| In its first year in office, the Bush
Administration conducted a congressionally-mandated review
of U.S. nuclear weapons policy. This review, called the
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), was submitted to Congress
in a classified version in December 2001. The review was
intended to provide guidance for U.S. nuclear strategy,
doctrine, force structure, and infrastructure for the
next five to10 years. This review has led to dramatic
changes in U.S. nuclear weapons policy.
The NPR rightly argues that the international security
environment has dramatically changed in the last two decades.
It contends that a nuclear posture based on the threat
of nuclear war with the Soviet Union is no longer appropriate.
However, these truths did not lead the Bush Administration
to advocate for disarmament. Rather, the Administration
argues for maintaining thousands of nuclear weapons for
the foreseeable future. According to the NPR, nuclear
weapons will continue to "play a critical role in the
defense capabilities of the Unites States, its allies
and friends." Additionally, the NPR promotes a more "flexible"role
for nuclear weapons. 12
Nuclear weapons will no longer solely be used to deter
a nuclear war, but also to deal with multiple contingencies
and new threats. That is, the Administration wants to
maintain a large number and types of nuclear weapons with
a wider range of possible uses.
Nuclear
Posture Review Initiatives
The NPR focuses on nuclear capabilities deemed necessary
for various military missions rather than primarily to
deter or counter a Russian nuclear attack. The nuclear
arsenal the U.S. built for the Cold War is not suitable
for the post-Cold War missions for nuclear weapons envisioned
by the Bush Administration. To expand the possible uses
of nuclear weapons, the U.S. would need to modify existing
nuclear weapons or develop new ones.
Consistent with the NPR's recommendations, the Administration
is working on developing new battlefield nuclear weapons.
In its annual request to Congress for fiscal year 2005,
the Administration asked for $27.6 million to conclude
a three-year study by the Energy Department on a Robust
Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP). These weapons are sometimes
referred to as "bunker busters" because they would be
designed to burrow into the ground to destroy underground
military facilities. The RNEP would modify an existing
large-yield nuclear device to penetrate a hard surface
and then detonate.
In addition to the RNEP, at the request of the Administration,
Congress in 2003 repealed the 10-year old statutory ban
on research leading to the production of low-yield nuclear
weapons, sometimes called "mini-nukes." Known as the "Spratt-Furse"
provision in recognition of its original sponsors, the
prohibition has served as a significant barrier to the
development and production of "mini-nukes." "Mini-nukes"
are believed by some to be more"usable" than the large-yield
strategic nuclear weapons because their explosive power
is less than one-third the size of the Hiroshima bomb.
Bush's "Preemptive" War Doctrine
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter reserves to states the right of self-defense against military attack. "Preemptive" war may be justified under the Charter if the military threat is so imminent, substantive (combining capability and intention), and substantial that an attack is virtually certain. However, the Bush Doctrine, as presented in the September 2002 National Security Strategy and implemented in the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, upends the concept of self-defense and proposes preventive wars. The doctrine asserts that all the U.S. needs to justify a preventive war is a unilateral determination that at some undefined future time, using means that might be acquired or developed, another country possibly could constitute a challenge to U.S. national interests. Because these conditions do not meet the prerequisites for preemptive self-defense under international law, the word "preemptive" will be placed in quotation marks throughout this document. |
The Policy
of "Preemption"
The most troubling aspect of these nuclear weapons
policies is in the context of the Bush Administration's
policy of "preemption." One of the most important
policies that came out of the Cold War was the idea
that nuclear weapons are not to be used. Presidents
Reagan and Gorbachev, at their 1985 Geneva summit,
agreed that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must
never be fought." 13
The norm of non-use is being challenged by some
in the Bush Administration.
|
The NPR proposes "greater flexibility"
with respect to nuclear forces, and it suggests that
nuclear weapons are useful to "hold at risk a wide
range of target types." Stated simply, nuclear weapons
are no longer only weapons of last resort, but could
be used in a variety of roles, including on the battlefield. |
"Preemption" and new nuclear weapons have never been
explicitly linked publicly by the Administration. However,
a classified version of National Security Presidential
Directive 17, signed by President Bush in September 2002,
reportedly authorized "preemptive"strikes with U.S. nuclear
weapons on sites believed to store or manufacture chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons. 14
The
Dangers of the Nuclear Posture Review
Since the inception of the atomic era, U.S. presidents
have differentiated between nuclear and conventional weapons.
U.S. policy has assumed that nuclear weapons would only
be used if the United States were attacked with nuclear
weapons. President Truman went so far as to place the
U.S. nuclear arsenal under the jurisdiction of the Atomic
Energy Commission, rather than the Pentagon, to separate
nuclear weapons from the conventional war-fighting arsenal.
This precedent remains to this day, with nuclear weapons
falling under the jurisdiction of the Energy Department.
The NPR, as well as other Bush Administration national
security documents, reversed this policy and outlined
a strategy that makes nuclear war-fighting acceptable.
Developing new types of nuclear weapons for battlefield
use blurs the distinction between conventional and nuclear
arms. The danger is greatly enhanced by a policy allowing
for the "preemptive" use of nuclear weapons. These policies
taken together could significantly lower the threshold
for the use of nuclear weapons.
Along with terrorism, weapons of mass destruction have
dominated White House rhetoric for the past few years.
The main justification for war in Iraq was its alleged
pursuit of such weapons. The U.S. has strongly criticized
Iran, Libya, and North Korea for moving to obtain equipment
to produce weapons-grade nuclear materials. The U.S. government
has also expressed concerns that nuclear materials could
fall into the hands of extremist groups, such as al Qaeda.
The Bush Administration is right to bring the dangers
posed by nuclear weapons to the public eye once again.
But, at the same time that the Administration is criticizing
others for having weapons, it is upgrading its own weapons
complex. This "do what I say, not what I do" policy is
evident to the world. If nuclear weapons are unacceptable
for Iran and North Korea, they are unacceptable for the
U.S. The Administration seems to believe that nuclear
weapons only present a problem when they are possessed
by people who do not support the U.S. Instead of reducing
the threat of nuclear weapons, this policy only enhances
the idea that nuclear weapons are sources of power and
prestige.
With all the nuclear dangers in the world, it is counterproductive
for the Bush Administration to start re-emphasizing nuclear
weapons in U.S. security policy. The U.S. should be working
to de-emphasize nuclear weapons, not making them more
usable by legitimizing nuclear war-fighting.
In order to make a safer world for generations to come,
the U.S. government must put an end to its dependence
on nuclear weapons. Real progress will be made only when
the President and Congress put the full resources and
political will of the United States behind removing the
threat of nuclear weapons.
11 Final Statement of
the 4th World Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates. Rome, November
30, 2003.
12 Nuclear Posture Review.
Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm.
48.
13 Joint Soviet-United
States Statement on the Summit Meeting in Geneva, November
21, 1985.
14 Mike Allen and Barton
Gellman, "Preemptive Strikes Part of U.S. Strategic Doctrine."
Washington Post. December
11, 2002, A1.
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