Imagine that U.S. diplomats are meeting regularly with Iranians and Syrians, as well as people from other neighboring states, to develop a common strategy to help stabilize Iraq and quell the violence. Imagine that the U.S. has given firm assurances that it will not maintain military bases in Iraq; the bulk of U.S. combat troops are gone, except for those needed to train Iraqis and participate in special operations. Imagine that Washington is supporting efforts to negotiate a ceasefire between the Iraqi government and groups fighting the government and is encouraging the Iraqi government to come into its own by tying its progress to U.S. military, political, and economic aid. Problems still remain, but, with the U.S. signaling it is beginning to transition out of Iraq, violence has decreased and Iraq is more stable than it is today.
Congress can take the first step to making this vision come to pass. The Iraq Study Group Implementation Act of 2007, which is cosponsored in the Senate by four Democrats and five Republicans, would establish this strategy as the policy of the U.S. government. The legislation gives new life to some of the recommendations made last December by the Iraq Study Group, steps that FCNL has been lobbying the U.S. to take for nearly a year. .
What Would the Iraq Study Group Implementation Act Do?
This bill (S. 1545/H.R. 2574) includes the following points:
- affirms that the ISG recommendations must be implemented as a comprehensive package in order for them to succeed;
- calls for the U.S. to make clear that it does not seek to establish permanent military bases in Iraq and does not seek to control Iraq’s oil resources;
- stresses the central need to carry out the ISG’s “New Diplomatic Offensive” to deal with the problems of Iraq and of the region, including the need to engage directly with Iran and Syria, and build an “Iraq Support Group” composed of neighboring states and others;
- envisions an early transition of the U.S. military role from combat to training and states, as the ISG report did, that barring “unexpected developments in the security situation” most U.S. combat troops “could be redeployed from Iraq by the first quarter of 2008” except those needed for force protection, training, counterterrorism, and special operations;
- conditions continued U.S. political, military and economic support for the Iraqi government on progress in meeting national reconciliation benchmarks on constitutional reform, revising de-Baathification, equitably distributing oil revenues, holding provincial elections, and protecting the rights of women and minorities;
- encourages transparency in the oil sector by posting all oil contracts, volumes and prices on the Internet; and
- establishes significant congressional oversight by requiring the president to report every three months on actions taken to implement most of the provisions of the bill.
Members of Congress from both major political parties have embraced this bill. See a list of current cosponsors of the Senate and House bills.
The result of this legislation could be a dramatic change in U.S. policy in Iraq. It could reinforce and transform the tentative diplomatic steps that the administration has taken up to now to negotiate with Iraqi factions and Iraq’s neighbors, and it could lend momentum to efforts to set a firm timetable for withdrawal from Iraq.
What Weaknesses Does the Bill Have?
We at FCNL believe that passage and implementation of the Iraq Study Group bill would be an important step forward in ending the war and stabilizing Iraq. But the legislation would have to be followed by additional congressional action to set a firm, date certain for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and to begin to address the broader regional issues that are central to any lasting peace in the Middle East.“Soft Withdrawal:” The bill suggests, but does not require that combat troops could be redeployed by March 2008, leaving room for the administration to ignore that provision and maintain the current high level of U.S. forces and the current aggressive counterinsurgency mission. We at FCNL believe that regional and internal Iraqi talks will fail if the U.S. does not bring a firm date for the withdrawal of U.S. forces to the negotiating table.
Our conversations with congressional offices suggest that the political impact of the bill’s withdrawal provision would be greater than its language implies. Though its wording is conditional, its specification of a March 2008 redeployment date and its linkage of withdrawal to required diplomacy will be hard to evade if a bipartisan majority in Congress support it.
Omission of Addressing Broader Middle East Peace: The ISG Implementation Act includes language stressing the importance of implementing the comprehensive recommendations of the Iraq study, but omits mention of key points on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Iraq Study Group concluded that “The United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the Middle East unless the United States deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict.” U.S. standing in the Middle East, and its ability to exert leverage in negotiations, is integrally tied to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
New U.S. efforts to broker an agreement to end the Arab-Israeli could defuse the resentment toward the United States generated by diplomatic stalemate and deterioration in the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian relations. A new diplomatic initiative would also improve U.S. leverage and take away one of the primary recruiting arguments for violent, anti-U.S. groups operating throughout the region. As former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft said recently, “I don’t think anything would release the energies of moderates in the region more than to make progress on the Palestinian issue.”
Nonetheless, the political momentum created by the passage of this bill, with its endorsement of the ISG’s comprehensive approach, would be positive.