|
Treaty |
Status
of U.S. Membership |
Key Terms |
Status
of U.S. Compliance |
Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) |
Ratified
March 5, 1970 |
The
NPT permits two categories of member states: non-nuclear
weapon states that are prohibited from acquiring, manufacturing
or transferring nuclear weapons (Articles I and II), and
nuclear weapon states, which agree to "pursue negotiations
in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control" (Article
VI). |
Current
U.S. policy does not comply with its disarmament obligation,
as it has been interpreted. According to the 2002 Nuclear
Posture Review, the United States plans for maintenance
of large and modernized nuclear forces for the indefinite
future and for expansion of options for use of nuclear weapons.
The recent U.S.-Russian treaty is also insufficient because
its reductions of warheads are not irreversible. |
Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty |
Ratified
in 1972; membership terminated June 13, 2002 |
An
ABM system is "a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles
or their elements in flight trajectory." The parties agreed
to limit ABM systems to one missile defense site each (originally
two but modified by amendment). The treaty put limits on
technological development to preserve the strategic balance
between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. |
The
United States withdrew from the Treaty to pursue construction
of missile defense systems. Withdrawal was considered premature
because work on missile defenses would not have violated
the treaty until far in the future, unnecessary because
Russia was willing to consider amending the treaty, and
potentially dangerous, in part because it sets a precedent
for unilateral withdrawal from security treaties. |
Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC) |
Ratified
March 26, 1975 |
State
parties are prohibited from developing producing, stockpiling,
acquiring or retaining: (1) Microbial or other biological
agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production,
of types and in quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2)
Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use
such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. |
After
a 7-year effort by BWC parties to create a verification
protocol for the BWC, the United States now opposes the
process of creating any internationally binding obligations
to strengthen the treaty, preferring instead voluntary measures.
Also, its own secret biodefense work may have violated the
BWC prohibition against making weapons |
Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) |
Ratified
April 25, 1997 |
(1)
State parties agree to never develop, acquire or use chemical
weapons or transfer them to anyone; (2) State parties agree
to destroy existing chemical weapons production facilities
and stockpiles; (3) Each state party must declare any chemical
weapons facilities or stockpiles. State parties must allow
routine inspections of "dual-use" chemicals and production
facilities that could be used in a manner prohibited by
the CWC. |
The
United States purports to advocate a strong CWC but has
imposed some limits on inspections of its facilities that
are contrary to the requirements of the treaty, including
reserving the right for the President to block inspections
and limiting what facilities may be inspected. Other countries
have followed the U.S. example. The result is a less thorough
inspection regime than was designed by the framers of the
treaty (including the United States). |
Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) |
Signed
September 24, 1996 but not ratified. In 1999 the Senate
voted to reject ratification. |
The
CTBT bans all nuclear explosions, for any purpose, warlike
or peaceful. In order to enter into force, the CTBT must
be signed and ratified by 44 listed countries that have
some form of nuclear technological capability, including
the United States. |
The
United States, along with France, is preparing to violate
the prohibition against nuclear explosions by building large
laser fusion facilities with the intent of carrying out
laboratory thermonuclear explosions of up to ten pounds
of TNT equivalent. |
