs in Russia”. General Accounting Office Report. March 4, 2003.