What is the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons?
PoA Review Conference (6/06) Site
Examining the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action (IANSA Red Book 2005)
Summary of the PoA (PDF, IANSA Red Book 2005)
International Committee of the Red Cross Statement on PoA (1/2006)
Letter from 14 Senators to Secretary Rice on Arms Export Criteria and the Illicit Arms Trade (PDF)
UN Secretary General's Report to General Assembly on SALW (A/52/298, 1997)
UN Secretary General's Report to General Assembly on SALW (PDF, A/54/150, 1999)
UN Secretary General's "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace"
US Delegation to PoA Fact Sheet on US SALW Policy and Programs (US State Department 2006)
Can Small Arms and Light Weapons Be Controlled? (US State Department 2001)
Control Arms Campaign
Center for Defense Information SALW Site
Federation of American Scientists Arms Sales Monitoring Project
While the problem of arms proliferation has a long history, the problem of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW)1 became quickly apparent in the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of superpower support from governments and insurgents fighting proxy wars allowed millions of weapons to flow into communities throughout the world. Corrupt officials in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and especially the Former Soviet Union were teaming up with a new breed of international arms traffickers to subvert international and domestic regulations against illegal SALW transfers. These weapons were feeding and hastening a changing geopolitical dynamic. Conflict was no longer that of superpower confrontation, but of complex interstate and regional troubles like warlordism, transnational crime, and racially and religiously charged militancy. These conflicts and the weapons that feed them have doggedly challenged development and reconstruction efforts on nearly every continent, and condemned millions of innocent civilians to death.
Swimming in small arms and violence, countries seek path to peace
The connection between the growing proliferation of SALW and the usage of these weapons to commit heinous crimes, violate human rights and threaten human security led the international community to act. Mali, a West African country plagued by small arms throughout the 1990s, requested assistance from the UN in 1993 in order to deal with the problem. Then Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali published his “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace” which first acknowledged the role of highly proliferated SALW in numerous deadly conflicts, but also the vital role of “micro-disarmament,” or dealing with the weapons that are “actually killing people”, in preventing conflict and enabling post-conflict peace-building. Pursuant to two General Assembly resolutions, the Secretary General convened two groups of experts that studied the emerging SALW problem and made recommendations (1, 2) on how to address the threat SALW posed. The first report, released August 1997, recommended comprehensive action to address the effects of illicit SALW transfers and the booming illegal trade. The second report, released August 1999, reviews progress made since the first report was released and recommends the convening of a conference on the illicit trade in SALW.In July 2001, the United Nations convened its Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, the goal of which was to decide how nations should combat the illicit trade of small arms. The conference concluded with an agreement: the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA). While not legally binding, the PoA is the primary international accord on preventing and combating the illicit trafficking, misuse and proliferation of SALW.
Every country must control arms
Every country in the world is a potential exporter or importer of, or transit route for small arms and light weapons. Estimates on the number of countries that produce SALW, though varying widely, indicate that more than half of the world’s countries produce SALW, and that nearly every country participates in legal production and trade of these weapons in some way. Since small arms proliferation is a global problem, it is vital that every country has effective controls in place to guard against the illicit arms trade. While the PoA embraces every country’s right to defend itself and thus the right to legally produce and trade weapons, the PoA also brings to light the connection between the licit and illicit SALW production and trade. Despite the efforts of even the most responsible states, weapons are routinely diverted into the illicit market. The globalization of the small arms trade demands a vigilant and comprehensive approach to stop illegal SALW production and trade.The PoA sets minimum global standards, norms, and practices on a full range of issues related to small arms proliferation that countries may use to craft strategies for combating the illicit SALW trade. These practices include:
- preventing and combating illicit SALW production and trafficking
- ensuring effective controls on the legal production and transfer of SALW
- weapons collection and destruction
- management and security of office stockpiles
- arms control in post-conflict situations
- information exchange and transparency
What next?
While the PoA is seemingly comprehensive, there is much room for improvement. The PoA is based on the UN consensus model and thus is rife with compromises. When states are forced to act consensually, final agreements tend to include only provisions that raise little controversy. Even some highly popular measures, such as a ban on small arms transfers to non-state actors, were left out of the final document. The PoA is also vague in a number of areas, rendering those sections useless. One such area is the export criteria that countries should take into consideration when authorizing SALW transfers. The document states that countries should follow their national laws and international commitments when deciding to whom they can transfer weapons. Governments however, interpret these statements differently. The lack of specific and strong export criteria increases the possibility that a country could sell SALW which would be used to violate human rights, threaten civilians or violate international law. In addition to these weaknesses, another significant caveat is that the PoA is politically and not legally binding. Countries signing on the PoA agree to take its provisions into consideration, but they are not bound by them, nor is there any redress for violations.In its five years of existence, the PoA has led to much progress. However, it is clear that more must be done to limit the effects of the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. An opportunity exists in the summer of 2006, when the PoA is scheduled for its 5-year review conference, to enhance effective implementation of the PoA and clarify existing commitments. Governments must continue what they started in 2001 by making the PoA the best it can possibly be. The millions suffering from small arms violence throughout the world demand action.



